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Gideon Rose on Bacevich's *American Empire*

Josef Joffe on Continental Divides

Adam Posen on Germany's Path to Economic Perdition

Sociologies of Islam

EuroIslam: The Jihad Within? *Olivier Roy*

Out of Bali: Cybercaliphate Rising *David Martin Jones*

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Paul Lendvai



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

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

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Rates: $26/yr.; $44/2 yrs.; $59/3 yrs. Please add $10 outside the United States and Canada.

The National Interest (ISSN 0884-9382) is published quarterly in Spring, Summer, Fall and Winter by The National Interest, Inc., a non-profit partnership of Hollinger International, Inc. and The Nixon Center that has received long-term support from the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation. Articles appearing in this journal are abstracted and indexed in *P.A.I.S.*, *Historical Abstracts*, *International Political Science Abstracts*, *U.S. Political Science Documents*, *Political Science Abstracts*, and *America: History and Life*; articles are available on microfilm from University Microfilms International, and archived on *Lexis-Nexis*. Periodicals postage is paid at Washington, D.C., and at additional mailing offices. © 2003 by The National Interest, Inc. *The National Interest* is printed by Kirby Lithographic Co., Inc. It is distributed in the U.S. and Canada by Ingram Periodicals (1240 Heil Quaker Blvd., La Vergne, TN 37086-7000; 615-793-5522) and Bernhard DeBoer (113 East Centre Street, Nutley, NJ 07110; 973-667-9300) and in the U.K. by Comag Special Services (Tavistock Road, West Drayton, Middlesex UB7 7QX; 44-1895-444055). BPA International Member since 2000.

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THE NATIONAL INTEREST NUMBER 71, SPRING 2003

Articles

5 **Migration and the Dynamics of Empire** *by James Kurth*
Do all roads lead to the new (American) Rome? The imperial task has always affected and been affected by the movement of peoples. It still is.

17 **The Transformation of National Security** *by Philip Zelikow*
The Bush Administration's *National Security Strategy* is based on five critical redefinitions of international politics—and not a moment too soon.

29 **Imperial Temptations** *by Jack Snyder*
The administration's emphasis on preventive war as a means to preserve American hegemony echoes failed imperial strategies of ages past. Myths of empire promise trouble ahead.

41 **The Death of Conquest** *by Anna Simons*
We don't "do" conquest anymore—but the new anti-conquest norm has had several unforeseen consequences. Some are proving very worrisome.

51 **An Empire, If You Can Keep It** *by Stephen Peter Rosen*
An empire is functionally distinct from a mere great power. If the United States adopts an imperial vocation, it will need to learn new ways to manage its national security challenges.

63 **EuroIslam: The Jihad Within?** *by Olivier Roy*
Islam in Europe is being transformed from diaspora to "universal" forms. The latter portend a rise of radicalism and terrorism within the EU.

75 **Out of Bali: Cybercaliphate Rising** *by David Martin Jones*
The rise of religious fundamentalism in Southeast Asia contradicts longstanding appraisals of Southeast Asian Islam and standard Western theories of modernization.

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87 **Australian for Alliance** *by Paul Kelly*
A haze of friendship obscures the real foundation of the U.S.-Australian alliance, a foundation under stress since September 11, 2001. Best to take notice before the haze lifts.

95 **The Beginning of Economic Wisdom** *by Michael Novak*
Two primers on economics reveal a lingering philosophical divide in the intellectual imagination of our time.

105 **Frog in the Pot: Germany's Path to the Japan Syndrome** *by Adam S. Posen*
Japan's economic troubles arise from four interwoven causes, three of which are now extant in Germany—with major global security implications for the United States.

119 **Taba Mythchief** *by David Makovsky*
The "near miss" at Taba is being widely promoted as the natural starting point for future Israeli-Palestinian diplomacy. The only problem is, there *was* no "near miss."

Books

131 **Imperialism: The Highest Stage of American Capitalism?** *by Gideon Rose*
Andrew Bacevich's *American Empire* is really two books in one: one quite good, the other quite inexplicable.

136 **Suffering** *by Alan J. Kuperman*
David Rieff's frustrations show in his effort to make sense of post-Cold War humanitarianism.

142 **"The Rudest Man I Ever Met"** *by Hume Horan*
One of America's most experienced Middle East hands finds a treasure of insight and grace in a book about the life and times of the late Philip Habib.

145 **Burying Nikita** *by Susan Eisenhower*
William Taubman's biography of Chairman Khrushchev combines original research and good sense to produce the best last word so far on the late Soviet leader.

Correspondence

151 Harvey Sicherman, Michael Mandelbaum, Walter McDougall, Michael Lind, Paul Schroeder, Nedra Dyer McCloud, Daniel Pipes, David Franklin, Paul Hollander

Quarterly

157 **Continental Divides** *by Josef Joffe*
It took awhile—more than a dozen years, in point of fact—but the natural tendency in international politics for states to balance against the power of a hegemon has emerged. In western Europe, of all places.

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Migration and the Dynamics of Empire

James Kurth

THE FIRST decade of the 21st century, like the first decade of the 20th, is an age of empire. A hundred years ago, however, there were many empires. They included both the overseas empires of the national states of western Europe—particularly those of Britain, France, Portugal and the Netherlands—and the overland empires of the multinational states ruled by the Habsburg, Romanov and Ottoman dynasties. Today, there is only one empire—the global empire of the United States, a state which is neither national nor multinational in the traditional sense, but which is more accurately described as multicultural and transnational. This new and historically strange American empire is the context and the arena in which all the great and global events of our time are taking place.

The first decade of the 21st century, like the first decade of the 20th, is also an age of immigration. A hundred years ago, large numbers of people were leaving the national states and imperial metropoles of western Europe to emigrate to their colonies or to the United States. At the same time, many people were leaving the rural hinterlands of the multinational states of central and eastern Europe to migrate to their metropolitan centers, or, again, to the United States. Today, however, the direction of imperial migration is largely the reverse of the western pattern, while reminiscent of the former central and eastern one. Large numbers of people have left the former colonies of the west European empires to emigrate to their once-imperial metropoles. At the same time, many people have left the current dominions of the American empire to emigrate to the United States. A century ago, the United States was receiving many immigrants from Europe, but not from its recently-acquired empire in the Caribbean and the Philippines. Today, the United States is receiving many immigrants from its long-established empire in Latin America and East Asia, but not from Europe.

James Kurth is Claude Smith Professor of Political Science at Swarthmore College and a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia, where he is chairman of the Study Group on America and the West.

The Double Dynamic

THE FORMER age of empire re-invented the national states of western Europe into imperial states, but the imperial metropole remained a national state in the classical meaning. It still made sense to talk of the national interest of Britain, France, Portugal or the Netherlands, and it still made sense to talk of inter*national* politics. Our own age of empire is reinventing the United States into an imperial state.

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Because of the impact of imperial immigration, however, the United States is no longer a national state in the classical sense, or even in the traditional American sense as understood during much of the 20th century. The conjunction of American empire (America expanding into the world) and American immigration (the world coming into America) has made the very idea of the American national interest problematic. There is a causal connection between empire and immigration, and the two are now coming together as a dynamic duo to utterly transform our world. Empire and immigration are reinventing the traditional ideas of national interest and international politics and perhaps will even displace them with the new ideas of transnational interests and global politics.

While empire and immigration are interesting enough topics for professional analysts of American foreign policy and international (or global) politics, they would probably seem rather theoretical and abstract to others but for one fact: these two features of the first decade of the 21st century have intersected with the first war of the 21st century, the war between the United States and Islamist terrorists. It has been often observed that Al-Qaeda and other transnational networks of Islamist terrorists with global reach are another version—part of the dark side, so to speak—of the globalization process that the United States has so vigorously promoted, and which has become a central feature of the American empire. And, of course, central components in these transnational terrorist networks are some of the Muslim immigrants who reside within Europe and the United States. The World Trade Center and the Pentagon were the most pronounced symbols of, respectively, the economic and the military power of the American empire. The attacks upon them were planned and prepared by Muslim immigrants living within Europe and the United States. The continuing threat of new terrorist attacks emanating from Muslim immigrants has pushed the issue of immigration to the top of the agenda of what was once called national security, but what is now more accurately seen as imperial security. The conjunction of empire, migration and terrorism now lies at the very heart of the U.S. national security predicament. It would be wise, therefore, to start devoting some systematic attention to it.

Versions of Empire

AT FIRST glance, it would seem that the European experience with empire and immigration has little relevance to Americans. For one thing, the Europeans explicitly and officially referred to their imperial systems with the term "empire", and referred to their subordinate territories as "colonies" and "dependencies." In contrast, Americans have rarely used these terms to refer to their own imperial relationships. The closest American counterparts to European-style colonies and dependencies were the territories that the United States acquired after its victory in the Spanish-American War, particularly the Philippines and Puerto Rico. However, each of these countries was soon designated a "commonwealth", and there was a common understanding that each could eventually achieve independence if it wished to do so. At any rate, these and several smaller formal dependencies of the United States (American Samoa, the Marshall Islands, Guam, the U.S. Virgin Islands and the Panama Canal Zone), when taken all together, never approached the levels of importance that the European dependencies held for the metropolitan nations of Europe.

A narrow focus on explicit and official

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dependencies alone would be misleading, however. Some European empires included vast areas in which imperial rule was informal or indirect. Local leaders could even be given the title of king, prince, sultan or sheik, and retain many elements of sovereignty. This was the case with much of the British Empire (e.g., the Indian princely states, the Federated Malay States and the sheikdoms of the Persian Gulf) and even the French Empire (e.g., Morocco, Tunisia, Laos, Cambodia and Annam). These forms of imperial rule were not that different from the kind of hegemony the United States exercised at the same time over the countries of the Caribbean and Central America (backed up in the 1910s–20s by ongoing U.S. military occupations in the Dominican Republic, Haiti and Nicaragua, and thereafter by the clear potential for further U.S. military intervention).

Beginning in the 1920s, the European nations themselves started to replace the term "empire" with words that connoted more equality between the various territories in the imperial system. This development was partly due to the example and influence of the United States after World War I. It was also accentuated by the rhetoric of freedom and democracy that the Western Allies used so frequently during World War II. At the end of 1945, Europeans could reasonably think that there was not that much difference between the three great imperial systems of Britain, France and the United States—by then officially designated as the British Commonwealth, the French Union and the Inter-American System.

Of course, each of the European overseas empires soon went through a painful and often violent period of decolonization. The British fought and more or less won wars in Malaya and Kenya; the French fought and lost wars in Indochina and Algeria; the Dutch much the same in Indonesia. (The Portuguese Empire remained somehow frozen in amber for another decade and a half.) Surely, it might be said, the United States never experienced anything like this violent decolonization, which might seem to be proof that it never really had colonies to begin with.

From a European perspective, however, the long series of abortive Marxist governments or movements in the Caribbean and Central America—Guatemala, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Grenada and El Salvador—represented attempts by local populations to achieve decolonization. These efforts failed because American power (and military intervention) was still overwhelming, whereas European power had been drastically weakened during World War II. Furthermore, Castro's revolution in Cuba represented a successful (if Pyrrhic) effort at decolonization, and during the Cuban Missile Crisis it might have issued in the greatest violence imaginable.

The American experience with empire in the 20th century, therefore, did have much in common with the European one. Americans today argue that their global role—and rule—in the 21st century is something new and unique. If there is now an American empire, it is best defined by the "soft power" of information networks and popular culture rather than by the hard power of economic exploitation and military force. It is an empire representative of the information age rather than the industrial age. Whatever *they* may think about their empire, however, Americans should not be surprised if Europeans and almost all other peoples around the world persist in perceiving the new American empire to be similar enough for *their* purposes to the earlier empires of their own historical experience. We can tell them they're wrong, but it won't do us any good.

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Imperial Immigration

THE contemporary American experience with immigration also has much in common with the European one. For both the United States and for several European states, the vast immigration of the last several decades has been closely connected with the nature of their empires. Let us see how.

Decolonization was not the last chapter in the long narrative of the European empires. A new chapter has been written since the 1960s by the massive migration of formerly-colonial peoples into the European metropoles. Thus, Britain has received immigrants especially from India, Pakistan and the former British West Indies; France especially from Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and the former French West Africa; the Netherlands from Indonesia and Surinam; and Belgium from what had been the Belgian Congo. For the most part, large-scale immigration from the colonies into the metropole commenced about the same time or not long after decolonization was occurring. It has continued to the present day; post-imperial immigration thus has been under way for four or five decades.

What explains this massive and prolonged immigration from the successor states of the European empires into their former imperial metropoles? Why has it occurred after the empires came to an end rather than at some earlier time? The answers to these questions lie principally within the metropoles themselves.

Some historians of Europe have seen the period 1914–45 to be another Thirty Years War. It certainly was a period of successive catastrophes—World War I, the communist revolutions in Russia and in parts of central Europe, the Great Depression, the Nazi and fascist dictatorships, World War II, the Holocaust, and the omnipresence of class conflict throughout the entire period. After 1945, it was natural that creative and constructive political leaders were determined to remove, once and for all, the causes of these catastrophes.

Fifty years later, we can see that these political leaders succeeded. To remove the causes of the two world wars, the Nazi and fascist dictatorships and the Holocaust, they promoted supranational and pan-European institutions, and also postnationalist and post-racist ideologies. The most recent, and most pronounced, versions of these ideologies are multiculturalism and universal human rights. To remove the causes of the Great Depression, they promoted the managed economy and European economic integration. To remove the causes of class conflict and communist revolutions, they promoted the welfare state and the elevation of the working class into a middle-class way of life. Together, these great and successful projects to remove the causes of the great catastrophes of the first half of the 20th century represent the finest achievements of European civilization in the second half of that century.

The last of these great achievements, however—that all their citizens were entitled to middle-class amenities—had embedded within it an intrinsic flaw. As this achievement advanced, ever fewer citizens of modern, affluent Europe wanted to do the decidedly non-middle-class work necessary to any modern economy—the dirty (and sometimes dangerous or degrading) jobs in the farms, factories, streets and hospitals of that modern economy. Thus, as soon as the welfare state and middle-class expectations were fully established for the citizenry of Western Europe (by the early 1960s in most cases), there developed a need for workers who were not citizens; i.e., immigrants or "guest workers" (the term tellingly invented at the time).

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One obvious place where European nations could find these immigrant workers was in the countries to their south—for example, Algeria for France, and Turkey for West Germany. (At the same time, Mexico and Puerto Rico were performing a similar role for the United States.) More generally, the obvious place to find immigrant workers was among the former colonies or other dependent territories of the nation's recently devolved empire. The colonial peoples had already been doing a good deal of the dirty work of the empire for several generations—in the plantations, factories, streets, homes and hospitals of the colonies. This included working to maintain the European civil officials, military officers and other emigrants to the colonies in a comfortable middle-class life style. It was natural, then, that as the working-class citizens of European nations ascended into some version of middle-class life (or at least middle-class pretensions), their necessary and essential working-class functions were filled by working-class immigrants from the colonies. Colonial workers not only knew how to work, they were also more likely than non-colonial peoples to know the distinctive national language, codes and customs of the citizens within the metropole.

The sociological phenomenon of the ascending working class was reinforced by the demographic phenomenon of the descending birth rate. The 1960s saw the end of the postwar baby boom and its replacement with a birth dearth, which has continued to the present day.[1] Demographers observe that, in order for a population to sustain itself, it should have an average reproduction rate of 2.1 births per woman. The reproduction rate for every European nation (except Albania) has fallen beneath 1.5 during the past few decades. When one projects these demographic statistics forward, it would appear inevitable that, in half a century, most European nations (or more precisely, European-descended peoples) will have less than two-thirds of the population they have today. Furthermore, a much larger percentage of that population will be old and no longer able to work. The only peoples in Europe whose birth rates are high enough to sustain or increase their populations are the communities composed of immigrants from the former imperial territories.

As it happens, the largest of these immigrant communities in most European countries are Muslim. These Muslim communities already form 5–10 percent of the population of some European countries, and much higher percentages of younger age cohorts. That percentage is steadily increasing both from continuing immigration and high natural increase among immigrant populations. These immigrant populations now perform functions essential to the economic system and are poised to make a significant impact on the political system as well, becoming a force in democratic elections, multiparty politics and coalition governments.

One might have expected the European nations to develop a strong resistance to admitting immigrants—particularly Muslim immigrants—whose culture was obviously very different from their own traditional national or European ones. However, this potential resistance has been aborted by one of the other achievements of the European political leadership in its successful efforts to remove the causes of the great catastrophes of the 20th century—the aforementioned development of post-nationalist, post-racist

[1] I discuss some of the causes and consequences of the birth dearth in my "Demography Is Destiny: Family and Civilization", *Orbis* (Spring 2003).

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and multicultural ideologies.[2] In doing so, however, the Europeans prepared the ground for a different kind of great conflict in the 21st century: a form of war-*cum*-terrorism that has already visited the United States and that will, very likely, visit Europe as well.

Muslim Immigrants

THE SPECTER of Islamic terrorism that now haunts the West has focused attention upon Muslim immigrants in Western countries. These immigrants form communities that have long been hostile to the culture—whether seen as Christian or as secular—of the host countries, and they now pose serious problems for domestic security. Muslim immigrants thus have an anomalous position in both Europe and America. The particular nature of the anomaly is different, however, in the two regions of the West.

For Europe, Muslim countries comprised major parts of the British, French and Dutch empires. Accordingly, Muslim communities in these post-imperial states comprise 5–10 percent of their populations. Muslims also comprise more than 5 percent of the population of Germany and several other west European countries. European political leaders will have to take Muslim political demands into account, and Muslim leaders may gain veto power over some policy issues, most obviously in regard to foreign policy toward the Middle East.

For the United States, in contrast, Muslim countries have not been long-established parts of the American empire. Even such putative allies as Saudi Arabia and Egypt have often engaged in independent, unfriendly and distinctly uncolonial behavior toward the United States. Accordingly, Muslim immigrant communities comprise only a small part (about 1 percent) of the U.S. population. Furthermore, given the uninviting environment in America for Muslim immigrants since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Muslim immigrant communities probably will not form a much larger part of the American population anytime soon. Consequently, American political leaders will not have to take Muslim political demands into account. On the contrary, they very likely will reject any such demands, particularly in so far as they conflict with those put forward by American Jews, most obviously in regard to foreign policy toward the Middle East.

The clear differences between Europe and America in regard to the relative strengths of their Muslim and Jewish communities—Muslims being strong in Europe and weak in America, and Jews being weak in Europe and strong in America—have already helped to crystallize a great divide between Europe and America with regard to their respective Middle East policies (though that divide has other, more important sources). It will take major efforts on the part of both European and American statesmen to ensure that this double and reverse asymmetry in communal structure does not contribute to a great divide between Europe and America on other policy issues, as well.

The most important division created by Muslim immigrants, however, will not be between Europe and America, but within the European states themselves. Over the next few decades, the prospects are for several European states, particularly the once imperial ones, to become two nations. The first will be the European nation: descended from the European and imperial peoples, it will be secular, rich, old and feeble. The second

[2]Coral Bell provides a perceptive analysis of this ideological change in her "Normative Shift", *The National Interest* (Winter 2002/03).

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will be the anti-European nation: descended from the non-European and colonial peoples, it will be Islamic, poor, young and virile. It will be a kind of overseas colony of a foreign nation, an obviously familiar occurrence in European history. But this time the foreign nation will be the *umma* of Islam, and the colonized entity will be Europe. As the *umma* forms the beginnings of a kind of settler state, the two nations will increasingly regard each other with mutual contempt, but in the new anti-European nation there will be a growing rage, and in the old European nation there will be a growing fear. This will provide the perfect conditions for endemic Islamic terrorism to be deployed against a terrified, once-imperial people.

At the same time that some European states are becoming two nations, they are becoming subordinate states within the European Union—conforming to economic policies made by the European Commission in Brussels and to monetary policies made by the European Central Bank in Frankfurt. They have also become subordinate dominions of a sort within the American empire (or perhaps within an American commonwealth of nations)—conforming to military policies ostensibly implemented through NATO in Brussels but which are actually made in Washington. In short, post-imperial immigration has resulted in European states that are becoming bi-national, while quasi-imperial subordination has resulted in European states that are becoming post- or even sub-national.

This is, to understate the matter, a long way from where European nations and national consciousness were less than two centuries ago, in the immediate aftermath of the French Revolution and at the beginning of the Industrial Revolution. The European metropoles began their imperial narratives as nation-states. The creators and exemplars of the nation-state were Britain and France, and the creators and exemplars of the overseas empires of the industrial age were the British and the French Empires. In the first half of the 20th century, at the highest point of the modern and industrial age, these were respectively the largest and second-largest overseas empires in the world.

Today, however, the long imperial narratives of Britain and France have reached the point that, in many ways, they are no longer nations at all. For about a century (from about the 1830s to the 1940s) the imperial narrative seemed to provide the latest chapters, indeed the fulfillment, of the much longer national narrative, and for both Britain and France this was a narrative that reached back more than a thousand years. The British and French Empires both, in their own way, seemed to be the consummation of the longest and grandest historical drama since that of the Roman Empire. But now, a half century after the end of these two empires, it seems that a boomerang effect of empire—in particular, immigration from the empire into the metropole and the heartland—may be bringing about the end of the British and the French national narratives themselves.

This melancholy tale of empire, immigration and national disintegration may not be relevant only to Europe. Perhaps it provides a warning, or a prophecy, for America as well.

Imperial Immigration to America

THE contemporary American experience with immigration can be usefully compared to other periods of massive immigration, particularly the American experience of a century ago and the European experience in recent decades.

Contemporary immigation to America does share some similarities with the massive immigration of the 1890s–1910s.

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Latin-American immigrants seem to be recapitulating the earlier path of Italian immigrants, and Asian immigrants seem to be recapitulating the earlier path of east European Jews. In the early 20th century, there was widespread concern that immigrants from southern and eastern Europe could not be assimilated into the American way of life. By the 1960s, however, these groups were largely integrated into American society. By analogy, one might expect Latin American and Asian immigrants to be largely integrated within a few decades.

However, it is also useful to recall important differences between the circumstances of immigration a century ago and those today. First, the United States was then a self-conscious and self-confident national state. The American political class promulgated "the American Creed" and vigorously promoted what was known as the Americanization program—assimilation of immigrants into "the melting pot." Second, the growing industrial economy of the time enabled immigrants to gain a step up on the ladder of social mobility (and also outward geographical mobility and dispersion). Third, the restrictive Immigration Act of 1924 sharply curtailed immigration for four decades, until the passage of the very different and unrestrictive Immigration Act of 1965. This converted immigrant communities from the turbulent streams of the 1890s–1910s into the settled masses of the 1920s–50s, upon which the Americanization program could steadily and relentlessly work its way. Fourth, almost none of the immigrants came from areas that were in the American empire of the time (Latin America or the Philippines). This meant that they did not bring with them the resentments and grievances of colonized populations. On the contrary, many immigrants were fleeing foreign empires that persecuted or limited them.

Even with these four factors favorable to assimilation, some immigrants brought with them particular ideologies prevalent in the lands they had left behind (anarchism among some Italians, Marxism among some Jews). For a few immigrants, these ideologies legitimated their sense of separation from and opposition to the dominant American culture of liberal democracy, the free market and competitive individualism. This produced a few obstacles on the road to assimilation (the "Red Scare" of 1919–20 and the deportation of some anarchists and Marxists, the activities of the Communist Party in the 1930s–40s, McCarthyism in the 1950s).

These four factors favorable to assimilation have been largely absent during the contemporary era of American immigration, however. In particular, the reigning ideology of multiculturalism has placed far greater obstacles on the road to assimilation than anarchism or Marxism ever did.

The contemporary era of immigration into America began with the Immigration Act of 1965, which eliminated previous restrictions on immigration from non-European regions (and, in effect, increased restrictions on immigration from Europe). Americans have been living under this immigration regime for almost four decades, and the result is manifest.

In contrast to the earlier American experience with immigration, in the contemporary era most immigrants to the United States have come from the various regions of the American empire. By far the majority has come from the oldest domains of the empire, namely, those countries that fell under the hegemony of the United States as a result of its 19th-century wars with Mexico and Spain: Mexico, Puerto Rico, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, the countries of Central America and the Philippines. In addition, many immigrants have come from countries within the empire America estab-

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lished in the western Pacific after World War II, or more precisely, after the Korean War—particularly from South Korea and Taiwan and also from the abortive domain of Indochina.

With respect to immigration coming principally from the territories of one's own empire, the contemporary American experience has been similar to the contemporary European one. However, whereas in Europe the great surge in immigration has come in its post-imperial era, in the United States it has come in the high imperial era, at a time when the American empire has been in its ascendancy.

In the past four decades or so, too, there have been powerful factors common to both Europe and America that have generated the need for immigrants. As it happens, the United States has its own version of the sociological, demographic and ideological factors that we have described for Europe: the ascent of working-class American citizens into a middle-class lifestyle, or at least into middle-class pretensions; the decline in the reproduction rate of the European-descended majority; and the establishment of a post-national, multicultural ideology. This has resulted in a similar structural demand for immigrant workers in the United States as in Europe. Once the structure of demand has been established in the imperial center, the imperial territories become the most practical source of supply, for reasons that are similar in both Europe and America.

There have also been some distinctive aspects about the U.S. relationship with its domains in the western Pacific that shaped U.S. immigration policy. In the early 1960s, South Korea and Taiwan were on the front lines of the Cold War, and they also suffered from poor and distressed economic conditions. They pushed hard for the abolition of restrictions on their U.S.-bound immigrants, and given their central importance in the Cold War conflict, U.S. policymakers complied. This was a major factor in bringing about the new openness embodied in the Immigration Act of 1965.

However, the largest immigrant communities in the United States are Latin American in origin. Latino-Americans now compose the largest minority in the United States, having recently surpassed African-Americans. Latino immigrants obviously already perform functions essential to the American economy, and they are steadily acquiring political power, including a kind of veto power on many issues for which they have a particular concern. They have been successful, for example, in preventing consistent enforcement of laws and regulations directed against illegal Latino immigrants and, particularly in California, in deterring discussion about the darker aspects of Mexican history in the public schools or in official discourse.

Might imperial immigration cause the United States to become two nations, as is now the prospect for some European countries? The first nation could be the Euro-Anglo nation, English speakers descended from European peoples. As in Europe, much of this nation would be secular, rich, old and feeble. The second nation could be a Latino nation, descended from Latin American peoples. Much of it would be Christian (evangelical and Pentecostal Protestant as well as Roman Catholic), poor, young and robust. These two nations could well come to regard each other with mutual suspicion and, in some quarters, with contempt. It is probably too much to predict that there will be a widespread fear of Latino terrorism in the Euro-Anglo nation, although young Latinos in the United States may learn something from their Islamic counterparts in Europe. However, it is not unlikely that there will be a widespread perception of Latino crime. The gated communities of

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Euro-Anglos, which are already widespread in the southwestern United States, are likely to become an even more central part of the Euro-Anglo way of life, and to define the distinctive architectural style and urban design of the Euro-Anglo nation.

Still, Latino-American culture is much closer to Anglo-American culture than Muslim is to European, if only because the two American cultures share a common Christian origin. This may retard or abort the development of two distinct nations within the United States. More likely, perhaps already happening, is the development in the Southwest of a blend of American and Mexican features, a sort of "Amerexico."[3] This is a society whose upper or capital-owning class is Euro-Anglo, whose professional and middle classes are largely Euro-Anglo but partly Mexican-American, and whose working and lower-class members—those who do the dirty work—are overwhelmingly Mexican-American. It is characterized by a rough correlation between class and color, which amounts to a racial division of labor. As such, it has important similarities to the colonial societies of the European empires, which were also characterized by a racial or ethnic division of labor.

Indeed, as the ratio of Mexican-Americans to Euro-Anglo-Americans increases, Amerexico may come to resemble something like Northern Ireland in the United Kingdom, or perhaps even all of Ireland as it was during the British Empire. If so, the United States would have become not only an empire abroad, but also one at home.

Empire and Emigration

ESSENTIAL TO every empire is an imperial class—the civil officials, military officers and business managers who go forth from the empire's metropole to its dominions and colonies to carry out its policies and practices. In other words, it is inherent in an empire that certain people will be imperial emigrants. Imperial emigrants are even more essential to an empire than are the imperial immigrants that have been the focus of our attention so far.

Who will comprise the imperial emigrants, the imperial class, of the American empire? Here it is useful to distinguish between the three different components of an imperial class—civil, military and business.

The U.S. military has had more than a half century of experience of peacetime service overseas, especially in Germany, Japan and South Korea, but also elsewhere. More than any other American institution, the military knows how and why it serves. They are the true heirs to the legendary civil officials, and not just the dedicated military officers, of the British Empire. Nor does America lack business entrepreneurs, managers and professionals who are willing to go overseas, especially to long-established (and more predictable) realms of the American Empire, particularly Latin America, Europe and East Asia. These American business people are the counterparts to the merchants, managers and engineers of the British Empire.

The problem, perhaps the void, in the American imperial class lies in the civil officials. There is no obvious equivalent of the Indian Civil Service or the Colonial Civil Service of the British Empire, that distinguished cadre of graduates from Oxford and Cambridge who served for long and hard years as district officers in the remote regions of the empire. The graduates of the best American universities are "organization

[3]Peter Andreas, "The Making of Amerexico: (Mis)Handling Illegal Immigration", *World Policy Journal* (Summer 1994).

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kids" intent on a successful career within America itself.[4] In any event, the U.S. State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency can hardly be compared to the civil services of the British Empire, either in regard to effectiveness or morale.

The real civil servants of the American empire are not American in their physical origin. They are, however, American in their intellectual apparatus. They are the foreign students who come to American universities and learn American principles and practices. In particular, they are the economics majors and business school students who come to believe in the free market, and the political science majors and law school students who come to believe in liberal democracy and the rule of law. When (or if) they return to their home countries, they will know both the culture and customs of their own society and the principles and practices of American society. These foreign students are both imperial immigrants—when they arrive in America for their studies—and imperial emigrants—when they return home for their careers.

Moreover, those who stay in America, as a great many do, form a kind of *corpus colosseum* between the American metropole and its hinterland. This goes for scientists and engineers as well as businessmen and lawyers. The computer whizzes from the subcontinent who live and work in America are the empire's most efficient and effective links to the considerable talents in Bangalore, for example. They and others (Chinese, Israelis, Australians) perform functions voluntarily—indeed, eagerly and unassumingly—for the American empire roughly analogous to those of the population transfer policies of the Habsburg Empire and especially of the Ottoman Empire. They help integrate the elites of the imperial periphery to those of the imperial core, though in an Internet world they do so in less materially obvious ways.

From the perspective of the American empire, these imperial immigrants/emigrants—local in their outer appearance, American in their inner attitudes—are perfect candidates for political and economic leadership in the empire's outer and even inner domains. And, indeed, a significant number of current officials in Latin America, Europe and East Asia are graduates of American universities, and an even larger cadre of graduates is now entering into official careers. The ability of the American empire to govern its domains will depend upon its success in producing this distinct kind of immigrant/emigrant to serve as its distinct kind of imperial civil official. In the empires of the past, the metropole served as the mind, and the colonies served as the body. The American empire is attempting to solve the imperial mind-body problem in a new way. In a sense, it seeks to perform a series of brain-transplants, to put an imperial mind into a colonized body.

The earlier European empires—the empires of the industrial age—also made some effort to educate and enculturate the best and the brightest from the colonies in the principles and practices of the empire. These efforts were successful in important ways (for example, they resulted in some exceptionally creative works of literature), but in the end they could not prevent—indeed they helped to cause—the rise of colonial nationalism and the demise of the empire. The American empire—the empire of the information age—is based even more upon ideas than the empires of the past. They are, in the recent formulation of Michael Mandelbaum "the ideas that conquered the world—peace, democracy,

[4]David Brooks, "The Organization Kid", *The Atlantic Monthly* (April 2001).

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and free markets."[5] In essence, these are the same ideas that Thomas Jefferson wrote into the birth certificate of the United States, the Declaration of Independence—"life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." As long as the American empire appears to be providing some semblance of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness to the peoples of its vast realm, it has a good chance of thriving.

If, however, the American empire fails to prevent a series of wars, or a new plague of sinister dictatorships, or a global economic depression, or the alienation of its own elite, then its ideas clearly would no longer dominate the world, and its particular and peculiar imperial civil service could no longer control the empire's domains. The empire would then come to an end, like the European empires before it. This, ultimately, is what is at stake in the war on terrorism, and why the United States must decisively win it. If it does not and the empire weakens, there would still be one massive legacy left from the imperial age. That would be the vast population of imperial immigrants within a now-diminished metropole, within the territory of the United States itself. □

[5]Mandelbaum, *The Ideas That Conquered The World: Peace, Democracy, and Free Markets in the Twenty-first Century* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2002).

The Louisiana Purchase, 1803–2003

There is on the globe one single spot, the possessor of which is our natural and habitual enemy. It is New Orleans, through which the produce of three-eighths of our territory must pass to market, and from its fertility it will ere long yield more than half of our whole produce and contain more than half our inhabitants. France placing herself in that door assumes to us the attitude of defiance. Spain might have retained it quietly for years. Her pacific dispositions, her feeble state, would induce her to increase our facilities there, so that her possession of the place would be hardly felt by us, and it would not perhaps be very long before some circumstance might arise which might make the cession of it to us the price of something of more worth to her.

Not so can it ever be in the hands of the French. The impetuosity of her temper, the energy and restlessness of her character, placed in a point of eternal friction with us, and our character, which though quiet, and loving peace and the pursuit of wealth, is high-minded, despising wealth in competition with insult or energy, enterprising and energetic as any nation on earth, these circumstances render it impossible that France and the U.S. can continue long friends when they meet in so irritable a position. They as well as we must be blind if they do not see this; and we must be very improvident if we do not begin to make arrangements on that hypothesis.

The day that France takes possession of N. Orleans fixes the sentence which is to restrain her forever within her low water mark. It seals the union of two nations who in conjunction can maintain exclusive possession of the ocean. From that moment we must marry ourselves to the British fleet and nation.

—Thomas Jefferson
Letter to Robert R. Livingston (April 18, 1802)

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The Transformation of National Security

Five Redefinitions

Philip Zelikow

PERHAPS THE key question of international politics and U.S. national security policy today is whether a genuinely new era has dawned since the end of the Cold War. It has. The attacks of September 11, 2001 did not create the new era, but they were a catalytic moment in our recognition of it. Like previous shocks to the United States in June 1940, December 1941 or June 1950, this shock gave emerging trends a form, brought them into mass consciousness, and forced upon us the task of defining a comprehensive national response.

Such a definition appears in the Bush Administration's recently published *National Security Strategy of the United States*.[1] This essay draws out some of the ideas that appear to undergird the administration's emerging strategy. It focuses on five essential redefinitions of what national security means for the United States in the 21st century—but first a note about the rhetoric of empire that has come to dominate much current discussion.

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The Distraction of Empire

ALL NATIONAL security strategies start with a mental image of the world. The image of the new era is properly that of a modern and truly pluralistic international system. In the traditional world, populations, governance, commerce, culture and habits of life evolved slowly and changed gradually. The break point between this traditional world and that of modernity arrives, at different times for different societies, when social and technological change severs the links that had defined the relationships between humanity and the physical resources of the

[1]This document represents a more comprehensive articulation of themes that President Bush had already begun to introduce, notably in his speeches to a joint session of Congress (September 20, 2001), on the State of the Union (January 29, 2002) and to graduating cadets at West Point (June 1, 2002). Less well known, but displaying a related set of ideas that antedate the 9/11 attacks, were the President's remarks to the World Bank on July 17, 2001 and, subsequent to those attacks, the address to the Inter-American Development Bank on March 14, 2002 (followed eight days later by the Millennium Challenge Account initiative in Monterrey). Condoleezza Rice also added an important summary of the strategy in the Wriston Lecture she delivered in New York City on October 1, 2002.

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earth; shatters the hitherto ageless ceilings on productivity enforced by the physical limits of humans, animals, wind and water; and transforms our ability to communicate across distances, communities and nations.

These transformations acquired momentum in the 18th century and spread in the 19th until, by the year 1900, the modern world extended to Europe, North America and to their limited veins of settlement and commerce stretched out over the rest of the planet. The 20th century saw the further, nearly global extension of modernity and wrenching, worldwide efforts to adjust to its impact. Indeed, such has been the shock to many societies that the last century has been dominated by great contests over how to conceive, organize and provide moral justification and political order for modern industrial nations.

Those great contests have now subsided. The world is no longer so broken and divided. The militant utopias of class, nation and race have been defeated and discredited. Modernity means that change itself becomes the constant, and the challenge of change has not disappeared. Its pressures have instead been internalized within every society trying to adapt to a quickening pace of change. In other words, today's battle lines are less *international* and more *transnational.*

In dealing with these pressures, some see the United States as a new source of world order—fearing or welcoming that prospect. This accounts in part for the current popularity of "empire" as a reigning metaphor for America's ambitions. The metaphor is seductive, yet vicious.

What is an empire? Once upon a time, "empire" was casually applied as a positive expression, as with Jefferson's "empire of liberty." In recent years "empire" has been used to describe—often with an edge—any circumstance where a powerful country exerts influence over lesser powers, whether direct or indirect, physical, cultural or commercial. This shallow equation of all sorts of economic and cultural influences with "imperialism" was first popularized about a hundred years ago by writers reacting to Britain's war against the Boers in South Africa. John Atkinson Hobson, for example, who had an immense influence on Vladimir Lenin, condemned economic imperialism as a ruling force in the world. Hobson also worked a strong element of his anti-Semitism into his theories, seeing a cabal of Jewish bankers and merchants lurking behind Britain's excesses.

The same distasteful mixture of bad thinking was prominent after World War I. Many writers in Europe, especially in the defeated nations, decried the new "Anglo-Saxon empire" that they accused Britain and America—and the Jews, of course—of having created.[2] The same fetid intellectual waters seep from this old gutter into much anti-American commentary today.

Sadly, even some American conservatives have joined the new anti-imperialists in seeing the United States as the metropole of a world empire. The appeal is understandable. After all, there is a certain gratification in imagining that one is the successor to emperors and proconsuls of past ages, a certain pleasure in opening such a dusty, venerable chest of ideas about how to sort out the affairs of far-away peoples.

But these imperial metaphors, of whatever provenance, do not enrich our understanding; they impoverish it. They use a metaphor of how to rule others when the problem is how to persuade and lead them. Real imperial power is sovereign power. Sovereigns rule, and a ruler is not just the most powerful among diverse interest groups. Sovereignty means a

[2]See Richard Koebner and Helmut Dan Schmidt, *Imperialism: The Story and Significance of a Political Word, 1840–1960* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964).

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direct monopoly control over the organization and use of armed might. It means *direct* control over the administration of justice and the definition thereof. It means control over what is bought and sold, the terms of trade and the permission to trade, to the limit of the ruler's desires and capacities.

In the modern, pluralistic world of the 21st century, the United States does not have anything like such direct authority over other countries, nor does it seek it. Even its informal influence in the political economy of neighboring Mexico, for instance, is far more modest than, say, the influence the British could exert over Argentina a hundred years ago.

The purveyors of imperial metaphors suffer from a lack of imagination, and more, from a lack of appreciation for the new conditions under which we now live. It is easier in many respects to communicate images in a cybernetic world, so that a very powerful United States does exert a range of influences that is quite striking. But this does not negate the proliferating pluralism of global society, nor does it suggest a will to imperial power in Washington. The proliferation of loose empire metaphors thus distorts into banal nonsense the only precise meaning of the term imperialism that we have.

The United States is central in world politics today, not omnipotent. Nor is the U.S. Federal government organized in such a fashion that would allow it to wield durable imperial power around the world—it has trouble enough fashioning coherent policies within the fifty United States. Rather than exhibiting a confident will to power, we instinctively tend, as David Brooks has put it, to "enter every conflict with the might of a muscleman and the mentality of a wimp." We must speak of American power and of responsible ways to wield it; let us stop talking of American empire, for there is and there will be no such thing.

Five Redefinitions

THE UNITED States does have unique responsibilities as the greatest power in this pluralistic world, however. Those responsibilities have moved the Bush Administration to rethink the meaning of America's national security, and it is a process of thinking that transcends yesterday's partisan differences. Both conservative and liberal orthodoxies are being challenged. To attain lasting influence, these new ideas must pass into the vocabulary and assumptions of many in *both* parties—just as happened with strategies of "containment" in the late 1940s and early 1950s—even as political conflict continues around the edges of this new vision.

- This vision is redefining the geography of national security.
- It is redefining the nexus between principles and power.
- It is redefining the structure of international security.
- It is redefining multilateralism.
- And it is redefining national security threats in the dimension of time.

THE NEW GEOGRAPHY OF NATIONAL SECURITY

IN THE PAST, the geography of national security was defined by foreign frontiers. Dangerous enemies had to possess mass and scale as they first accumulated armies, navies or air forces and then deployed them. Today the frontiers of national security can be everywhere. The point is so obvious in the case of mass-casualty terrorism that it needs no elaboration.

Less obvious is the way the Bush Administration, following on but surpassing the Clinton Administration, has consistently identified poverty, pandemic disease, biological and genetic dan-

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gers, and environmental degradation as significant national security threats. All of these dangers have a transnational character, their social origins resting within the turmoil of modern and modernizing societies. In other words, national security threats in the new era are defined more by the fault-lines within societies than by the territorial borders between them. The decisive clashes in this phase of history are not therefore between civilizations but inside them.

The implications of this redefinition touch every major institution of national security in the U.S. government. We are witness to the largest Executive Branch transformation in half a century with the new Department of Homeland Security, the largest reorganization of the FBI in a generation, significant overhauling of the U.S. intelligence community, the creation of an entirely new unified command and other dramatic restructuring in the Department of Defense. Fundamental relationships between Federal, state, regional and local agencies—and the private sector—must change, and are changing, as well. These transformations are just getting under way, but they are already breaking down the core paradigm of the American national security system created in the 1940s and 1950s.

The geographical redefinition of national security profoundly affects the entire U.S. foreign policy agenda. Whether dealing with terrorism or public health, the division of security policy into domestic and foreign compartments is breaking down. U.S. foreign and security policies must delve into societies, into problems from law enforcement to medical care, in novel ways—challenging international institutions and the principles that define them to adapt. More fundamentally, if the United States is to develop national security policies that are aimed at the fault-lines within societies, those policies must transcend physical and material dimensions. They must include positions about fundamental principles.

THE NEW CENTRALITY OF MORAL PRINCIPLES

DURING AND after World War II, a conventional image of American interests developed that posed a dichotomy between realism and idealism. Practically every thinker on foreign policy alive today has grown up under the influence of this dichotomy. Realism was usually identified as a cold-eyed focus on calculations of power. Idealism embraced a pre-eminent concern for human rights, global poverty or other facets of human welfare. These two images became a convenient shorthand for labeling political factions or individual leaders. But those stereotypes, overly simple to begin with, no longer even remotely suit our times. They do not capture the nature of the controversies within the present administration, nor do they comprehend the new fusion of power and principle that is now guiding U.S. policy.

The administration's concept of a "balance of power that favors freedom"—to note the marquee concept of the *National Security Strategy*—applies calculations of power to the worldwide capacity to support beneficial principles affecting both relations among states and conditions within them. The administration thus emphasizes both power and a readiness to distinguish good from bad, right from wrong. The administration takes to heart the observation of John Courtney Murray that

> policy is the meeting-place of the world of power and the world of morality, in which there takes place the concrete reconciliation of the duty of success that rests upon the

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statesman, and the duty of justice that rests upon the civilized nation that he serves.[3]

The administration drives power and principle together around a remarkably straightforward statement of the "non-negotiable demands of human dignity." Seven of these demands, all originally appearing in the President's January 2002 State of the Union message, are listed in the strategy document: the rule of law; limits on the power of the state; respect for women; private property; free speech; equal justice; and religious tolerance. All seven focus on the relationship of individuals to the state. None deals directly with the form or processes of government to produce these relationships: There is no mention here of democracy. Far from being an assertion of American exceptionalism, therefore, or a call for others to emulate the example of our "city on a hill", both the strategy document and President Bush have stressed that these are universal principles that apply everywhere. This is not an affirmation of the Scottish Enlightenment, but of human civilization itself.

Such a stance is critical in an age that seems to contradict or qualify every universal truth, preferring instead to cultivate irony as the essential human sensibility. The Bush Administration has defined one constant as the essential complement to modernity, what the *National Security Strategy* calls a "single, sustainable model for national success." That model features a linked conception of respect for human dignity and regard for liberating human potential. If modernity implies constant change, then greater personal and economic freedom is the perpetual safety valve, the constant source of adaptation and thus the very source of structural resilience that enables different societies to organize themselves in different successful forms. Influenced by his experiences in the Balkan crises, Tony Blair put the matter well in his October 1, 2002 speech to the Labour Party conference in Blackpool:

> Our values aren't Western values. They're human values and anywhere, anytime people are given the chance, they embrace them. Around these values, we build our global partnership. Europe and America together. Russia treated as a friend and equal. China and India seeking not rivalry but cooperation and for all nations the basis of our partnership—not power alone but a common will based on common values, applied in an even-handed way.

The Bush Administration's similar emphasis on moral reasoning, on uncomfortable (to some) judgments about good and evil, challenges some conservatives and liberals alike. The challenge to conservatives flows from the fact that traditional conservatism is founded on a cultural pessimism, on an abiding skepticism about human improvement. But President Bush (and many of his key advisors) are cultural optimists who, in their own lifetimes, have witnessed great and *positive* upheaval—not least the successful end to the Cold War. Indeed, President Bush's whole education reform agenda ("Leave no child behind!") epitomizes the break with traditional conservatism, and it is an attitude that carries over to world affairs. His administration's efforts on HIV/AIDS, for example, have not bothered with the Clinton Administration's convoluted effort to justify attention to global disease in traditional national security terms. The danger is not dressed up as a threat to "stability" but is portrayed for what it really is: a moral obligation to act when tens of millions face preventable death.

The administration's rhetoric is

[3]Murray, *Morality and Modern War* (New York: Council on Religion and International Affairs, 1959).

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broader still: "Including all of the world's poor in an expanding circle of development—and opportunity", the *National Security Strategy* states, "is a moral imperative . . . one of the top priorities of U.S. international policy." Hence the proposal for a 50 percent increase in development assistance, the largest proposed by any administration since that of John F. Kennedy. President Bush is gambling that a notoriously broken foreign aid system can be reformed to make such investments politically saleable, and perhaps thereby legitimize an even greater effort in the future.

The challenge to liberals has been more interesting, if somewhat depressing in its manifestations. The American Left in its various hues once defined itself by its fierce belief in values, a readiness to judge and to act on those judgments. It is now too often defined by dedication to a consensus that disclaims any right to make moral judgments at all—except those that condemn the U.S. government. The Left's "knowing" attitude about America's own failings has evolved into the chronic suspicion of any expression of patriotism, and into the instinctive assumption that anyone who uses words like "evil" must be some Bible-thumping rube pronouncing naive moral judgments. And to think that such a person is President of the United States!

But many liberal Democrats are now wisely pressing for a return to the ancient virtues. What, then, is the net result? One old contrarian of the Left, Christopher Hitchens wrote of it in the October 20, 2002 *Washington Post*:

> As someone who has done a good deal of marching and public speaking about Vietnam, Chile, South Africa, Palestine, and East Timor in his time (and would do it all again), I can only hint at how much I despise a Left that thinks of Osama Bin Laden as a slightly misguided anti-imperialist, or a Left that can think of Milosevic and Saddam as victims. Instead of internationalism, we find among the Left now a sort of affectless, neutralist, smirking isolationism. In this moral universe, the views of the corrupt and conservative Jacques Chirac—who built Saddam Hussein a nuclear reactor, knowing what he wanted it for—carry more weight than that of persecuted Iraqi democrats.

Of course, the Bush Administration's emphasis on moral judgment is vulnerable to criticisms. One is simply aesthetic. The image of the preachy American abroad, short on talent and long on sanctimony, inspires enough resentment already, and few foreign diplomats want to encourage more such Americans to sally forth. But there are more substantive problems, too. One concerns the so-called slippery slope—and it *is* slippery. Yet it is hard to explain why, because one cannot right wrongs everywhere, one should not try to right them anywhere. If the United States simply deals and trades with all countries as we find them, then how, in an age when the frontiers of national security are increasingly defined by issues inside societies, can the United States take stands on the battle lines that matter most?

Then there is the problem of hypocrisy and double standards. (Saudi Arabia is of late the usual friendly villain hauled into the dock for illustration.) Here the administration's goals and rhetoric do bring with them a real burden. Whether it chooses to be reticent or outspoken, whether its reflections are offered in private or in public, any administration that stresses moral judgment is obliged to display a basic honesty about the character of other governments. And it assumes the burden of a consistent regard for the non-negotiable demands of human dignity, no matter the pull of other interests or the nation's accounts. Sometimes other strategic equities will win pride of place, and the admin-

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istration should not lie to itself about the tradeoffs—either their difficulty or their durability—that will have to be made.

Confronting a messy world full of frustrating choices, President Bush might draw comfort from the remarks of another wartime president, Franklin Roosevelt:

> I am everlastingly angry only at those who assert vociferously that the four freedoms and the Atlantic Charter are nonsense because they are unattainable. If those people had lived a century and a half ago they would have sneered and said that the Declaration of Independence was utter piffle. If they had lived nearly a thousand years ago they would have laughed uproariously at the ideals of Magna Carta. And if they had lived several thousand years ago they would have derided Moses when he came from the Mountain with the Ten Commandments.
>
> We concede that these great teachings are not perfectly lived up to today, but I would rather be a builder than a wrecker, hoping always that the structure of life is growing—not dying.[4]

THE NEW STRUCTURE OF WORLD POLITICS

ANOTHER reason for thinking hard about the centrality of moral judgment in redefining American national security is because of the way the Bush Administration, following on the work of its predecessors, is trying to integrate universal principles into great power politics. For centuries the structure of world politics has been defined by the rivalry of great powers. It is now possible instead for the United States to form active agendas of cooperation with every major center of global power, founded on imperfect yet extraordinary degrees of agreement about underlying principles in the organization of society.

A circumstance of unprecedented great power harmony is neither an immutable fact nor a deterministic prediction. It is a contingency over which we have limited but not inconsiderable influence. Great power rivalry could return to the foreground, so present circumstances ought to be viewed as an opportunity. It is an opportunity that can be lost, however, if the Bush Administration and its successors allow serious agendas of cooperation to drift into routinized gestures and petty fractiousness. These agendas, moreover, will never be built entirely out of the bilateral relationships between the United States and other great powers. Instead, the United States must challenge its present and future partners to join in common tasks that transcend narrow concerns, offering the networks of American allies in Europe and Asia real opportunities to share the responsibilities of global leadership.[5]

In this regard, the United States and its traditional allies have already given considerable attention to Russia and China as potential great powers in transition. India, set to become not only the most populous country in the world but also its largest and most diverse democracy, deserves comparable notice. If India can balance these attributes with sustained growth and stability, the world must bring that nation, and the distinct and ancient civilization it represents, into every inner circle of global power. That would include

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[4]From an address in Ottawa delivered after the Quebec strategy conference of 1943. The language was FDR's own, added in his own hand at the end of the draft his speechwriters had prepared. Samuel I. Rosenman, *Working with Roosevelt* (London: Rupert Hart-Davis, 1952), p. 356.

[5]I have elaborated these ideas in "American Engagement in Asia", in Robert D. Blackwill & Paul Dibb, eds., *America's Asian Alliances* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000); and "The New Concert of Europe", *Survival* (Summer 1992).

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at the least permanent representation on the United Nations Security Council and in the Group of Eight.

VARIETIES OF MULTILATERALISM

THE CARTOON version of America's international policy dilemma poses a choice between unilateralism versus multilateralism, the wild cowboy versus the cooperative diplomat. This depiction is false.

Everything that America does in the world is done multilaterally. That emphatically includes the policies the Bush Administration considers most important, and even those that are the most "military" in character. The global war against terrorism is being conducted through an elaborate, often hidden, network of multilateral cooperation among scores of governments. A large number of players are interacting on intelligence, law enforcement, military action, air transportation, shipping, financial controls and more. Ongoing military operations in Afghanistan involve several countries, and were multilateral even at the height of American military activity, as the United States relied heavily on relationships with Pakistan, Russia, three Central Asian governments and a variety of Afghan factions.

The caricature of the administration's unilateralism usually rests on the recitation of a by now standard list of diplomatic actions that some other governments did not like (Kyoto, the International Criminal Court and so on). Some of these disagreements were handled in a style and manner that seemed insensitive or simply maladroit. Unfortunately, too, the caricature of the administration's unilateralism is willingly fed by some U.S. officials and unofficial advisers who relish the chance to play the role of the truth teller lancing foreign obfuscations. Sometimes they overplay the part, sensing the license they get from working for a plain-spoken president.

President Bush, however, is more sensitive to foreign opinion than some who act in his name. He knows that, to much of the world, "I'm the toxic Texan, right?" He recognizes that

> if you want to hear resentment, just listen to the word unilateralism. I mean, that's resentment. If somebody wants to try to say something ugly about us, 'Bush is a unilateralist, America is unilateral.' You know, which I find amusing.

He finds it amusing because he meets and works with foreign dignitaries almost every day, and sees himself as a "pretty good diplomat"—though he smilingly concedes that "nobody else does." From the time Bush first started making decisions about the Iraq issue, for example, he has worked at every turn through international coalitions, noting how much he had enjoyed building one for the war in Afghanistan.[6]

Europeans, of course, rush to play the part of the cosmopolitan professional who rolls his eyes and offers wittily barbed observations about American innocents abroad. Sometimes they, too, overplay the part. But all this is a very old genre of diplomatic theater; John Adams and the Comte de Vergennes set the archetypes more than two hundred years ago. It has since been performed on many stages with a wonderful variety of scripts and sets. No doubt it will be played often in future, as well.

Beyond problems of tone and execution, the real differences in the multilateral strategies of the Bush Administration and other friendly states are not about "unilateralism" versus "multilateralism." They have to do instead with five contrasting ways of conceiving and opera-

[6]Quotations are drawn from Bob Woodward, *Bush At War* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002), pp. 44, 341–2.

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tionalizing multilateral action.

First, the Bush Administration prefers an inductive method that draws ideas from many sources and adapts them to specific conditions. Alternative deductive strategies develop abstract principles and develop them into generic, universal solutions. For instance, the painstakingly crafted individual agreement drawn up for handling war crimes in Sierra Leone, blending local and foreign judicial traditions, is preferable to the one-size-fits-all approach taken in designing the International Criminal Court. The former is designed to solve real problems and get real results on a case-by-case basis. The latter, unfortunately, aims at more rarefied ambitions.

Second, the administration prefers international institutions that judge performance and stress accountability rather than those that maintain a detached neutrality in order to preserve a friendly consensus. Too often, for example, the institutions charged with preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction seemed to choose courtesy over candor. The history of IAEA inspections in Iraq—going back to the 1970s—is exemplary.

Third, the administration prefers multilateral strategies that rely on the sovereign accountability of states instead of strategies that limit sovereignty in order to link states together in a common enterprise—but which thereby dissipate responsibility. As the European Union attempts to develop a "common foreign and security policy", it can hardly avoid a lowest common denominator approach, for example.

Fourth, the administration takes a view of international law that emphasizes democratic accountability, plainly linking the authority of international officials to constitutional sources of political authority that are essentially national in character. Other nations contemplate and encourage much broader delegation of sovereign powers, where only the initial delegation need occur through a democratic process, so that international officials can have greater freedom of action. Hence the U.S. government believes that the International Criminal Court, as a permanent yet essentially stateless entity, might grow ever more distant from the democratic sources of legitimacy that are an essential source for its claimed right to administer global justice.

Fifth, the administration prefers functional institutions that produce concrete results instead of symbolic measures that might rally more support for an ideal, but at the cost of not doing much to further its attainment. Sometimes, as in the case of the Kyoto Accords, well-meaning but dysfunctional efforts can be worse than useless if they complicate attempts to develop a more effective and sustainable solution. We cannot afford such indulgences in a world that in some ways is more threatening today than it was during the Cold War.

REDEFINING NATIONAL SECURITY AS A FUNCTION OF TIME

IMAGINE THREATS as having a cadence—rhythm plus speed. In the past, threats tended to emerge slowly, often visibly, as weapons were forged, armies were conscripted, units were trained and deployed, and enemy forces were massed in position to move. The greatest threats, too, came from large states that could raise and equip the mass armies of the industrial age. Precisely because of their size and elaborate structures, these large states had much to lose in a war. Doctrines of deterrence were developed to confront such states, first in the pre-nuclear and then in the nuclear age.

In today's world, threats can emerge more quickly, without having to accumulate a mass of men and metal. Nor do the

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greatest threats necessarily come from large states that have much to lose.[7] It is thus hard to quarrel with the essential premise of the Bush Administration's open willingness to consider pre-emption, which is that the strategic military doctrines developed for the Cold War must be adapted to the circumstances of the 21st century.

Note, too, the interaction of the new cadence of threat with the new geography of national security. The fault-lines are now inside societies, where even small political factions might have access to weapons of unprecedented destructiveness. The line between internal and international security becomes blurry in parallel with the acceleration of the cadence of threat.

The basic critique of the Bush strategy of pre-emption is that it is better to wait until threats are so acute and universally apparent that a consensus can form in favor of forceful action against them. The flaw in this argument is that there is today a kind of inverse continuum of threat and vulnerability. As a potential enemy's WMD capability becomes more threatening, it becomes less vulnerable to military disruption. Such programs are most vulnerable when they are immature, but that is when the threats they pose are so ambiguous that it is harder to rally allies to act against them. Yet at the point where such threats are so evident that coalitions readily arise, it may be too late—weapons will have already been used, programs will be difficult or impossible to destroy, or outsiders will be themselves deterred by their fear of retaliation.[8]

There is a long tradition in American history of keeping dangerous threats at bay, if necessary by pre-emptive action. Defending Andrew Jackson's pre-emptive invasion of Spanish Florida, his occupation of Pensacola and his execution of individuals inciting Seminole and Creek raids against the United States, Secretary of State John Quincy Adams informed the Spanish government that

> by all the laws of neutrality and of war, as well as of prudence and humanity, [Jackson] was warranted in anticipating his enemy by the amicable and, that being refused, by the forcible occupation. . . . There will need no citations from printed treatises on international law to prove the correctness of this principle. It is engraved in adamant on the common sense of mankind. No writer upon the laws of nations ever pretended to contradict it. None, of any reputation or authority, ever omitted to assert it.[9]

More recently the United States was prepared to deal with acute dangers by taking pre-emptive or preventive military action against states with which we were technically at peace—Cuba and the Soviet Union in 1962 and North Korea in 1994—if diplomacy had failed to remove or contain specified dangers. The great debates in the Kennedy Administration were over whether or how to even give diplomacy a chance. But there is abun-

[7]An essential argument in Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment Revisited", *The National Interest* (Winter 2002/03).

[8]The current cases of North Korea and Iraq offer interesting illustrations. For a general consideration of preventive/pre-emptive strategies, see my essay on "Offensive Military Options", in Robert D. Blackwill & Albert Carnesale, eds., *New Nuclear Nations: Consequences for U.S. Policy* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1993).

[9]Adams to Erving, November 28, 1818, in Worthington Chauncey Ford, ed., *Writings of John Quincy Adams* (New York: Macmillan, 1916), p. 483. John Lewis Gaddis called my attention to the significance of Adams' influence in the Goldman Lectures he delivered in New York City in September 2002.

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dant evidence of President Kennedy's underlying resolve to remove the Soviet missiles from Cuba, one way or another, to prevent an even more dangerous nuclear crisis from arising the next month over Berlin. In 1993 and 1994 the Clinton Administration readied military options against North Korea with evident purpose, but President Clinton never had to make the final decision on what to do if his diplomatic gambit failed. Actually, Iraq is a less clear case of pre-emptive strategy than either of these historical examples, since the United States and the most concerned allies have been in a state of hostilities against Iraq for years. The United States and others have long been conducting constant, if mostly low-intensity, combat operations ever since Iraq conclusively broke the terms of the 1991 military truce that suspended, but never concluded, the Gulf War.

The Bush Administration's strategy is a more explicit adaptation to the new conditions of international life. That explicitness has drawn fire from some who argue that while it might be proper to hold these views, it is not wise to call attention to them. They do not reject the administration's thinking, and can themselves list many examples of real and potential cases of pre-emption. They rather accuse the administration of tactlessness.

The new strategy is somewhat provocative, but it is deliberately so. It must be provocative if it is to foster the painful worldwide debate that must occur in order to condition the international community to think hard about these new dangers, and about how the cadence of security threats has changed. Although the debate is still raging, the older habits of thought are already changing, subtly, around the world. It remains to be seen how the argument over what is and is not tactful will ultimately be settled.

In any event, the United States has not arrogated to itself some vague right to pursue and pummel anyone it dislikes, as many critics contend. The strategy document lists five criteria that must be met for a state or an organization to cast itself outside of ordinary international protection. Condoleezza Rice observed in her Wriston lecture:

> [T]his approach must be treated with great caution. The number of cases in which it might be justified will always be small. It does not give a green light—to the United States or any other nation—to act first without exhausting other means, including diplomacy. Pre-emptive action does not come at the beginning of a long chain of effort. The threat must be very grave. And the risks of waiting must far outweigh the risks of action.

Moreover, the administration's focus is not just on security threats, but also on opportunities. The terrorists have no vision of the future that can assure Muslim parents that their children will lead a better life; the United States does. There are only a few states that could start a new wave of dangerous WMD proliferation, and deflecting them now may nudge history in the right direction. Failure to do so, however, may condemn millions to needless suffering and the American people to years of living in fear.

Grand Strategy and Small Realities

THE BUSH Administration has helped spur worldwide debate not only about the purposes of American power, but about the objectives of the international system as a whole. The United States is not challenging the necessity of international institutions for common action, but it is pressing other nations to decide what they want, to reconsider how to get it, and to re-evaluate old habits in light of new realities. This is an uncomfortable and necessarily disruptive process, and the

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U.S. government is bound to add its share of distracted stumbles to its progress. But the international agenda is already changing in positive ways.

Grand strategy usually disappoints when it is carried into action. Measured against this or that phrase, this or any administration will come up short. But it is possible to offer general direction, to set different chains of action and reaction into motion. Critics of the Bush Administration's emerging ideas must either accept the new definitions of national security presented or articulate coherent alternatives, working through the implications of present—not past—realities.

There are always too many problems. But the great powers are working together more than anyone would have considered possible half a century ago. New approaches to economic and humanitarian cooperation offer great promise. The advances in human liberty and material well-being just since 1990 have been staggering enough to encourage ambitious thoughts about what might be possible. With new understandings about the real problems the United States and its friends face together, and a flexible, pragmatic approach to achieving them, the prospects have never been better for the project of building a commonwealth of freedom. □

Patience, Flexibility, Intelligence

For progress there is no cure. Any attempt to find automatically safe channels for the present explosive variety of progress must lead to frustration. The only safety possible is relative, and it lies in an intelligent exercise of day-to-day judgment.

The problems created by the combination of the presently possible forms of nuclear warfare and the rather unusually unstable international situation are formidable and not to be solved easily. Those of the next decades are likely to be similarly vexing, 'only more so.' The U.S.-USSR tension is bad, but when other nations begin to make felt their full offensive potential weight, things will not become simpler.

Present awful possibilities of nuclear warfare may give way to others even more awful. . . . [and] we should not deceive ourselves: once such possibilities become actual, they will be exploited. It will, therefore, be necessary to develop suitable new political forms and procedures. All experience shows that even smaller technological changes than those now in the cards profoundly transform political and social relationships. Experience also shows that these transformations are not *a priori* predictable and that most contemporary 'first guesses' concerning them are wrong. For all these reasons, one should take neither present difficulties nor presently proposed reforms too seriously.

The one solid fact is that the difficulties are due to an evolution that, while useful and constructive, is also dangerous. Can we produce the required adjustments with the necessary speed? The most hopeful answer is that the human species has been subjected to similar tests before and seems to have a congenital ability to come through, after varying amounts of trouble. To ask in advance for a complete recipe would be unreasonable. We can specify only the human qualities required: patience, flexibility, intelligence.

—John von Neumann
"Can We Survive Technology?"
Fortune (June 1955)

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Imperial Temptations

Jack Snyder

AMERICA TODAY embodies a paradox of omnipotence and vulnerability. The U.S. military budget is greater than those of the next 14 countries combined and the American economy is larger than the next three combined. Yet Americans going about their daily lives face a greater risk of sudden death from terrorist attack than ever before. This situation has fostered a psychology of vulnerability that makes Americans hyperalert to foreign dangers and predisposed to use military power in what may be self-defeating attempts to escape their fears.

The Bush Administration's new national security doctrine, which provides a superficially attractive rationale for preventive war, reflects this uneasy state of mind.[1] In an open society, no strictly defensive strategy against terrorism can be foolproof. Similarly, deterring terrorist attack by the threat of retaliation seems impossible when the potential attackers welcome suicide. Bizarre or diabolical leaders of potentially nuclear-armed rogue states may likewise seem undeterrable. If so, attacking the sources of potential threats before they can mount their own attacks may seem the only safe option. Such a strategy presents a great temptation to a country as strong as the United States, which can project overwhelming military power to any spot on the globe.

In adopting this strategy, however, America risks marching in the well-trod footsteps of virtually every imperial power of the modern age. America has no formal colonial empire and seeks none, but like other great powers over the past two centuries, it has sometimes sought to impose peace on the tortured politics of weaker societies. Consequently, it faces many of the same strategic dilemmas as did the great powers that have gone before it. The Bush Administration's rhetoric of preventive war, however, does not reflect a sober appreciation of the American predicament, but instead echoes point by point the disastrous strategic ideas of those earlier keepers of imperial order.

Imperial Overstretch

LIKE AMERICA, the great empires of the 19th and 20th centuries enjoyed huge asymmetries of power relative to the societies

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[1]Office of the President, *National Security Strategy of the United States* [hereafter *NSS*], September 2002.

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at their periphery, yet they rightly feared disruptive attack from unruly peoples along the turbulent frontier of empire. Suspecting that their empires were houses of cards, imperial rulers feared that unchecked defiance on the periphery might cascade toward the imperial core. Repeatedly they tried the strategy of preventive attack to nip challenges in the bud and prevent their spread.

Typically, the preventive use of force proved counterproductive for imperial security because it often sparked endless brushfire wars at the edges of the empire, internal rebellions, and opposition from powers not yet conquered or otherwise subdued. Historically, the preventive pacification of one turbulent frontier of empire has usually led to the creation of another one, adjacent to the first. When the British conquered what is now Pakistan, for example, the turbulent frontier simply moved to neighboring Afghanistan. It was impossible to conquer everyone, so there was always another frontier.

Even inside well-established areas of imperial control, the use of repressive force against opponents often created a backlash among subjects who came to reassess the relative dangers and benefits of submission. The Amritsar massacre of 1919, for example, was the death knell for British India because it radicalized a formerly circumspect opposition. Moreover, the preventive use of force inside the empire and along its frontiers often intensified resistance from independent powers outside the empire who feared that unchecked, ruthless imperial force would soon encroach upon them. In other words, the balance of power kicked in. Through all of these mechanisms, empires have typically found that the preventive use of force expanded their security problems instead of ameliorating them.

As the dynamic of imperial overstretch became clearer, many of the great powers decided to solve their security dilemmas through even bolder preventive offensives. None of these efforts worked. To secure their European holdings, Napoleon and Hitler marched to Moscow, only to be engulfed in the Russian winter. Kaiser Wilhelm's Germany tried to break the allies' encirclement through unrestricted submarine warfare, which brought America's industrial might into the war against it. Imperial Japan, facing a quagmire in China and a U.S. oil embargo, tried to break what it saw as impending encirclement by seizing the Indonesian oil fields and preventively attacking Pearl Harbor. All sought security through expansion, and all ended in imperial collapse.

Some great powers, however, have pulled back from overstretch and husbanded their power for another day. Democratic great powers, notably Britain and the United States, are prominent among empires that learned how to retrench. At the turn of the 20th century, British leaders saw that the strategy of "splendid isolation"—what we would now call unilateralism—was getting the empire into trouble. The independence struggle of Boer farmers in South Africa drained the imperial coffers while, at the same time, the European great powers were challenging Britain's naval mastery and its hold on other colonial positions. Quickly doing the math, the British patched up relations with their secondary rivals, France and Russia, to form an alliance directed at the main danger, Germany. Likewise, when the United States blundered into war in Vietnam, it retrenched and adopted a more patient strategy for waiting out its less capable communist opponents.

Contemporary America, too, is capable of anticipating the counterproductive effects of offensive policies and of moderating them before much damage is done. The Bush team, guided by wary public opinion, worked through existing UN res-

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olutions during the fall of 2002 to increase multilateral support for its threats of preventive war against Iraq. Moreover, the administration declined to apply mechanically its preventive war principles when North Korea renounced international controls on its nuclear materials in December 2002. Strikingly, too, a December codicil to the *NSS*, dealing specifically with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, never mentioned the option of preventive attack.[2] A brief tour through the misguided strategic ideas of previous empires underscores the wisdom of such self-restraint.

Myths of Security Through Expansion

EVERY MAJOR historical instance of imperial overstretch has been propelled by arguments that security could best be achieved through further expansion—"myths of empire", I have called them.[3] Since many of these myths are echoed eerily in the Bush Administration's strategic rhetoric, it is worthwhile recalling how those earlier advocates of imperial overstretch tried to make their dubious cases. Eight themes deserve mention.

OFFENSIVE ADVANTAGE

THE MOST general of the myths of empire is that the attacker has an inherent advantage. Sometimes this is explained in terms of the advantages of surprise. More often, it relies on the broader notion that seizing the initiative allows the attacker to impose a plan on a passive enemy and to choose a propitious time and circumstance for the fight. Even if the political objective is self-defense, in this view, attacking is still the best strategy. As the *NSS* says, "our best defense is a good offense."

Throughout history, strategists who have blundered into imperial overstretch have shared this view. For example, General Alfred von Schlieffen, the author of Germany's misbegotten plan for a quick, decisive offensive in France in 1914, used to say that "if one is too weak to attack the whole" of the other side's army, "one should attack a section."[4] This idea defies elementary military common sense. In war, the weaker side normally remains on the defensive precisely because defending its home ground is typically easier than attacking the other side's strongholds.

The idea of offensive advantage also runs counter to the most typical patterns of deterrence and coercion. Sometimes the purpose of a military operation is not to take or hold territory but to influence an adversary by inflicting pain. This is especially true when weapons of mass destruction are involved. In that case, war may resemble a competition in the willingness to endure pain. Here too, however, the defender normally has the advantage, because the side defending its own homeland and the survival of its regime typically cares more about the stakes of the conflict than does a would-be attacker. It is difficult to imagine North Korea using nuclear weapons or mounting a conventional artillery barrage on the South Korean capital of Seoul for purposes of conquest, but it is much easier to envision such desperate measures in response to "preventive" U.S. attacks on the core power resources of the regime.

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[2]Office of the President, *National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction*, December 2002.

[3]See my *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991). I used the term "empire" in the general sense of a powerful state that uses force to expand its influence abroad beyond the point at which the costs of expansion begin to rise sharply.

[4]Quoted in my *Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984), p. 113.

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Because the Bush Administration saw such retaliation as feasible and credible, it was deterred from undertaking preventive strikes when the North Koreans unsealed a nuclear reactor in December. Indeed, deterring any country from attacking is almost always easier than compelling it to disarm, surrender territory or change its regime. Once stated, this point seems obvious, but the logic of the Bush strategy document implies the opposite.

POWER SHIFTS

ONE REASON that blundering empires have been keen on offensive strategies is that they have relied on preventive attacks to forestall unfavorable shifts in the balance of power. In both World War I and II, for example, Germany's leaders sought war with Russia in the short run because they expected the Russian army to gain relative strength over time.[5] But the tactic backfired badly. Preventive aggression not only turned a possible enemy into a certain one, but in the long run it helped bring other powers into the fight to prevent Germany from gaining hegemony over all of them. This reflects a fundamental realist principle of the balance of power: In the international system, states and other powerful actors tend to form alliances against the expansionist state that most threatens them. Attackers provoke fears that drive their potential victims to cooperate with each other.

Astute strategists learn to anticipate such cooperation and try to use it to their advantage. For example, one of the most successful diplomats in European history, Otto von Bismarck, achieved the unification of Germany by always putting the other side in the wrong and, whenever possible, maneuvering the opponent into attacking first. As a result, Prussia expanded its control over the German lands without provoking excessive fears or resistance. Pressed by his generals on several occasions to authorize preventive attacks, Bismarck said that preventive war is like committing suicide from fear of death; it would "put the full weight of the imponderables . . . on the side of the enemies we have attacked."[6] Instead, he demanded patience: "I have often had to stand for long periods of time in the hunting blind and let myself be covered and stung by insects before the moment came to shoot."[7] Germany fared poorly under Bismarck's less-able successors, who shared his ruthlessness but lacked his understanding of the balance of power.

Because Saddam Hussein attacked Kuwait, the elder Bush enjoyed a diplomatic advantage in the 1991 war. That's why the coalition against Iraq was so large and willing. This advantage is vastly and inherently more difficult to achieve in a strategy of preventive attack, as the younger Bush has learned over the past year. Especially when an adverse power shift is merely hypothetical and not imminent, it hardly seems worthwhile to incur the substantial diplomatic disadvantages of a preventive attack.

PAPER TIGER ENEMIES

EMPIRES ALSO become overstretched when they view their enemies as paper tigers, capable of becom-

[5]Dale C. Copeland, *The Origins of Major War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000).

[6]Gordon Craig, *Germany: 1866–1945* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), pp. 24–25; and Gerhard Ritter, *The Sword and the Scepter: The Problem of Militarism in Germany*, vol. 1 (Coral Gables, FL: University of Miami Press, 1969), p. 245, quoting Bismarck's Reichstag speech of February 6, 1888.

[7]Quoted in Otto Pflanze, *Bismarck and the Development of Germany: The Period of Unification, 1815–1871* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 90.

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ing fiercely threatening if appeased, but easily crumpled by a resolute attack. These images are often not only wrong, but self-contradictory. For example, Japanese militarists saw the United States as so strong and insatiably aggressive that Japan would have to conquer a huge, self-sufficient empire to get the resources to defend itself; yet at the same time, the Japanese regime saw the United States as so vulnerable and irresolute that a sharp rap against Pearl Harbor would discourage it from fighting back.

Similarly, the Bush Administration's arguments for preventive war against Iraq have portrayed Saddam Hussein as being completely undeterrable from using weapons of mass destruction, yet Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said he expected that Iraq would not use them even if attacked because "wise Iraqis will not obey his orders to use WMD."[8] In other words, administration strategists think that deterrence is impossible even in situations in which Saddam lacks a motive to use weapons of mass destruction, but they think deterrence will succeed when a U.S. attack provides Iraq the strongest imaginable motive to use its weapons. The *NSS* says "the greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction"; but this is a rationale for preventive attack only if we accept a paper tiger image of the enemy.

BANDWAGONS

ANOTHER MYTH of empire is that states tend to jump on the bandwagon with threatening or forceful powers. During the Cold War, for example, the Soviet Union thought that forceful action in Berlin, Cuba and the developing world would demonstrate its political and military strength, encourage so-called progressive forces to ally actively with Moscow, and thereby shift the balance of forces still further in the favor of the communist bloc. The Soviets called this the "correlation of forces" theory. In fact, the balance of power effect far outweighed and erased the bandwagon effect. The Soviet Union was left far weaker in relative terms as a result of its pressing for unilateral advantage. As Churchill said of the Soviets in the wake of the first Berlin Crisis, "Why have they deliberately acted for three long years so as to unite the free world against them?"[9]

During the 1991 Gulf War, the earlier Bush Administration argued that rolling back Saddam Hussein's conquest of Kuwait was essential to discourage Arabs throughout the Middle East from jumping on the Iraqi bandwagon. Now the current Bush Administration hopes that bandwagon dynamics can be made to work in its own favor. Despite the difficulties that the United States has had in lining up support for an invasion of Iraq, the administration nonetheless asserts that its strategy of preventive war will lead others to jump on the U.S. bandwagon. Secretary Rumsfeld has said that "if our leaders do the right thing, others will follow and support our just cause—just as they have in the global war against terror."[10]

At the same time, some self-styled realists in the administration also argue that their policy is consistent with the concept of the balance of power, but the rhetoric of the *NSS* pulls this concept inside out: "Through our willingness to use force in our own defense and in the defense of others, the United States demonstrates its resolve to maintain a balance of power that favors freedom." What this Orwellian statement really seems to mean is that preventive war will attract a bandwagon of support that creates an

[8]Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, September 18–9, 2002.

[9]Speech at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, March 31, 1949.

[10]Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, September 18–9, 2002.

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*im*balance of power in America's favor, a conception that is logically the same as the wrongheaded Soviet theory of the "correlation of forces." Administration strategists like to use the terminology of the balance of power, but they understand that concept exactly backwards.

BIG STICK DIPLOMACY

A CLOSELY RELATED myth is the big stick theory of making friends by threatening them. Before World War I, Germany's leaders found that its rising power and belligerent diplomacy had pushed France, Russia and Britain into a loose alliance against it. In the backwards reasoning of German diplomacy, they decided to try to break apart this encirclement by trumping up a crisis over claims to Morocco, threatening France with an attack and hoping to prove to French leaders that its allies would not come to its rescue. In fact, Britain did support France, and the noose around Germany grew tighter.

How does the United States today seek to win friends abroad? The *NSS* offers some reassuring language about the need to work with allies. Unlike President Bill Clinton in the Kosovo war, President Bush worked very hard for a UN resolution to authorize an attack on Iraq. Nonetheless, on the Iraq issue and a series of others, the administration has extorted cooperation primarily by threats to act unilaterally, not gained it by persuasion or concessions. Russia was forced to accept a new strategic arms control regime on take-it-or-leave-it American terms. EU member states were similarly compelled to accept an exemption for U.S. officials from prosecution by the International Criminal Court. Germany was snubbed for resisting the war against Iraq. Multilateral initiatives on the environment were summarily rejected. Secretary Rumsfeld, in his personal jottings on strategy, has raised to the level of principle the dictum that the United States should "avoid trying so hard to persuade others to join a coalition that we compromise on our goals."[11] Either the administration believes allies are dispensable, or a powerful faction within it adheres to the Kaiser Wilhelm theory of diplomacy.

FALLING DOMINOES

ANOTHER COMMON myth of empire is the famous domino theory. According to this conception, small setbacks at the periphery of the empire will tend to snowball into an unstoppable chain of defeats that will ultimately threaten the imperial core. Consequently, empires must fight hard to prevent even the most trivial setbacks. Various causal mechanisms are imagined that might trigger such cascades: The opponent will seize ever more strategic resources from these victories, tipping the balance of forces and making further conquests easier. Vulnerable defenders will lose heart. Allies and enemies alike will come to doubt the empire's resolve to fight for its commitments. An empire's domestic political support will be undermined. Above all, lost credibility is the ultimate domino.

Such reasoning has been nearly universal among overstretched empires.[12] For example, in 1898 the British and the French both believed that if a French scouting party could claim a tributary of the Upper Nile—at a place called Fashoda—France could build a dam there, block the flow of the Nile, trigger chaos in Egypt that would force Britain out of the Suez Canal, cut Britain's strategic lifeline to India, and thus topple the empire that depended on India's wealth and manpow-

[11]Rumsfeld quoted in the *New York Times*, October 4, 2002.

[12]See Charles Kupchan, *The Vulnerability of Empire* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994).

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er. Britain and France, both democracies, nearly went to war because of this chimera. Similarly, Cold War America believed that if Vietnam fell to communism, then the credibility of its commitment to defend Taiwan, Japan and Berlin would be debased. Arguably, the peripheral setback in Vietnam tarnished American deterrent credibility only because we so often and so insistenly said it would.

Similar arguments, especially ones that hinge on lost credibility, have informed Secretary Rumsfeld's brief for preventive war against Iraq. In a nice rhetorical move, he quoted former President Clinton to the effect that if "we fail to act" against Saddam's non-compliance with inspections,

> he will conclude that the international community has lost its will. He will conclude that he can go right on and do more to rebuild an arsenal of devastating destruction. . . . Some day, some way, I guarantee you he will use that arsenal.[13]

Rumsfeld could have added (but didn't) that the Clinton Administration made the same argument even more strongly about the dire precedent that would be set by permitting the further expansion of North Korea's nuclear weapons capability. Ironically, the credibility of the United States is on the line in such cases mainly because of its own rhetoric.

And yet it may be that the threat of an American attack is all *too* credible. The main motivation for North Korea to break out of the 1994 agreement constraining its nuclear program was apparently its perceived need, in light of the Bush Administration's preventive war doctrine and reluctance to negotiate, for more powerful weapons to deter the United States.

A ubiquitous corollary of the domino theory holds that it is cheap and easy to stop aggressors if it is done early on. Secretary Rumsfeld has made this kind of argument to justify a preventive attack on Iraq. Between 35 and 60 million people died needlessly, he claimed, because the world didn't attack Hitler preventively: "He might have been stopped early—at minimal cost in lives—had the vast majority of the world's leaders not decided at the time that the risks of acting were greater than the risks of not acting." Apart from its questionable relevance to the case of Iraq, the historical point is itself debatable: Britain and France were militarily ill-prepared to launch a preventive attack at the time of the Munich crisis, and if they had, they probably would have had to fight Germany without the Soviet Union and the United States as allies. As Bismarck had understood, preventive war is bad strategy in part because it often leads to diplomatic isolation.

EL DORADO AND MANIFEST DESTINY

MOST OF the central myths of empire focus on a comparison of the alleged costs of offensive versus defensive strategies. In addition, myths that exaggerate the benefits of imperial expansion sometimes play an important role in strategic debates. For example, German imperialism before World War I was fueled in part by the false idea that Central Africa would be an El Dorado of resources that would strengthen Germany's strategic position in the same way that India had supposedly strengthened Britain's. In debates about preventive war in Iraq, some commentators have portrayed an anticipated oil windfall as a comparable El Dorado. Astutely, the Bush Administration has refrained from rhetoric about this potential boon, realiz-

[13]Clinton quoted by Rumsfeld, Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, September 18–9, 2002.

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ing that it would be counterproductive and unnecessary to dwell on it. Such a windfall could turn out to be a curse in any event, since pumping massive amounts of oil to pay for an occupation of Iraq could undercut Saudi oil revenues and destabilize the political system there.

Sometimes the promised benefits of imperial expansion are also ideological—for example, France's civilizing mission or America's mission to make the world safe for democracy. In a surprising moment of candor, John Foster Dulles, a decade before he became Dwight Eisenhower's Secretary of State, wrote that all empires had been "imbued with and radiated great faiths [like] Manifest Destiny [and] The White Man's Burden." We Americans "need a faith", said Dulles, "that will make us strong, a faith so pronounced that we, too, will feel that we have a mission to spread throughout the world."[14] An idealistic goal is patently invoked here for its instrumental value in mobilizing support for the imperial enterprise.

The idealistic notes that grace the Bush Administration's strategy paper have the same hollow ring. The document is chock full of high-sounding prose about the goal of spreading democracy to Iraq and other countries living under the yoke of repression. President Bush's preface to the strategy document asserts that "the United States enjoys a position of unparalleled military strength", which creates "a moment of opportunity to extend the benefits of freedom across the globe. We will actively work to bring the hope of democracy, development, free markets, and free trade to every corner of the world." This sounds like insincere public relations in light of candidate Bush's warnings against the temptations of nation-building abroad. The theme of promoting democracy is rare in Secretary Rumsfeld's statements, which may turn out to be a better index of the administration's underlying views.

NO TRADEOFFS

A FINAL MYTH of empire is that in strategy there are no tradeoffs. Proponents of imperial expansion tend to pile on every argument from the whole list of myths of empire. It is not enough to argue that the opponent is a paper tiger, or that dominoes tend to fall, or that big stick diplomacy will make friends, or that a preventive attack will help to civilize the natives. Rather, proponents of offensive self-defense inhabit a rhetorical world in which *all* of these things are simultaneously true, and thus all considerations point in the same direction.

The Bush Administration's strategic rhetoric about Iraq in late 2002 did not disappoint in this regard. Saddam was portrayed as undeterrable, as getting nuclear weapons unless deposed and giving them to terrorists, the war against him would be cheap and easy, grumbling allies would jump on our bandwagon, Iraq would become a democracy, and the Arab street would thank the United States for liberating it. In real life, as opposed to the world of imperial rhetoric, it is surprising when every conceivable consideration supports the preferred strategy. As is so often the case with the myths of empire, this piling on of reinforcing claims smacks of *ex post facto* justification rather than serious strategic assessment.

During the 2000 presidential campaign, Condoleezza Rice wrote of Iraq that "the first line of defense should be a clear and classical statement of deterrence—if they do acquire WMD, their weapons will be unusable because any attempt to use them will bring national obliteration."[15]

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[14] "A Righteous Faith for a Just and Durable Peace", October 1942, Dulles Papers, quoted in Ronald Pruessen, *John Foster Dulles: The Road to Power* (New York: Free Press, 1982), p. 200.

[15] Rice, "Promoting the National Interest", *Foreign Affairs* (January/February 2000), p. 61.

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Two years later, however, the possibility of deterrence has become unthinkable as administration rhetoric regarding Iraq has been piled higher and higher. "Given the goals of rogue states [and] the inability to deter a potential attacker" of this kind, says the *NSS*, "we cannot let our enemies strike first." Administration dogma left no room for any assessment of Iraq that did not reinforce the logic of the prevailing preventive strategy.

Why Are Myths of Empire So Prevalent?

IN AMERICA today, strategic experts abound. Many are self-styled realists, people who pride themselves on accepting the hard reality that the use of force is often necessary in the defense of national interests. It is striking that many of these realists consider the Bush Administration's strategic justifications for preventive war against Iraq to be unconvincing. Indeed, 32 prominent international relations scholars, most of them realists, bought an ad in the *New York Times* to make their case against the Bush strategy. Included among them was the leading proponent of the "offensive realism" school of thought, John Mearsheimer, a professor at the University of Chicago.[16]

Proponents of the new preventive strategy charge that such realists are out of touch with a world in which forming alliances to balance against overwhelming U.S. power has simply become impossible. It is true that small rogue states and their ilk cannot on their own offset American power in the traditional sense. It is also true that their potential great-power backers, Russia and China, have so far been wary of overtly opposing U.S. military interventions. But even if America's unprecedented power reduces the likelihood of traditional balancing alliances arising against it, the United States could find that its own offensive actions create their functional equivalents. Some earlier expansionist empires found themselves overstretched and surrounded by enemies even though balancing alliances were slow to oppose them. For example, although the prospective victims of Napoleon and Hitler found it difficult to form effective balancing coalitions, these empires attacked so many opponents simultaneously that substantial *de facto* alliances eventually did form against them. Today, an analogous form of self-imposed overstretch—political as well as military—could occur if the need for military operations to prevent nuclear proliferation risks were deemed urgent on several fronts at the same time, or if an attempt to impose democracy by force of arms on a score or more of Muslim countries were seriously undertaken.

Even in the absence of highly coordinated balancing alliances, simultaneous resistance by several troublemaking states and terrorist groups would be a daunting challenge for a strategy of universal preventive action. Highly motivated small powers or rebel movements defending their home ground have often prevailed against vastly superior states that lacked the sustained motivation to dominate them at extremely high cost, as in Vietnam and Algeria. Even when they do not prevail, as on the West Bank, they may fight on, imposing high costs over long periods.

Precisely because America is so strong, weak states on America's hit list may increasingly conclude that weapons of mass destruction joined to terror tactics are the only feasible equalizer to its power. Despite America's aggregate power advantages, weaker opponents can get access to outside resources to sustain this kind of cost-imposing resistance.

[16] *New York Times*, September 26, 2002. See also John J. Mearsheimer, "Hearts and Minds", *The National Interest* (Fall 2002), p. 15.

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Even a state as weak and isolated as North Korea has been able to mount a credible deterrent, in part by engaging in mutually valuable strategic trade with Pakistan and other Middle Eastern states. The Bush Administration itself stresses that Iraq bought components for the production of weapons of mass destruction on the commercial market and fears that no embargo can stop this. Iran is buying a nuclear reactor from Russia that the United States views as posing risks of nuclear proliferation. Palestinian suicide bombers successfully impose severe costs with minimal resources. In the September 11 attack, Al-Qaeda famously used its enemy's own resources.

In short, both historically and today, it seems hard to explain the prevalence of the myths of empire in terms of objective strategic analysis. So what, then, explains it?

In some historical cases, narrow interest groups that profited from imperial expansion or military preparations hijacked strategic debates by controlling the media or bankrolling imperial pressure groups. In imperial Japan, for example, when a civilian strategic planning board pointed out the implausibilities and contradictions in the militarists' worldview, its experts were thanked for their trenchant analysis and then summarily fired. In pre-World War I Germany, internal documents showing the gaping holes in the offensive strategic plans of the army and navy were kept secret, and civilians lacked the information or expertise to criticize the military's public reasoning. The directors of Krupp Steelworks subsidized the belligerent German Navy League before 1914, and then in the 1920s monopolized the wire services that brought nationalist-slanted news to Germany's smaller cities and towns. These were precisely the constituencies that later voted most heavily for Hitler.

In other cases, myths of empire were propounded by hard-pressed leaders seeking to rally support by pointing a finger at real or imagined enemies. For example, in the aftermath of the French Revolution, a series of unstable regimes found that they could increase their short-run popularity by exaggerating the threat from monarchical neighboring states and from aristocratic traitors to the Revolution. Napoleon perfected this strategy of rule, transforming the republic of the Rights of Man into an ever-expanding empire of popular nationalism.

Once the myths of empire gain widespread currency in a society, their origins in political expediency are often forgotten. Members of the second generation become true believers in the domino theory, big stick diplomacy and the civilizing mission. Kaiser Wilhelm's ministers were self-aware manipulators, but their audiences, including the generation that formed the Nazi movement, believed in German nationalist ideology with utmost conviction. In a process that Stephen Van Evera has called "blowback", the myths of empire may become ingrained in the psyche of the people and the institutions of their state.

Many skeptics about attacking Iraq suspect that similar domestic political dynamics are at the root of the Bush doctrine of preventive war. In particular, they think that the Iraq project echoes the plot of recent fictions in which a foreign war is trumped up to win an election. Some suggested that the day after the November 2002 election, the drumbeat of war would miraculously slacken and then disappear. Such rank cynicism deserved to be disappointed, and it was. Some members of Bush's inner circle have been spoiling for a rematch with Iraq for years, so clearly the convergence of its timing with the mid-term congressional election was a coincidence. Nonetheless, it probably did not hurt the hawks' cause in White House deliberations that the Iraq issue succeeded

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in pushing the parlous state of the economy off the front pages at a convenient moment.

A deeper reason for the prevalence of the myths of empire in contemporary debates is the legacy of Cold War rhetoric in the tropes of American strategic discourse. The Rumsfeld generation grew to political maturity inculcated with the Munich analogy and the domino theory. It is true that an opposite metaphor, the quagmire, is readily available for skeptics to invoke as a result of the Vietnam experience. But after the September 11 attack and the easy victory over the Taliban, the American political audience is primed for Munich analogies and preventive war, not for quagmire theories. Indeed, it is striking how many Senate speeches on the resolution authorizing the use of force in Iraq began with references to the effect of September 11 on the American psyche. They did not necessarily argue that the Iraqi government is a terrorist organization like Al-Qaeda. They simply noted the emotional reality that the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon had left Americans fearful and ready to fight back forcefully against threats of many sorts. In this sense, America is psychologically primed to accept the myths of empire. They "feel right"; but this is no way to run a grand strategy.

A final reason why America is primed to accept the myths of empire is simply the temptation of great power. As the German realist historian Ludwig Dehio wrote about Germany's bid for a hegemonic position in Europe, "since the supreme power stands in the solitude of its supremacy, it must face daemonic temptations of a special kind."[17] More recently, Christopher Layne has chronicled the tendency of unipolar hegemonic states since the Spain of Philip II to succumb to the temptations of overstretch and thereby to provoke the enmity of an opposing coalition.[18] Today, the United States is so strong compared to everyone else that almost any imaginable military objective may seem achievable. This circumstance, supercharged by the rhetoric of the myths of empire, makes the temptation of preventive war almost irresistible.

THE HISTORICAL record warrants a skeptical attitude toward arguments that security can be achieved through imperial expansion and preventive war. Moving beyond mere skepticism, we may consider a general prescription, one that might resonate with both liberals and realists alike.

Liberals might want to review a recent book by G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory*, which tells the story of attempts by the victors in global power contests to establish a stable post-conflict international order.[19] Ikenberry shows that democracies are particularly well suited to succeed in this because the transparency of their political institutions makes them trustworthy bargaining partners in the eyes of weaker states. As a result, strong and weak states are able to commit themselves to an international constitution that serves the interests of both. Realists should study this book, too, because it explains why even the strongest of powers has an incentive to lead through consensus rather than raw coercion.

President Bush's National Security

[17]Dehio, *Germany and World Politics in the Twentieth Century* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1967 [1959]), p. 15.

[18]Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Powers Will Rise", *International Security* (Spring 1993).

[19]See Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000); and Ikenberry, "Getting Hegemony Right", *The National Interest* (Spring 2001).

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Advisor, former Stanford political science professor and provost Condoleezza Rice, has recently advanced a much different view of the interplay of power-political realism and democratic idealism. (Once you have been a professor of international relations, it is evidently hard to get these debates out of your blood.) She argues that realism and idealism should not be seen as alternatives: a realistic sense of power politics should be used in the service of ideals. Who could possibly disagree? But contrary to what she and Bush once argued on the campaign trail about humility and a judicious sense of limits, Rice now believes that America's vast military power should be used preventively to spread democratic ideals. She has also said, speaking in New York this past October, that the aim of the Bush strategy is "to dissuade any potential adversary from pursuing a military build-up in the hope of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States and our allies." Today, no combination of adversaries can hope to equal America's power under any circumstances. However, if they fear the unbridled use of America's power, they may perceive overwhelming incentives to wield weapons of terror and mass destruction to deter America's offensive tactics of self-defense. Indeed, the history of the myths of empire suggests that a general strategy of preventive war is likely to bring about precisely the outcome that Bush and Rice wish to avert. □

Of Empire, Power Balances and Preventive War

To speak now of the true temper of empire, it is a thing rare and hard to keep; for both temper, and distemper, consist of contraries. . . . The difficulties in princes' business are many and great; but the greatest difficulty, is often in their own mind. For it is common with princes (saith Tacitus) to will contradictories, *Sunt plerumque regum voluntates vehementes, et inter se contrariae*. For it is the solecism of power, to think to command the end, and yet not to endure the mean. . . .

For their neighbors; there can no general rule be given (for occasions are so variable), save one, which ever holdeth, which is, that princes do keep due sentinel, that none of their neighbors do ever grow so (by increase of territory, by embracing of trade, by approaches, or the like), as they become more able to annoy them, than they were. And this is generally the work of standing counsels, to foresee and to hinder it. During that triumvirate of kings, King Henry the Eighth of England, Francis the First King of France, and Charles the Fifth Emperor, there was such a watch kept, that none of the three could win a palm of ground, but the other two would straightways balance it, either by confederation, or, if need were, by a war; and would not in any wise take up peace at interest. . . .

Neither is the opinion of some of the Schoolmen, to be received, *that a war cannot justly be made, but upon a precedent injury or provocation.* For there is no question, but a just fear of an imminent danger, though there be no blow given, is a lawful cause of a war. . . .

—Francis Bacon

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The Death of Conquest

Anna Simons

THERE HAVE been at least two elephants in the room since September 11, 2001. The one nobody wants to arouse is Islam; the one nobody wants to acknowledge is conquest. We don't "do" conquest anymore. Our presumptions seem to be that we shouldn't do it, and that we can't do it. Thus in the polymorphous scholarship and commentary that have appeared since last September 11, those who would influence policy argue over the lures of pre-emption and the limits of power. They debate a putative U.S. imperial role and reflect on the predicates of American history. But old-fashioned conquest, in which ground is seized and populations are controlled against their will for extended periods, is never raised as a policy option. The world community, such as it is, has come to oppose utterly wars fought overtly and permanently to occupy, subjugate or seize another country or its population. This represents a genuine if frequently overlooked new norm of international politics.[1]

World War II is the obvious watershed for this new norm. That war was initiated by those bent on literal conquest on the grandest scale, and once they were beaten the Allies came up with all sorts of safeguards to prevent conquerors from ever again being able to contemplate such a project. Nuclear weapons soon came to represent another deterrent in our anti-conquest arsenal, and the creation of the United Nations yet another. Indeed, the UN exists only because member states agree that territorial sovereignty is so inviolate that cross-border invasion should be a punishable offense. The rapid dissolution of the vast British and French colonial empires after World War II was to some degree a result of the new anti-conquest norm, but it also contributed to it by illustrating the impermanence and costly trouble of imperial control.

The very nature of the Cold War drove a further nail in conquest's coffin. Given the specter of mutually assured destruction, both we and the Soviets realized, privately at least, that neither side could pursue the outright conquest of the other; thus all military competition shifted toward the proxy (in places like Vietnam) and the symbolic (with arcane calculations of warheads and throw-weight). Besides, it was communism we opposed, so that "to win" the Cold War came to mean undermining (or overwhelming) an ideology and its trappings, not conquering Russia

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[1]Coral Bell's insightful essay, "Normative Shift", in the Winter 2002/03 issue, mentions several new 20th-century norms—but not the death of conquest.

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or subjugating Russians. The very fact that international politics at its most consequential level was conducted for over half a century without reference to the possibility of literal conquest had huge implications that we have yet to recognize, let alone fully digest.

The broad consensus against conquest has not, of course, abolished entirely the urge to conquer—witness the Argentine invasion of the Falklands and Iraq's incursion into Kuwait. But it has made clear that international wars of conquest stand an excellent chance of being forcefully sanctioned or opposed by powers acting under the aegis of "the international community."

Other factors, too, have discounted the relative significance of sheer military force—and one of these is the way today's greatest power, the United States, conceives of military force relative to other forms of power. We are a corporate republic, a capitalist juggernaut whose expansionist impulses are gladly sublimated in capturing markets and extending our economic reach. Like the Hellenes before us, we tend to colonize via commerce and culture, no matter how shamelessly materialist our version of the latter may be.

Whether our particular genius to show others how they, too, can release their inner consumer selves makes us economic imperialists is debatable. But we are clearly not conquerors in the classic imperial sense. We do not seek permanent physical control. We are neither interested in forcibly subjugating nor in forcibly absorbing foreign populations. We do not exact tribute. Nor do we force anyone to labor on our behalf. Perhaps most significant but least appreciated, we also do not militarily seize or appropriate anything without offering compensation. Together, these attitudes and the behaviors they sire reflect as profound a shift in the nature of human relations, never mind the *modus operandi* of the pre-eminent global power, as any that has occurred since the debut of conquest thousands of years ago.

The fact that literal conquest is no longer an imaginable war aim has had all sorts of unintended consequences. In a cruel twist of irony, there is even a way to connect Al-Qaeda's aims—and its methods—to *our* abolition of conquest. Let us now tend to these effects and connections.

Conquest, the West and the Rest

TO EXPLAIN what a radical disjuncture our antipathy toward conquest truly represents requires a brief foray through the historiography of warfare. Military historians usually present this history in terms of a singular progression: first came stone tools, then bronze, then iron, then steel, and now we've got beams of light. According to this line of thinking, different peoples have simply gotten stuck at different places along this trajectory, which explains why Masai warriors still carry spears and the Yanamamo cannot sufficiently defend themselves or their rainforest. Even when military historians turn to organizational issues, like the recruitment and deployment of a military, they usually make it seem as though humans have steadily moved on a single track from the simple to the complex.

Some historians do occasionally take a less evolutionary tack and aver that, lurking beneath all of this technological and organizational advancement, the essence of war really hasn't changed: humans fight for the same old reasons and to accomplish the same old goals.

Neither view quite fits the ethnographic evidence, however.

The anthropologist H.H. Turney-High first pointed out more than fifty years ago that, until World War II, two

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types of warfare had co-existed for millennia.[2] One involved conquest, the other raiding. Those who fought below the "military horizon", as Turney-High called it, could not engage in conquest because they could not field permanent forces or engage in sustained warfare. They had no surpluses with which to support troops nor leaders who could compel warriors to fight (let alone fight in strategically smart ways). Turney-High never explained why or how primitive peoples came to be stuck below this horizon, though he did note the extent to which their warfare became ritualized as a result: they took trophies, stole women and counted coup in a never-ending round of raids and counter-raids. Beyond this, they did not progress. The proof? They never turned into us. Nor, as popular military historians like John Keegan and Victor Davis Hanson point out, could they beat us at our own game.[3]

But they weren't playing our game. Not only do those who write about the Western way of war mostly fail to differentiate among non-Westerners, but worse, by failing to grasp the difference between raiding and conquest forms of warfare, they elide all sorts of critical differences. Were we to re-examine the distinction Turney-High makes between people who did not progress and those who did, we would notice that those he calls primitive were not just non-Western, they were often nomadic. They were stateless hunters and gatherers, livestock raisers or shifting cultivators. They were not the least bit interested in waging war in order to control or subjugate a foreign population. Yes, they were often happy to acquire captives and some indulged in vicious raids and may well have wanted to wipe out their closest rivals. But so long as they preferred a nomadic lifestyle, none of these peoples had reason or inclination to sit in one place for long enough to exert permanent control. The great North African historian, Ibn Khaldun, already saw this in the 14th century: where permanence was an alien concept, control was not just impossible, but meaningless.[4]

In contrast, wherever people have been able to exploit a fixed resource base permanently, or were stuck having to do so, we see arms competitions aimed either at advancing or preventing conquest. The rule seems to be: the more people invest in fixed property, the more valuable that investment becomes; and the more valuable it becomes, the more enticing the conquest of it becomes, too. Why else fortify a settlement except to protect what it contains? Fortification itself, though, sends the message that riches are to be had within. Once fortified, settlements were bound to invite sieges, sieges countermeasures, and countermeasures better siege engines. Along with arms races came organization races. Armies were mustered; taxes were raised; rulers were empowered; dynasties were founded; states were consolidated. And the more often national armies fought, won and improved, the better they did subsequently. This process composes, so to speak, the birth of conquest.

Now pit these two social types of war-

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[2]Turney-High, *Primitive War: Its Practice and its Concepts* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1991 [1949]).

[3]Jeremy Black is one of the few military historians to argue that Westerners triumphed due more to others' socio-political weaknesses than to Western strengths. See his *War and the World: Military Power and the Fate of Continents, 1450–2000* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998).

[4]The Mongols and other steppe nomads might appear to be exceptions, but they are not. See Thomas Barfield, "The devil's horsemen: steppe nomadic warfare in historical perspective", in S.P. Reyna and R.E. Downs, eds., *Studying War: Anthropological Perspectives* (Langhorne, PA: Gordon & Breach, 1984).

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fare against one another. It should be evident that whenever people keen on conquest fought those who were not, the latter could not possibly prevail. By definition, societies in which stateless peoples lived tended to be decentralized and so lacked the ability to organize or sustain a military. Such peoples, too, were unfamiliar with the social form they were up against and so, not knowing how a state or a government operated, they could not recognize its vulnerabilities. At best, they could take advantage of gaps in the security of invading militaries at the tactical level, but there was no way for even the toughest mobile tribal fighters to penetrate successfully to the core of the state itself. States, in contrast, hit tribal peoples right where they lived—and often attacked *how* they lived.

The Rest Strike Back

SUCH CONDITIONS, however, hardly describe most stateless people or non-state actors today. For one thing, few non-Western societies remain nomadic. More important, those who do not share our values (since this is what we really mean by "non-Western") hold at least two increasingly powerful advantages.

First, they now know us better than we know them, and have penetrated our world far better than we have penetrated theirs. They understand very well indeed how our states and governments work.

Second, by definition, those who do not ascribe to Western values are not bound by our conventions and constraints. We may prevent them from indulging in cross-border invasions, but this only encourages them to discover new tactics, techniques and procedures that bypass overt conquest. Indeed, not abiding by our conventions frees them to engage in behavior that is not only reprehensible (by our standards), but, even more seriously, that defies easy redress. Here is where real innovation in the realm of warfare has occurred over the past several decades, and where our real challenges lie.

Consider, for instance, the phenomenon of child soldiers. Their prevalence across the African combat belt represents a completely organic development. John Garang reportedly began absorbing orphans into the Sudanese People's Liberation Army in the early 1980s. At first he offered them security, food and shelter in exchange for their help around camp. Before long he was using some as soldiers. Shortly thereafter, Youweri Mouseveni in Uganda also "discovered" orphans, whom he likewise turned into soldiers. Then, less than a decade after their appearance as combatants in Sudan, we find Charles Taylor (of Liberia) and Foday Sankoh (of Sierra Leone) pushing the use of eight, nine, ten and eleven year-olds toward the next logical step: murdering parents in order to create orphan children who can then be turned into soldiers.

If we could suspend our moral sensibilities for a moment, we might marvel at how imaginative people can be and note the horrible irony that has occurred. What some West Africans have achieved with child soldiers is something that Western researchers have sought for years: the Universal Soldier who needs little sleep, can withstand tremendous hardship, and is still able to fight.[5] The fear among many military psychiatrists has been that even if pharmaceuticals could be developed to keep American military personnel awake and functioning, these drugs would rob them of their consciences, leaving us with super-soldiers as capable of committing atrocities as of being effective agents of state power. As it

[5]See Richard A. Gabriel, *No More Heroes: Madness and Psychiatry in War* (New York: Hill & Wang, 1987).

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happens, this is a good description of what child soldiers are made to do—commit atrocities before they have matured enough to have developed consciences. In the process, of course, there is every likelihood they will never develop consciences, and will remain wedded to violence for life.

Child soldiers represent just one diabolically clever development that has been enabled by the death of conquest. As has been much remarked recently, suicide bombers who, while not children, are also not fully-formed adults, comprise another. They are utterly low-tech yet hugely effective. Indeed, how many billions have we spent on precision-guided smart weapons, compared to how little Hamas or the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka has invested in martyr-based munitions delivery systems? The purposes of both systems are roughly similar, and both are, or can be, very effective. They differ, however, in one important regard: precision-guided munitions are technologically sophisticated, most being properly described by the phrase "fire and *forget*"; suicide bombers, in contrast, iconize memory. With photos of martyred bombers plastered all over bedroom and living room walls, who *can* forget?

Like orphans, alienated youth are an unintended but inevitable consequence of conflict. They may be slightly harder to "weaponize", but the fact that they can be used to target random civilians specifically, rain terror and recruit new martyrs all in one sets a whole new standard for military parsimony.

Terror has always been a fear multiplier, but over time people grow inured to chronic acts. For those wielding terror, then, surprise matters and novelty counts. Both can be achieved by varying the timing, location or scale of what is done. Al-Qaeda operatives could not bring down the World Trade Center towers with a method we have come to consider conventional—a car bomb. So they brought them down unconventionally, using our own airplanes. To do so they also hijacked assumptions about hijackings, which further indicates the distance we have traveled since militants first started taking over civilian aircraft in the early 1970s. Yet another novel trend was illustrated on September 11, 2001: no one claimed explicit credit for the attacks. Nor has anyone claimed responsibility for blowing up the Khobar Towers, or ramming the U.S.S. *Cole*, or setting off bombs in those Russian apartment complexes. Anonymity for attacks of this magnitude would have been unheard of and indeed unthinkable decades ago. But for those seeking to undermine and overwhelm rather than capture or seize, nothing makes more sense.

Other fairly recent practices represent the flip side of killing civilians anonymously. These include the use of civilians as human shields. In 1982 the PLO purposely put its anti-aircraft guns in apartment buildings in Beirut, thus turning local residents into safeguards for its weapons. In 1991 Saddam Hussein took Westerners hostage to shield certain sites. In both cases what was done was based on the premise that neither Israel nor the United States would knowingly sacrifice groups of civilians. Similarly, although scorched-earth tactics have been used since the advent of agriculture, Saddam Hussein clearly meant to offend our environmental sensibilities when he befouled the Persian Gulf; his intent was not just to cripple Kuwait financially, but to maximize a form of aesthetic shock.

Without question, such actions can be viewed as variations on old themes. In previous ages children were conscripted, hostages were taken, and Samson sacrificed himself to kill others. But the intent with which such things are done today suggests that more than just past practices

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are being violated. *We* are being violated. Western conventions regarding what should or should not be done in war are being consciously, purposely flouted.

At the same time, violence is not being put to quite the same uses it once was. When conquerors in the past laid waste entire communities and obliterated whole peoples, this was almost always done for its demonstration effect—to show others what would happen to them if they, too, refused to submit or chose to rebel. The aim was, still, to subjugate. Not so today, as we see most vividly with ethnic cleansing—itself a direct consequence of our anti-conquest sentiments. Not only did World War II finish off the colonial empires, much as World War I did the landed empires, but by 1945, with overt imperialism clearly on the way out, political and military entrepreneurs had to find new ways to secure loot and booty for their supporters. This was easy during the Cold War, when the United States and USSR (or their proxies) could be counted on as patrons. But when those sources of largesse dried up, leaders and aspiring leaders had to find alternative sources. Unable to invade or absorb other countries, they did what hard-pressed leaders have always done to generate wealth: cannibalize their own. They discovered they could "right" long-standing ethnic wrongs, create *lebensraum*, and liberate resources simply by getting rid of people from within their own borders—something Zimbabwe's President Robert Mugabe is only the most recent leader to do.

But there is also another way to interpret ethnic cleansing: as a "strategic improvement" on genocide. Unlike genocide, the aim of ethnic cleansing is to remove people, not to annihilate them. Even had the Nazis won World War II in Europe, they could not have rid the world of Jews; final solutions are impossible in a world of diasporas. Removal is easier than murder, and has been made easier still thanks to the existence of UNHCR, the corporatization of humanitarian relief, and the proliferation of governmental and non-governmental aid agencies. One of the most striking instances of a leader using relief to further his own ends occurred during the mid-1980s, when Ethiopia's Haile-Mariam Mengistu used feeding camps as traps. With families flooding in to receive famine relief, he was able to cull males from ethnic groups and factions he wished to suborn or eliminate. He did much of this with the tacit complicity of relief agencies that were much more anxious to maintain a presence in Ethiopia than to expose Mengistu's manipulation of them.[6]

Learning Curves

CUNNING people have always been able to turn adversity into advantage, as well as wring narrow opportunity from the best-intentioned acts of others. We often winked at this during the Cold War, when we viewed most conflict through communist/anti-communist and insurgency/counter-insurgency lenses. At the time, Marxist tactics received far more attention than did Maoist tactics, while we tended to consider tactics developed by anyone else as not tactics at all. We therefore learned nothing from militias in Lebanon or *mujaheddin* in Afghanistan, but, as we now know, others did. Take Velupillai Prabhakaran, long-time leader of the LTTE. Prabhakaran was so impressed with the damage done by the 1983 truck bomb in Lebanon that killed 241 U.S. Marines that he set about collecting enough explosives so that the LTTE could blow up a truck of its own in Sri Lanka, which it finally did in 1987. Over time, Prabhakaran progressed from suicide drivers to suicide bombers, and then to

[6]Editor's note: This theme is discussed below in Alan J. Kuperman's "Suffering."

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suicide boats. No one has done more with suicide tactics than he has, while others, in turn, seem to have learned from *his* example—as we saw with the U.S.S. *Cole*.

Not only have we failed to study and understand a lot of ruthless tactical brilliance over the past half century, we have also discounted the proliferation and perfection of new strategically destructive means. Although weapons of mass destruction have long worried us, more labor-intensive lesser forms—like amputation, rape and mutilation—really have not. We have dismissed these acts as atavistic behavior of no real strategic significance. We did not see that such forms of destructiveness signified a new logic. We forgot that, thanks to conquest, the vanquished often survived—even if to be enslaved, sold or made to pay tribute. With the death of conquest, that is no longer possible. The unforeseen consequence? Enemies, targeted populations, victims—all might as well be considered of no use, so why not just abuse or eliminate them?

Couple this change with the fact that novel destructive forces, once unleashed, are extremely difficult to rein in, and we suddenly recognize a series of spiraling dangers before us that are much harder to reverse than any associated with conquest. As it is, halting conquest took us two world wars and a cold war to achieve. To do so required us to outwit, outproduce and outlast any that opposed us. Industry, technology, science and ingenuity were our strong suits; and moral argument our idiom. But now what do we do? How do we redeem child soldiers or glue suicide bombers back together? How *do* we stop this ever more threatening and demonic learning curve?

Worse than just being up against Al-Qaeda and other extremists, we are up against "progress" of a most pernicious sort. Al-Qaeda has managed to marry the local to the global better than any other anti-Western movement so far, and not just in technological and organizational terms, but ideologically as well. Islam is Osama bin Laden's ideological weapon of choice as he urges the *umma* of the world to unite. But he wields Islam not to conquer or subjugate, or even to convert—the uses to which Islam has historically been put—but to utterly destroy. Al-Qaeda has adopted our opposition to conquest and pushed it to its logical conclusion: can't conquer, so kill.

Al-Qaeda mimics our very nature, as well. The West, and the United States, is at once everywhere in the world and nowhere. Our culture and general influence are pervasive, even though no centralized effort has (or can) be made to order, control or directly manage that influence. Turning the tables on us, Al-Qaeda also strives to be everywhere in the world and nowhere. It is everywhere that members of the transnational *umma* live and plot, and it is nowhere in the sense of having—after the fall of the Taliban—as low-profile a logistical center as possible. Yet its aims represent a radical twist. Freed from the difficulties attendant on fighting to subdue, never mind subjugate, it can concentrate instead on causing unrecoverable collapse and destruction.

Not only does the structural logic to Al-Qaeda's aims and methods grow directly out of the death of conquest, but we have inadvertently handed our opponents a number of advantages while hamstringing ourselves. We have done this, first, by advertising, pre-emptively as it were, what we will not do: fight to conquer. Second, by refusing to directly control anyone or any place, we free people to do things that we then lack the physical presence to stop.

The most glaring (and grating) example of this at the moment is Saddam Hussein. He would not now be developing weapons of mass destruction had we taken over—never mind invaded—Iraq a

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decade ago. Nor does it matter whether—strategically, tactically or even logistically speaking—we could have done this at such a distance from the United States. The fact that we never even considered such an option, and can still barely bring ourselves to do so, reflects a shift in how we think about power—and it illustrates the extent to which we have unwittingly boxed ourselves in. Up until fifty years ago, humans who generated power did so in order to be able to coerce others, whether pre-emptively or defensively. Now it is all we can do to exert even temporary control. Instead, we seek out locals to trust—like a Marcos or a Mobutu, a Pahlavi or a Karzai. We no longer just fight (sometimes) with a vengeance, we subsequently delegate with a vengeance.

On a certain level, this aversion to exerting ourselves is what some iconoclastic historians, strategists and pundits rail against when they tell us that our leaders should adopt the warrior politics of the ancient Greeks and Romans, or that we should behave more like an empire in order to make the world safe for the civilization we represent.[7] They would have us act. Yet, in addition to misreading significant differences between then and now—should we revive slavery, too?—curiously, none promotes a return to village-by-village conquest, or systematically fighting until every community in our path sues for peace. This is how empires used to be established and maintained.

In part, this lapse in not connecting control to physical conquest must be because we no longer wage war that way; air supremacy obviates the need for slow, grinding, old-fashioned land campaigns. With speed, too, we do less damage. (Never mind that less damage done over longer periods helps convince people to adopt new ways of resistance.) We increasingly believe, too, that all we need do is remove megalomaniacal leaders and their populations will reform themselves after our image of what good governments and healthy societies should be.

There is even a school of thought that considers the significance of territory itself to be *passé*. But this school misunderstands something that is of the essence. Wars of conquest in the past were rarely fought over territory or resources as such. Conquest was about taking people and doing something with them; one usually aggrandized for the sake of supporters or to gain more subjects, or both. That is what used to define imperialism. We reject that approach, of course, but we may soon be forced to reconsider it. That is because it may turn out that fighting to own, and not just to win, may be the only way to secure effective control in many cases, and to truly turn hearts and minds away from gratuitous destruction and depopulation. Think back to any of our lengthy military engagements over the past century. In how many of these did we take and hold ground? How many can be considered unqualified successes? The answers to these questions tend to run parallel, and with all due respect for the impresarios of novelty among us, this is probably not a coincidence.

WHAT CAN we do, then, now that we have not only rendered conquest institutionally impossible, but made being conquered unacceptable for others, as well? One thing we need to do is rethink *again* the nature of our military capabilities, those of our army in particular.

No matter how much reconfiguring has been done since the end of the Cold War, all armies remain institutionally geared for conquest. This, after all, is what they were designed to do—to pur-

[7]For example, Roger Kimball, "Freedom and Duty: Pericles and Our Times", *The National Interest* (Spring 2002).

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sue and thwart hostile territorial takeovers. Small wonder, then, that between the end of the Cold War and the onset of the war on terrorism, the U.S. Army found itself unsure of its role. Most of what it was tasked to do were military operations other than war. Even so, its parts were never substantively rearranged, nor has any of the new technology adopted since 1991 caused it to change its fundamental orientation. Its design still predisposes it to excel at taking and holding ground.

That is the first irony we confront. The second is that when it comes to being able to squelch others' desire for autonomy or liberation—especially autonomy and liberation from us—what could a successfully reformed army do then? Not much. Thus, as we try to transform a force that actually knows how to conquer and subjugate into a force that can do less clear-cut, nobler and even harder things, we may be heading in exactly the wrong direction. To root out and obliterate our enemies, and to subdue and re-orient their supporters, may well require the kind of thorough military approach, permanent control and reconstruction of society from the ground up that we have consigned to history.

So here the Western world is, having forsworn military conquest, and having made conquest by military means an impossible war aim for anyone else. What a tremendous achievement. It is revolutionary. But the attendant consequences—child soldiers, suicide bombers, ethnic cleansing, addressless terrorism—are revolutionary, too, and where they are leading us is not entirely within our control. This should give us pause, for how we might reconcile our anti-conquest ideals with such realities remains to be seen. □

Greatness and War

In our century, dominance brings loss more often than gain. The source and measure of wealth is rational labor in common. Europe, contemplating a world in the process of adopting a civilization that Europe itself generated, need not feel vanquished by its own victory. Greatness is no longer indissolubly linked to military force, because the superpowers can no longer use their weapons without causing their own destruction by way of reprisal, and because no society need rule over others in order to give its children a decent life.

Europe has two reasons for refusing to feel decadent. It is Europe that, first by its achievements, then by its warlike follies, helped humanity cross the threshold into the nuclear age. In this age, when because of the exploitation of natural resources men need no longer tyrannize over one another, Europe can still be great while conforming to the spirit of the new era and assisting other peoples to cure themselves of the childhood illnesses of modernity. Realizing its ideas at home, with a task to perform abroad—why should Europe brood over a bitterness that is explained by the recent past but for which the prospects of the future give no reason?

Never have men had so many reasons to cease killing one another. Never had they had so many reasons to feel they are joined together in one great enterprise. I do not conclude that the age of universal history will be peaceful. We know that man is a reasonable being. But men?

—Raymond Aron
"The Dawn of Universal History" (1960)

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

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An Empire, If You Can Keep It

Stephen Peter Rosen

WITHOUT TOO much difficulty, an interested reader can in these early months of 2003 find numerous references to contemporary American imperialism in newspapers and journals of opinion. Attacks on American imperialism were, of course, easy to find in the 1960s and 1970s. What is new is that many such references are neither hostile nor apologetic. Writers from the political Left and Right such as Michael Ignatieff, Paul Kennedy, Max Boot and Tom Donnelly not only discuss American imperialism but call for more of it in the name of humanitarian nation-building or global stability. Moreover, what is being discussed is not simply the reach and influence of American capitalism or culture, but the harder kind of imperialism—the kind exercised by coercive intimidation and actual soldiers on the ground.

Nearly every discussion of alleged contemporary American imperialism notes that America is far more powerful than any other nation or effective group of nations—which is perfectly true, of course. But primacy or hegemony is not the same as empire, and if it has been made so by virtue of some novel definitional fiat, then "empire" becomes too loose a term and hence a useless concept. No one would argue that all empires are alike, or that the global position of modern post-industrial America is the same as that of ancient, agrarian Rome. But empires really are different, in form and function, from merely powerful states. This is why certain questions emerge repeatedly in the study of empire that do not emerge in the study of conventional interstate relations. It therefore matters a great deal whether, for analytical as opposed to rhetorical purposes, contemporary American power is indeed imperial in nature.

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Is America an Empire?

IF THERE IS, or soon will be, an American empire, it will be faced with questions different from those to which it is accustomed, and it will need to learn forms of statecraft different from those to which it has become habituated in the 19th and 20th centuries. This is because the range and nature of the issues facing an empire differ qualitatively from those facing a merely powerful state.

Empire is the rule exercised by one nation over others both to regulate their *external* behavior and to ensure minimally acceptable forms of *internal* behavior within the subordinate states. Merely powerful

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states do the former, but not the latter.

The central—one may say the necessary but not sufficient—imperial task is the creation and management of a hierarchical interstate order. From that key task of regulating the external behavior of other states proceeds the imperial problems of maintaining a monopoly on the use of organized military power, and of using its monopolistic but still finite military power efficiently—a problem captured in the military concept of "economy of force." But an empire must also ensure the security and internal stability of its constituent parts, extract revenue to pay the costs of empire, and assimilate the elites of non-imperial societies to the metropolitan core, tasks that presuppose influence over the *internal* affairs of other societies.

By this definition, for example, the Wilhelmine empire was an empire over the Germanies, but not over central Europe. Imperial Britain included its crown colonies, but not Argentina or, for very long, Afghanistan or Persia. As for the United States, it was a *de facto* imperial power in much of the Western Hemisphere beginning in the late 19th century, and formally over the Philippines from 1898 to 1946.

Today, the picture for the United States is mixed. It exercises effective, if less than formal, hierarchical authority in the Western Hemisphere, in the Asian rimland, on the Arab side of the Persian Gulf and in the NATO area. At the start of 2003, it was trying to extend its hierarchical interstate order to the Balkans and Afghanistan, and was preparing to intervene in the internal affairs of Iraq. China, Russia and India cooperate opportunistically with the United States, but have been willing to challenge American dominance when possible. They certainly reject the right of the United States to intervene in *their* internal affairs, and thus remain the major countries outside the U.S. hierarchical order.

But what of the three internal governance functions of empire? The United States does tend to the internal security and stability of its constituent parts, but it does so selectively. Its methods are manifold: humanitarian intervention, aid and assistance programs, intelligence sharing, stationing U.S. military forces abroad and other means besides. The new post-September 11 concern with the security implications of failed states suggests an even greater focus on internal governance issues, and indeed the language of the new *National Security Strategy* points in that direction. As for extracting revenue to pay the costs of empire, only the 1991 Gulf War stands as a direct example of that. American influence over the main international economic organizations—the WTO, the IMF and the World Bank—may be construed, at least indirectly, as a revenue extraction process, as may the international role of the dollar, but this is really to stretch the imperial point. And as to the absorption of elites from the periphery to the core, the nature of globalization changes how we even think about such a question.[1] If the United States does do this, it is not a function of an imperial governmental core that can tightly manage or control such things, but a by-product of social and economic phenomena intrinsic to the culture.

Covering all of the external and internal aspects of a putative American empire exceeds the possibilities of a single essay. Here we deal only with the prior and most critical elements: the external ones. We thus leave in abeyance, for now, a final pronouncement as to America's imperial vocation.

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[1]Editor's note: As James Kurth's essay above, "Migration and the Dynamics of Empire", shows.

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Establishing Hierarchy

BECAUSE THE problems of running an empire are different from the problems of interstate primacy, there is more to imperial statecraft than knowing how to conduct a "humble" foreign policy, a theme to which students of American hegemony constantly return.[2] Humility is always a virtue, but the dominant male atop any social hierarchy, human or otherwise, never managed to rule simply by being nice. Human evolutionary history has produced a species that both creates hierarchies and harbors the desire among subordinates to challenge its dominant member. Those challenges never disappear. The dominant member can never do everything that subordinates desire, and so is blamed for what it does not do as much as for what it does. This is why empires never rest easy.

It is a naive and perhaps uniquely American notion that those states inferior in power to the United States ought not resent their own subordinate status; that, if it is nice enough, Washington can build a "benign" imperium in which all love it. This does not mean that the United States should dispense with tact. Ritual plays a role in ameliorating tensions in a social hierarchy by creating and confirming expectations of how members of the hierarchy are treated, but rituals do not fundamentally change reality or the attitudes of those subordinate in power. Acting in a humble manner is a ritual worth much respect, so the United States does well to consult the United Nations and NATO councils before it acts. But such rituals will only reduce, not eliminate, the resentment toward the United States that springs from the fact that it can do what it must in any case. And what it must do, if it is to wield imperial power, is create and enforce the rules of a hierarchical interstate order.

The organizing principle of interstate relations, Kenneth Waltz famously wrote, is anarchy: In the absence of an overarching power that creates and enforces rules for interstate behavior, states help themselves by "balancing" against other centers of power that could hurt them—either by building up their own forces or by joining with other states. The organizing principle of empire rests, in contrast, on the existence of an overarching power that creates and enforces the principle of hierarchy, but is not itself bound by such rules. In turn, subordinate states do not build up their own capabilities or join with others when threatened; they call instead on the imperial power for assistance. In so doing, they give up a key component of state sovereignty, which is direct control of their own security. This condition is the result of two sets of factors: the ability and willingness of the imperial power to acquire and maintain something close to a monopoly on the organized use of military power, and the abdication of states within the empire of responsibility to build their own effective military capabilities. How does such overarching power come to exist?

The formation of a monopoly on military power is greatly facilitated by the decision of other potential powers not to compete. The Roman Empire effectively had two components, one in the west and one in the east (centered on Byzantium). As is well known, the eastern empire persisted long after the sack of Rome in 476 CE. Less well known is the fact that the internal factors associated with the fall of the Roman Empire—the rise of Christianity, increasing social rigidity and the bureaucratization of imperial governance—were just as power-

[2]See, for example, Stephen M. Walt, "American Primacy: Its Prospects and Pitfalls", *Naval War College Review* (Spring 2002); and Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth, "American Primacy", *Foreign Affairs* (July/August 2002).

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ful in the east as they were in the west. The difference was that there were fewer organized military challenges in the east, and the one potential challenger to Byzantium, the Parthian Empire, chose to accept Rome's dominant role.[3] Similarly, the British monopoly on seapower began to emerge in the early 18th century, when French Continental concerns led to the virtual disappearance of the French battle fleet. The withdrawal of competitors was even more marked following the wars of the French Revolution, at which time British naval mastery rested, according to Paul M. Kennedy, on the "simple wish of other nations not to spend the time or energy to challenge the British."[4]

The same phenomenon is at work today. The American empire did not emerge simply as the result of the growth of American power, but as a result of the collapse of Russian power, the decline of European and Japanese military spending relative to the United States, and the unwillingness of those countries to take military action or make military preparations in response to a host of security problems. A surprising number of major states are not now engaging in the self-help that Waltz says is at the heart of interstate relations, but are relying instead on the United States for their security.

The creation and maintenance of a U.S. monopoly, or near-monopoly, on organized military power could not and did not arise simply from the abdication of non-imperial powers, however. Historically, either enduring differences in the social organization of imperial versus non-imperial states, or active and effective imperial strategies, have led to gross disparities in military power. The ability of republican Rome to develop military power from a population of free adult males from Rome and its Italian allies (totaling approximately 2.75 million men) was the basis of Roman expansion. From this base it built an army that controlled an imperial population of approximately fifty million people. Rome's ability to develop more military power than its rivals rested primarily on the organizational practices of the Roman Legions, which created a unified and coordinated fighting force that could routinely defeat opposing armies five times its size. Drill and discipline produced formations that could withstand uncoordinated infantry and cavalry attacks mounted by less well-organized adversaries. The internal divisions and lack of social cohesion among the rivals of Rome, with the exception of the armies of Hannibal, created an enduring military advantage that cascaded over time, for as Rome's area of control expanded, the population base from which it could draw military recruits expanded, too.[5]

Other empires also benefited from large asymmetries in the ability to generate military power from their populations. Those asymmetries often arose from the military capabilities of nomadic pastoral societies relative to sedentary agricultural populations. Thus, the total population of the Manchu empire in the period before it expanded to include Xinjiang and Tibet has been estimated at approximately 150 million.[6] The records of the Manchu empire in China suggest that the number of bannermen (the Manchu and northern Chinese military personnel who swore allegiance to the Manchu rulers) was not much larger than the Roman Legionnaires, and they controlled an even

[3]Arther Ferrill, *The Fall of the Roman Empire: The Military Explanation* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1986), p. 18.

[4]Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery* (London: Allen Lane, 1976), p. 157.

[5]See my *Societies and Military Power* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), pp. 92–7.

[6]Colin McEvedy and Richard Jones, *Atlas of World Population History* (New York: Penguin Books, 1978), pp. 127, 167.

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larger population. As was the case with the Roman Legions, the decline in effective Manchu military power took place as military training and discipline declined in peacetime. Artillery practice, for example, was cut back in 1795 so as not to disturb the silkworms of local silk producers. The result was that 2,100 British and Indian soldiers were sufficient to bring about the Manchu army's initial defeat in 1841.[7]

Similarly, the Moghul empire in India was established in 1526 when Babur conquered the armies defending Delhi with a cavalry army of only about 5,000 soldiers. Babur's small but effective force faced a local Indian population with levels of social cohesion so catastrophically low that local leaders were happy to provide information that allowed him to defeat his enemies. The prospect of being on the winning side swelled the number of soldiers who switched their allegiance to Babur, which diminished the forces available to his foes.[8]

In the context of the history of empires, as opposed to the history of interstate relations, the position the United States now holds is not that unusual. Military competence, arising from superior training and long periods of active military engagement, builds forces that are proficient at converting human resources into fighting power. Indeed, the lopsided military outcome of the 1991 Gulf War was probably more the result of organizational competence than technological superiority.[9] While there has been much talk of the way in which information technology has improved weaponry, and hence initiated a "revolution in military affairs", much less attention has been paid to the revolution in American military training practices that flowed from problems associated with the Vietnam War. Post-Vietnam innovations at the National Training Center at Fort Irwin made possible highly realistic training for combined arms warfare. The U.S. Navy instituted its Top Gun program for realistic training in air-to-air combat, the Air Force its Red Flag exercises for the same purpose. Advances in data processing enabled computer-supported, fully-networked training for armored warfare. By the time of the 1991 Gulf War, data from ongoing military operations was being used to develop and adjust combat training simulators. Movement from a conscript military to an all-volunteer force, too, made it both possible and necessary to institute these intensive training methods on a vast scale, and repeated military deployments after the end of the Cold War created powerful incentives to maintain these rigorous training programs.

Progress continues to be made. Advances in technology are making it possible for seamen to train for duty at sea on simulators while ashore, using real time data from the ships at sea to which they will be deployed. No other country in the world, except Israel, profits from this combination of intensive training and repeated operational deployments. The result is a military instrument that improves with use, even as the military capabilities of other countries atrophy. That U.S. capabilities continue to draw away from other competitors strikes many as improbable and the reason is clear: the concept we have inherited from the history of interstate relations tells us that interstate competition inhibits any country from devel-

[7]See Pamela Kyle Crossley, *Orphan Warriors: Three Manchu Generations and the End of the Qing World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990).

[8]*Memoirs of Zehir-el-Muhammad Babur*, translated by John Leyden and William Erskine (London: Longman, Rees, Orme, Brown and Green, 1826).

[9]See Stephen Biddle, "Victory Misunderstood: What the Gulf War Tells Us About Future Conflict", *International Security* (Autumn 1996).

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oping and sustaining outsized military capabilities. This concept, however, ill equips us to recognize the conditions associated with the creation of empire.

Maintaining Hierarchy

EMPIRES ultimately rest on military predominance, but military predominance is not a static phenomenon. Imperial strategy must sustain that position, but how does it do so? In the case of military practices and capabilities that emerged historically from the basic character of civilian society, it is easy to see why more mobile warrior societies had advantages over sedentary agricultural societies. In the more modern cases of military practices that can be taught to any soldier, or technology that can be transferred across international boundaries, the answer is less obvious. It seems to be related to the empire-builder's ability and willingness to use its initial technological and organizational advantages in ways that prevent others from acquiring them as well.

We tend to assume that military knowledge and capabilities diffuse quickly. This was certainly the case in modern Europe. The presence of a literary tradition—exemplified by Machiavelli's *The Art of War*—focused modern Europeans on ancient Roman military writings. This eventually made it possible for the Dutch, Swedes and others to recreate Roman military practices in the 16th century. The Dutch were then able to defeat Spanish Habsburg armies many times the size of their own army. The existence of printing presses and a literary class fluent in Latin ensured the spread of the Roman army's tactical secrets. Given the power of the new practices, the diffusion of this knowledge made it impossible for the Dutch, or anyone else, to maintain a monopoly within Europe on the military advantage they initially gained. This precluded the creation of an empire based on those techniques.[10]

Not so in Asia at the end of the 18th century, when the British established and maintained their empire. In India, the military power of small but efficient European armies enabled the French and the English to win victories against local Indian armies ten times their size. Military skill, not just technology, was the dominant factor, and the ability of local Indian military leaders to learn the new techniques from Latin texts was essentially nonexistent. Nonetheless, the possibility that new military knowledge would diffuse to the Indians and neutralize the military advantage of European armies very much concerned the English. This, in turn, led them to take two courses of action: co-optation and pre-emption.

New military skills could be taught directly by European military trainers, and the French were the first to train Indian soldiers in hopes of using them to resist the British. So Arthur Wellesley, the commander responsible for British military operations in India, ordered that any French officer training local Indians (Marathas to be specific) could receive safe conduct and free passage back to Europe. In this fashion Wellesley hoped to sustain the British monopoly on effective military power in India.

But by observation and learning on their own, Indian armies began to adopt or re-invent European techniques even without European trainers. Richard Wellesley, Governor-General of the East India Company, believed that the only solution for this rising danger was to quickly capitalize on the waning British military advantage to lock in British superiority. Rather than hang back and avoid involvements in local Indian military

[10]Geoffrey Parker, *The Military Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 6–44.

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struggles, Wellesley adopted an aggressive policy of offering British military assistance to selected local Indian rulers so that they could win their battles, but only on the condition that those helped by the British agreed thereafter to disband their armies and rely on British power for their security. It was a good idea, but even so, it was a near thing. By 1803, the British were still able to defeat a Maratha army twice the size of their own army, but only after losing half the British force.

As these examples illustrate, successful imperial governance must focus on maintaining and increasing, if possible, the initial advantage in the ability to generate military power. Putting matters in these terms casts an acute historical light on U.S. policies to control the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. Americans see such efforts as part of a program to ensure global "stability"—something that is good for everybody, because it heads off "unnecessary" and costly arms races. Viewed through the lens of imperial practice, however, U.S. nonproliferation policies compose a classic case of an imperial effort to keep a monopoly on the forms of military power that help provide its dominance.

Complementary to efforts at arms control, the United States has a strategy similar to that of the British in India: extending security guarantees to others in order to remove their need for independent military capabilities. This concept was explicitly raised in the now famous 1992 Defense Policy Guidance, which recommended that the United States be capable of defending other countries so that they would not feel compelled to build forces to defend themselves. External observers were left to make the point that this would have the consequence of reinforcing the dominant American military position. American forces stationed abroad help fulfill this function, even after the collapse of the Soviet Union, by reassuring host countries that the United States will ensure that they need not arm themselves further. The offer to friendly countries of American missile defense technology—the research and development costs of which have been carried by the United States for almost fifty years—similarly reduces the likelihood that they will develop and control their own missile defenses.

At the same time, conventional challenges to the U.S. Navy, or to the navies of its subordinate states, are unlikely because of American naval supremacy. But as was the case during the era of British naval mastery, adversaries of the United States have shifted to *guerre de course*, or commerce raiding, openly in the Persian Gulf in the 1980s and indirectly, by means of ballistic missiles launched into the waters around Taiwan, in 1996. In both the 19th and 20th centuries, the imperial response was the same: convoys to stabilize and reassure friendly nations, and thus to remove the need for them to arm themselves for naval operations. So it will be, most likely, in the 21st century, too.

Imperial governance also involves the creation and enforcement of rules. The first rule of the empire must be to prohibit behavior that threatens its basic power position. Nonproliferation treaties and alliance diplomacy are today part of the set of imperial rules drawn up and enforced by the United States. NATO, ANZUS and the U.S.-Japan defense agreement are not really alliances among equals, but security guarantees offered by the imperial power to subordinates. As such they are mechanisms for codifying interstate hierarchy. The position advanced by the U.S. government in 2002, that it will act pre-emptively to destroy the programs of hostile states to construct weapons of mass destruction, is a logical extension of that policy, and one enabled by the improved power position of the United States after the end of the Cold War.

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Economy of Force

THE PROBLEM of sustaining hierarchy comes down, in the main, to achieving economy of force. This is because imperial powers have predominant but not infinite amounts of military power. While they have a near monopoly on the organized means of violence, they face numerous potential challenges from less well-organized groups and peoples both within the empire and, more particularly, outside of it. In an interstate system, the land boundary of one state marks the beginning of another state that is capable of maintaining order within its frontiers. The boundaries of an empire, however, are often marked by peoples who are less well-organized socially and who do not accept imperial dominance. In the old and impolite language of empires, these are the barbarians at the gates.

This exactly was the problem shared by the Romans, the various Chinese empires and the British in India and Africa. Lasting peace was difficult to establish with the peoples beyond the frontiers because of their fluid internal social orders and their hostility to the empire. They thus constituted a chronic problem that could drive up the cost of empire. The historical repertoire of imperial techniques employed to manage this problem is still relevant today. That repertoire was composed of three parts: walls, which were part of a system of defenses in depth; the application of overwhelming force followed by withdrawal; and indirect rule. Imperial strategy could combine or alternate among these techniques, but the fundamental goal was the same—economy of force. Each of these techniques was supposed to reduce the number of soldiers and the expenditure of treasure needed to maintain order at the frontier.

In *The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire* (1976), Edward Luttwak provided an excellent, if controversial, analysis of the *de facto* Roman strategy that effectively combined barriers, mobile forces and client states to help the Roman Legions handle the multiple potential threats at the periphery of empire. Roman walls, he pointed out, were not meant to provide a continuous, impermeable barrier. Rather, they formed part of a zone of defenses in depth that served as an intelligence collection device and delaying mechanism. The existence of walls and strong points on the frontier meant that an outer zone would have to be breached by an enemy in order to effect a serious incursion. This meant that incursions could be detected by small numbers of friendly forces along the frontier. Fortifications protected those small forces long enough for the Legions to react to their intelligence. Roads running from the interior of the empire to the outer walls reduced the time it took the Legions to arrive.

Defenses in depth meant that breaches of the perimeter were not catastrophic, since the enemy would be weakened the further he penetrated into the defensive zone, within which there would be strong points from which counterattacks could be launched. Since any heavy fighting would be done by the Legions when they arrived, perimeter defenses could be, and often were, manned by locally-recruited mercenaries who accepted their status as imperial clients. When the system worked, the result was not only reduced defensive burdens on the Roman Legions, but the enhancement of their deterrent offensive power.

This offensive power was crucial to the economy of force aspect of Roman strategy. Every challenger to the empire could not be handled simultaneously at an acceptable cost. Therefore, periodic offensive operations had to be conducted so that potential challengers were aware of the terrible things that could happen to them if they rebelled. The war against the

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Jews and the reduction of Masada, so carefully chronicled by Josephus and published by the Romans, was meant to enforce peace by demonstrating that no matter how fanatical or distant you were, offensive military operations would eventually and inevitably annihilate you.

In conventional interstate relations, the presence of rival powers of near-equal strength creates the possibility that initial conflicts will escalate, and escalation may or may not favor the state that starts the war. Prudence therefore leads to at least the consideration of limits on military operations. Empires do not face the problem of escalation mounted by peers. They do face the problem of long, drawn out, small but multiple wars against peoples who have not yet gotten the message that resistance to the empire is futile. This is the source of the logic of overwhelming force—of which history provides many successful examples aside from that of Rome.

The Athenians could not afford to wage war against every island state that might defy them. The Melians had to be crushed, therefore, so that no other island state would even think about rebelling against Athens. So, too, with China. The Great Wall was meant not only to handle hostile local peoples, but to provide the base for massive punitive raids. Both its barriers and its punitive raids were responses to chronic threats that could not be met at acceptable cost by the permanent presence of regular military forces.[11]

In 2003, the United States is trying to cope with essentially the same problems, and with essentially the same conceptual range of responses. The military position of the United States, however strong, can still be stretched to the breaking point by multiple hostile peoples who cannot mount direct military challenges to the United States, but who can create disorder by unconventional means. Even before the attacks launched by Al-Qaeda, the U.S. military was being worn out by the extensive operations needed to maintain an acceptable international order in such places as Haiti and Bosnia. The increase in international terrorism reflects the ability of the enemies of the American empire to take advantage of the porosity of its frontiers. The American response to date has involved the application of force followed by withdrawal and indirect rule. Less attention has been paid to the development of barriers or defensive zones.

As in the past, barrier strategies and offensive raids should not be expected to be completely effective, only to achieve higher levels of security within the boundaries of empire at acceptable levels of defense expenditures. They should be judged in terms of their use as economy of force measures, not as instruments of absolute security.

A Choice

THE PARALLELS between earlier empires and the United States today are suggestive, but they hardly exhaust the factors we need to understand in order to define what post-post-Cold War international relations may be like. The external structural feature shared by all empires is a sustainable near-monopoly on the organized means of violence, but each historical period has its own unique characteristics. In our own period, it appears that the United States has such a monopoly, but one factor could quickly put an end to it: the proliferation of nuclear weapons. If such weapons become available to forces sufficiently hostile to the empire that they are willing to use them, the non-nuclear military predominance of the United

[11]See Arthur Waldron, *The Great Wall of China: From History to Myth* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

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States would be essentially neutralized. This suggests that the outcome of the debates about Iraq and North Korea today could have important long-term consequences, and that other potential sources of hostile nuclear weapons use—such as a Pakistan that reverses its currently favorable stance toward the United States—will have much to do with whether and how long the United States can maintain its primacy.

The other unique aspect of American empire today, of course, is that it is a putative empire run by a democracy that embraces the principle of equality and values formal limits on its own state power. These principles contradict the imperial tendency to hierarchy and to the use of unrestrained, extra-legal violence. The United States, to be sure, is capable of hypocrisy and brutality on massive scales. But its most naked expressions of imperial power have really been mere episodes—intense, but limited in time and scope. Since imperial governance must sustain itself for decades to really work, it is worth asking whether the United States, given its principles, can sustain the kind of actions that an imperial mission requires for years on end.

The answer depends on circumstances. As long as the personal and societal safety of American citizens is at risk from external threats, historical precedent suggests that rather few limits will be placed on the use of American military power, or on the constraints the United States will impose on the peoples of other countries. Any use of weapons of mass destruction against targets in the United States, or against American soldiers abroad, will evoke the implacable rage of the American people against a clear enemy.

As for imperial rule over other peoples, the United States has always preferred indirect rule: the installation of local governments compatible with American policies. Direct rule will be seen as a temporary measure to prepare conditions for a transfer of power to local inhabitants. But effective transfer could be a long time coming in places like Afghanistan and Iraq, or in other places where the United States establishes military garrisons intended to be temporary. The United States is fully capable of enlarging its army to maintain such garrisons over long periods of time; in living memory, after all, the peacetime U.S. military has had over three million men and women. The real constraint will be political: Will the elites and general population of the United States regard it as just to rule other peoples, some of whom hate Americans enough to engage in suicidal attacks, and many of whom may exploit American power for their own malign purposes?

Rather than wrestle with such difficult and unpleasant problems, the United States could give up the imperial mission, or pretensions to it, now. This would essentially mean the withdrawal of all U.S. forces from the Middle East, Europe and mainland Asia. It may be that all other peoples, without significant exception, will then turn to their own affairs and leave the United States alone. But those who are hostile to us might remain hostile, and be much less afraid of the United States after such a withdrawal. Current friends would feel less secure and, in the most probable post-imperial world, would revert to the logic of self-help in which all states do what they must to protect themselves. This would imply the relatively rapid acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Iran, Iraq and perhaps Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, Indonesia and others. Constraints on the acquisition of biological weapons would be even weaker than they are today. Major regional arms races would also be

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very likely throughout Asia and the Middle East. This would not be a pleasant world for Americans, or anyone else. It is difficult to guess what the costs of such a world would be to the United States. They would probably not put the end of the United States in prospect, but they would not be small. If the logic of American empire is unappealing, it is not at all clear that the alternatives are that much more attractive.

NOR IS IT really obvious, as so many assume, that empire is somehow historically obsolete. If an American empire does endure, we may, in retrospect, come to understand the era of independent nation-states as something of an historical anomaly. William McNeill first advanced this idea in 1985, when he challenged the opinion

> that it is right and proper and normal for a single people to inhabit a particular piece of territory and obey a government of their own devising. . . . [I]t is my contention that civilized societies have nearly always subordinated some human groups to others of a different ethnic background, thereby creating a laminated polyethnic structure.[12]

It was only the particular circumstances of 18th-century western Europe and modern industrial economies, McNeill argued, that temporarily created the conditions conducive to the culturally cohesive and economically viable political units known as nation-states. Pre- and post-industrial economies, he suggested, required specialization of military and economic functions and large-scale integration that culturally and linguistically homogeneous societies could not support, but which supranational empires could.

If McNeill was right, then the notion of American empire, far from being anomalous and ill-fitted to the 21st century, might comport nicely with it. That alone, however, is insufficient reason to seek it. □

[12]McNeill, *Polyethnicity and National Unity in World History* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985), pp. 6–7.

Atlantic Alliance, Act I

K. HEN: If ever thou beest mine, Kate, as I have a saving faith within me tells me thou shalt, I get thee with scambling, and thou must therefore needs prove a good soldier-breeder. Shall not thou and I, between Saint Denis and Saint George, compound a boy, half French, half English, that shall go to Constantinople and take the Turk by the beard? Shall we not? What sayest thou, my fair flower-de-luce?

KATH: I do not know dat.

—William Shakespeare
Henry V (Act V, scene ii)

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Smith Richardson Foundation
International Security and Foreign Policy Program
Junior Faculty Research Grant Program

Description

The Smith Richardson Foundation's International Security and Foreign Policy Program is pleased to announce its annual grant competition to support junior faculty research on American foreign policy, international relations, international security, military policy, and diplomatic and military history. The Foundation will award at least three research grants of $60,000 each to support tenure-track junior faculty engaged in the research and writing of a scholarly book on an issue or topic of interest to the policy community. These grants are intended to buy-out up to one year of teaching time and to underwrite research costs (including research assistance and travel). Each grant will be paid directly to, and should be administered by, the academic institution at which the junior faculty member works. Projects in military and diplomatic history are especially encouraged.

Procedure

An applicant must submit a research proposal, a maximum of ten pages, that includes the following five sections: (1) a one-page executive summary; (2) a brief description of the issue or the problem that the proposed book will examine; (3) a description of the background and body of knowledge on the issue to be addressed by the book; (4) a description of the personnel and methods (e.g., research questions, research strategy, analytical approach, tentative organization of the book, etc.); and (5) a brief explanation of the implications of the prospective findings of the research for the policy community. The applicant should also include a *curriculum vitae*, a detailed budget explaining how the grant would be used, a work timetable with a start date, and a copy of policy-relevant scholarship. A template for a junior faculty proposal is available at the Foundation's website (www.srf.org).

Proposal Evaluation Criteria

Proposals will be evaluated based on the following criteria: (1) the relevance of potential analysis and findings to current and future foreign and security policy issues; (2) the potential of the project to innovate the field and to contribute to academic or policy literature on the chosen topic; (3) the degree to which research questions and analytical methods are well defined; (4) the degree to which the project will develop valuable new data or information through field work, archival work, or other methods; and (5) the applicant's publication record.

Eligibility

An applicant must have a Ph.D., preferably in Political Science, Public Policy, Policy Analysis, International Political Economy, or History. He or she also must hold a position as a full-time tenure-track faculty member of a college or university in the United States. An applicant should explain how he or she meets all of these requirements in a cover letter to the proposal.

Deadline

The Foundation must receive all Junior Faculty Research Grant proposals by **July 3, 2003.** Applicants will be notified of the Foundation's decision by **October 31, 2003.** No electronic submissions please.

Please mail your proposal to:

Junior Faculty Research / International Program
Smith Richardson Foundation
60 Jesup Road
Westport, CT 06880

If you have any further questions, submit them via e-mail to plandesberg@srf.org. No phone inquiries please.

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EuroIslam: The Jihad Within?

Olivier Roy

IF THERE WERE any question as to whether Middle Eastern-born Muslim radicals could wreak massive destruction in Western countries, it was answered on September 11, 2001. An important related question, however, remains on the table. Could future Islamic terror arise from *within* Western societies, from Muslim radicals born in the West and thoroughly familiar with its ways? What paths might such radicalization take? To answer this question, we must develop and consult a new sociology—that of EuroIslam.[1]

Diasporic and Universalist Islam

ISLAM IN western Europe is in rapid transition from an imported Islam to forms of European or "universal" Islam. The key difference between the two is this: the former is practiced mostly by immigrants who preserve links with their countries of origin, while the latter is adhered to mostly by European-born Muslims who have ceased looking to the "old country" as a reference point and a storehouse of activists and clerics. The extent of the transition from imported to universal Islam varies greatly from one community to another. It is pronounced in recent generations born in Europe, and it applies more to Arabs than to Turks. Once through its transition, Islam in Europe could assume several different forms. One is integration, by which is meant the development of a distinct European, or French or British, "Muslim church." Another is re-communalization along supranational lines, which is defined in essence by European Muslims' identification with a universal *umma*, or community of the faithful. It is with this latter phenomenon that radicalism and violence become potentially serious issues.

A necessary condition of radicalization is re-Islamization—that is, the socialization of European-born Muslims to Islamic beliefs, or at least beliefs that are presented as Islamic. But this is not a sufficient condition. Clearly, there are modes of conservative and conformist re-Islamization where the primary concerns of individuals are preserving dignity and achieving recognition and respect. This is the case, for example, for many Muslims from the Indian subcontinent living in Great Britain. Re-Islamization can take

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[1]This essay deals only with western Europe. A universal form of Islam is also developing in the United States and Canada, but it differs in structure and implication from that in European countries.

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on a humanist and even a liberal mode, such as that form advocated by the imam of the Ad-Dawa mosque in Paris.

Nevertheless, re-Islamization can also lead to radicalization, and it can do so, theoretically at least, in two ways. There is, first, diasporic radicalization, defined as that linked to and focused on the country of origin, not the European host society. But radical Muslim groups active in Europe that maintain close links with their countries of origin are never primarily Islamist; they are nationalist and often leftist, like the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK). The Algerian Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), although present in Europe, is no longer involved in militant activity among Algerian-born migrants, and the Turkish Milli Görüs—a European offshoot of the since-banned Refah Party—is, as we shall see, increasingly less involved in Turkish domestic politics even as it remains active among the diaspora.

The second type of radicalization is ideological and takes the form of a transnational Islam divorced from its country of origin. Ideological radicalization typically develops as a result of the alienation of the young, which is common to depressed or socially marginal urban areas. Unmoored from traditional Islam, second- and third-generation jobless males provide fertile ground for recruiters to radical Islam.

Islamic radicalization in Europe since the early 1990s has predominantly taken this second path, oriented toward a supranational community, the Muslim *umma*. As a constructivist community it is partly imaginary, but once imagined it becomes real in effect—a development much advanced by the advent of the Internet and its associated subculture. Oddly enough, this type of radicalization goes hand in hand with Westernization in France and other European countries. Most radicalized Muslim youth in Europe are Western educated, often in technical or scientific fields. Very few come out of a traditional *madrassa*, and most experience a period of fully Westernized life, complete with alcohol and girlfriends, before becoming "born-again Muslims" in European mosques or jails. Inversely, conservative groups, whose members practice traditional Islam with strong cultural and linguistic affinities with non-European cultures, can nonetheless develop strong loyalty toward the host European country. Radicalization is thus not directly linked to the level of integration.

Diasporic Radicalism

TO UNDERSTAND why transnational, "ideological" Islam is liable to be most dangerous to the security and well-being of European states, it helps to look first at the lesser problem—diasporic radicalization.

A diaspora is formed when a community of migrants maintains close links with its country of origin: continuing to speak the mother tongue; keeping in touch with national events through newspapers and other media; supporting extended family relationships through endogamous practices (the marriage partner is selected from the country of origin, sometimes from the same village); maintaining a juridical link (dual nationality or the nationality of the country of birth); and often preserving the myth of a return to the home country—even if this return is constantly being postponed. The term "diaspora" retains no meaning in reference to those who abandon these behaviors, even if some family and emotional ties remain. Before a Muslim in Europe can become a supranationalized radical, he (or, far less often, she) must lose most if not all connection to the diaspora.

The transition away from the diasporic condition can take three forms. The first of these is assimilation: the loss of all

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identity-related indicators of existing differences, even if memories or, for those born in the diaspora, awareness of one's origins persist (as, for example, with Italian immigrants to France). In this case, an Arab or Turkish immigrant would blend into a European society and lose all traces of his cultural, linguistic and religious origin. The second form of transition is integration, which is characterized by a reconstituted identity that stresses remaining differences. Thus, one can be simultaneously European and "Arab" without reference to the Arabic language or a particular Arab country; or simply "Muslim", understood as a follower of a religion detached from any specific citizenship. The third form is re-communalization, which combines a physical presence in Europe with a supranational Muslim identity that produces a "virtual ghetto."

Sociologically, west European Muslims are distributed all along this identity scale. Most of the approximately 13 million Muslims living in EU countries are not politically radical.[2] But of those who are, the main pattern in recent years evinces a growing separation of the process of radicalization from the country of origin. During the 1980s and early 1990s, Algerian (FIS), Turkish (Refah/Milli Görüs) and Pakistani Islamic militants concentrated their actions on the country of origin, avoiding confrontations with the authorities of the host European country. They used the diaspora for recruitment and financing, but also as political leverage to influence the host country's policy toward the country of origin—on the same model, more or less, as that of the IRA, the Basque ETA and the PKK. They needed to avoid prosecution and hence kept a low political profile in the host country. A dozen years later, it is clear that this strategy failed.

The FIS provides the best example of that failure. During its meteoric rise beginning in 1989 and culminating in its short-lived victory in the 1991 Algerian elections, the FIS garnered much sympathy from Algerian immigrants in Europe. But its strategy was always centered on the home country: its aim was to mobilize Europe's Muslims in support of the struggle in Algeria. Its networks abjured violence in Europe against Europeans, particularly in France, in order to transform Europe into a base of support for militants on the run and a public relations platform.

For these purposes the FIS mobilized immigrants of North African origin through the Algerian Federation of France. Despite its anti-Western rhetoric, the Federation sought compromise with European authorities in order to isolate the Algerian government. For example, under the aegis of an Italian Catholic community, the Federation was involved in the "San Egidio process", whose objective was to reach an "historical compromise" in Algeria. The FIS was thus an Islamo-nationalist organization whose goal was power in Algeria, not international Islamic revolution; it worked entirely within the framework of the Algerian nation, and rejected the exportation of jihad to Europe or anywhere else.

The FIS' European strategy failed for two reasons. First, a more radical group, the GIA (Groupes Islamiques Armés, or Armed Islamic Groups), entered the political arena of global confrontation and terrorism. Second, European governments (and most of the media and public

[2]Muslims represent about 3.4 percent of the EU population, but in some countries—France, Germany and the United Kingdom—the percentage is somewhat higher. In France, about a third of the Arab Muslim population is under the age of 20, compared to 21 percent for the country as a whole. If current demographic trends were to continue unbroken, the Muslim population of France could reach 50 percent as soon as 2053.

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opinion, as well) aligned themselves with the Algerian government's eradicative stand, refusing to recognize the FIS as a *bona fide* political player. Ill prepared for clandestine action, the FIS quickly lost the battle at home to the Algerian army and the GIA, and it collapsed in Europe for this and additional reasons. Its members in France felt increasingly less in tune with their native country's politics. Second-generation European Muslims, including those of Algerian descent, were more attracted by the GIA's radical discourse on jihad than by the FIS call to form a political coalition in Algeria. That radical discourse helped European-born Muslims blend with other deracinated radicals to form new transnational Islamist networks.

What happened to the FIS exemplifies a general process: the detachment of the new Islamic radical youth of Europe from the Islamic political parties of their countries of origin. A polarization has resulted: radicalized Muslim youth in Europe become less attracted to the purely political and national approach of any Islamic mother-party, and those parties become even more Islamo-nationalist than internationalist as a result. While many Islamist movements are consolidating a stable constituency within their own countries, they are simultaneously losing appeal beyond their borders.

This polarizing tendency has affected groups other than the Algerian FIS. The 2001 split of the Refah-Fazilet party has partly dissociated Milli Görüs from domestic Turkish politics; the movement is now far more "European" than Middle Eastern, often associating with the Europe-based Arab Muslim Brothers. Its internal debates concentrate on what it means to be a Muslim in Europe. It is also dividing within itself in its European context. On one side is a dominant conservative body; on the other is a liberal wing represented by its Dutch section, headed by Haci Karacaer—of whom more below.

Two Examples

THE SALMAN Rushdie affair exemplifies the shift from a diasporic to a universalist Islam. Pakistani immigrants to Great Britain from the Barelwi current were responsible for the public burning of *The Satanic Verses* in 1989. The Barelwis are considered moderates by Pakistani standards, but their special devotion to the Prophet rendered Rushdie's "insult" particularly grievous in their eyes. The fact that Rushdie is a renegade in their estimation was also very important. What was at stake was the definition of a new Islamic community in a European context that had nothing to do with possessing a particular passport. The Barelwis were trying to define a community that has no territorial, ethno-linguistic or juridical base. They were trying to pre-emptively determine the definition of a "Western" Muslim, which is a huge existential question for observant Muslims in Europe. Rushdie, of Indian Muslim origin, was targeted precisely because he is a British citizen who writes only in English and disclaims being a practicing Muslim. Had a Christian written *The Satanic Verses*, the Barelwis would have launched no street demonstrations.

At a deeper level, the objective of the anti-Rushdie campaign in England (before the matter was seized by Imam Khomeini in Iran for his own reasons) was to pass a new British law on blasphemy—to date reserved exclusively for the Church of England—for the benefit of Islam. Thus it was the demand for recognition on the part of Pakistani immigrants to Britain that lay behind the anti-Rushdie campaign, though Western public opinion, naturally enough, was oblivious to this angle. It is, however, interesting to note that two non-Muslim groups lent them an

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attentive ear: the left wing of the Labour Party, probably for electoral reasons but also in the name of multiculturalism; and a conservative group of Anglican and Catholic priests for whom this was a heaven-sent opportunity to forge a sacred alliance against the profanation of religion in the name of art—the controversy over Martin Scorsese's *The Last Temptation of Christ*, it should be recalled, was a near-contemporaneous affair.

Finally on this point, it bears noting that the anti-Rushdie campaign flowed more from fear than from aggression. The demand for communal recognition ran parallel to the attempt to define the borders of a community that, as its leaders saw it, was in danger of disintegration through assimilation. The internal vision of a beleaguered Islam in decline is important: many Muslims in the Middle East and outside of it share this vision—a view confirmed, in their eyes, by the Gulf War, the failure of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, the sanctions against Iraq and so on. Such motives contrast sharply with those attributed to Muslims in the Western view of an expanding Islam. In any case, it is clear that the European Muslim reaction to *The Satanic Verses* had nothing to do with importing Islamic radicalization to Europe; on the contrary, it evidenced a *sui generis* Muslim-European process of ideological radicalization, with the potential of exporting radicalism to, rather than importing it from, the Middle East.

The rise of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Europe also exemplifies the transition from a diasporic to a universalist mode of Islamic identity. Hizb ut-Tahrir ("Liberation Party") is a fundamentalist party based in London that was originally set up as a Palestinian Islamic movement in 1953. Officially non-violent, its ideas are nevertheless very radical. It advocates the immediate re-establishment of the caliphate and the ultimate conversion of the entire world to Islam. Hizb ut-Tahrir is now a genuinely international movement; indeed, it is difficult to identify and locate precisely its controlling authority. Officially, its leader is Sheikh Abdel Qadir Zalum, a Palestinian from Beirut who succeeded Taqiuddin Nabhani, the movement's founding father, in 1977. But Zalum appears to have lost effective control to a group of militants based in London. And it is a movement that is rapidly growing.

Hizb ut-Tahrir's growth is revealed through an analysis of its relationship with the Muhajirun organization of Sheikh Omar Bhakri, a Syrian residing in London who maintains a high profile in the English-language media. Though Bhakri does not make explicit reference to Hizb ut-Tahrir, their pronouncements and website content are often identical. The Muhajirun movement, therefore, is likely a front for Hizb ut-Tahrir in Europe, which developed in the 1980s and 1990s in Great Britain, Sweden and the Netherlands—and to a lesser extent in the United States. Starting in 1997, Hizb ut-Tahrir established new chapters in Muslim countries including Sudan, Uzbekistan and Pakistan. The Pakistani branch, led by Dr. Abdul Qayyum, is more recent than the Uzbek branch, set up in 1999, and also more visible, with its meetings announced in the press. It seems to have been set up at the instigation of the London leadership. During a trial for sedition in Lahore in the fall of 2002, the defendants were British-born Muslims who spoke exclusively English with a cockney accent. Hizb ut-Tahrir thus represents another example of a re-communalized European radicalism being deliberately and systematically exported to Muslim countries.

The transition from diasporic to universalist Islam is also illustrated by the fact that very few Muslims in Europe mobilize on the basis of Middle Eastern conflicts. Although the Palestinian cause is popular among European Muslims, their support has never gone further than

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street demonstrations numbering fewer than 5,000 people in Paris, in company with traditional left-wing and anti-imperialist non-Muslim European sympathizers. Support for the Palestinian cause is generally not expressed in religious terms, and neither is opposition to a U.S.-led war against Iraq.

The Radicalization of the Uprooted

WHAT IS the essential nature of supranational, ideological Islam in Europe, and what recruitment patterns does it manifest? Only by understanding these matters can we hazard a guess as to how significant a security problem European states—and the United States—may face in the future from such movements.

Identification with a supranational *umma* in Europe can be experienced as a purely religious identification. This is often the case among Muslim middle-class populations, but, particularly among disenchanted and alienated youth, such identification can lead to a process of political radicalization. This process varies from place to place, and from one immigrant community to another, but the general trend is clear—as is the reason for it.

When Muslim immigrants live in open, cosmopolitan societies, particularly ones offering economic dynamism and social mobility, efforts by diasporic elders to keep them segregated from the mainstream usually fail, albeit in varying degrees and at varying speeds. As the original culture falls away, it is replaced by new cultural norms—either fully, as with assimilation, or partly, as with integration. When these new norms come from the host country, they can sometimes take the form of a subculture—such as the "suburban" youth culture in France, whose combative nature is Western, not Islamic, in origin. But as we have seen, sometimes a process of identity reconstruction ensues that seeks to preserve the essence of difference. Without the actual anchors of a diasporic community to sustain them, however, they require an imagined community. In the case of European Muslims, this constructivist community is usually based on a transnational religious identity. (Interestingly enough, many European Muslims nonetheless require their host society's freedom and openness to advance the cause of a transnational identity that bypasses both Muslim nations and local European patriotisms. This is illustrated by the creation in Antwerp of a controversial organization, the Arab European League, which lobbies for recognition of minority rights for Muslims at an all-European level.)

The rejection of the culture of origin, together with the refusal to assimilate into the surrounding Western culture, finds perfect expression in neo-fundamentalism (or salafism).[3] Fundamentalism—meaning a return to the "true" tenets of religion—is nearly as old as Islam itself. The contemporary trend, justifiably called *neo*-fundamentalism, combines technical modernism, de-culturation (rejection of both traditional Muslim and modern Western cultures) and globalization (exemplified by websites like umma.net). Neo-fundamentalism is particularly appealing to alienated youth because it turns their cultural alienation into a justification for forging a universal Islam stripped of customs and traditions and thus adaptable to all societies. It envisions the whole world as a great potential *umma*, and it does not require the thousands of hours of study that traditional Islamic piety requires from would-be lead-

[3]Salafism, meaning "the path of the pious ancestors", was the name of an Islamic reformist movement at the end of the 19th century, but today it is used by Wahhabis and the like to refer to themselves in opposition to both traditional and "Westernized" Muslims.

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ers and community activists. It discards native religious cultures as un-Islamic and polluted by superstitions, folklore and accretions from non-Islamic sources. Thus, contrary to what many casual observers seem to think, traditional and national culture, even if they are Muslim, are connoted negatively in the neo-fundamentalist vision.

Neo-fundamentalism in Europe does not target communities with ties to a culture of origin, but individuals in doubt about their faith and identity. It appeals to well-educated, but also uprooted and disgruntled, youth. For such individuals, fundamentalism offers a system for regulating behavior in any situation, from Afghan deserts to American college campuses. But this system is both a product and an agent of de-culturation. Islam, as preached by the Taliban, Saudi Wahhabis and bin Laden's radicals, is hostile even to culture that is Islamic in origin. It expresses the same rejection of all material civilization and gladly destroys it—whether it is Muhammad's tomb, the Bamiyan Buddha statues or the World Trade Center.

Yet these movements are not nihilistic. On the contrary, they are determined to restore what they imagine the purity of early Islam to have been, before it was sullied by human constructs. By championing the transnational *umma*, they address the universalist yearning of Muslims who cannot identify with any specific place or nation. The constructivist *umma* therefore must span the globe, where it battles the Western political, economic and cultural uniformity that, ironically, it requires to sustain itself. Thus McDonald's and English-as-a-second-language is fought by neo-fundamentalists wearing white robes and beards who also speak English-as-a-second-language (except in Britain, where it has become the new mother tongue) and go for *hallal* fast food.

The Security Dimension of EuroIslam

THE FACT that re-Islamization of young Muslims in Europe represents a radical *dis*connection between the country of origin and the new generations, constituting rather a factor of *de*-culturation, helps to explain why the dynamic of re-Islamization favors supranational organizations instead of "national" Islamic movements. But the various recruitment strategies of these organizations—the Muslim Brotherhood, Tablighi Jamaat, Hizb ut-Tahrir and Al-Qaeda—are rather different, and these differences have important implications for the security threats they may pose.

The Muslim Brothers and their sympathizers approach integration on a communal basis: they try to organize Muslims into a visible and active community, with institutions for education and social services. The UOIF (Union of French Islamic Organizations) and Milli Görüs now fit this pattern precisely. They want to be recognized by the authorities and often advocate the "Jewish" model (as they see it) to mobilize the Muslim community. They are legal-minded, stressing the negotiation of their status (whether over the veil, *hallal* food or consultation on ethical issues). They may evolve into a sort of Muslim church in Europe, which would pose little or no security threat, and would advance a conservative agenda in terms of moral and social values. This would likely put an end to the alliance between the multiculturalist, liberal European Left and the first generation of migrants, itself an interesting and important political development in its own right.

Tablighi Jamaat, a South Asian fundamentalist organization, on the other hand, is opposed to any sort of integration and, along with many salafi or Wahhabi movements, wants to organize the Muslims as separate communities—on a kind of ghetto

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model—with as little interaction as possible with the non-Muslim European world. Its members look askance at educating females and strongly oppose coeducation. They are a font of societal problems, but they are probably not a serious security threat so long as they are allowed to live their segregated communal lives without interference from Western authorities.

This brings us to Al-Qaeda and Hizb ut-Tahrir. If we analyze the violent Islamic militants who have operated in western Europe since the early 1990s, a distinct pattern emerges. These individuals are not linked to or used by any Middle Eastern state, intelligence service or radical movement, as had been the case in the 1980s. With a single, transitional exception,[4] they are part of the de-territorialized, supranational Islamic networks that operate specifically in the West and at the periphery of the Middle East. Their background has nothing to do with Middle Eastern conflicts or traditional religious education (excluding only the Saudis). On the contrary, as noted above, they are Western-educated and often have scientific backgrounds. Their groups are often mixes of educated middle-class leaders and working-class dropouts, a pattern common to most of the West European radicals of the 1970s and 1980s (Germany's Rote Armee Fraktion, Italy's Brigada Rossa, France's Action Directe). Many became "born-again" Muslims or jailhouse converts, sharing a common marginal culture.

The converts from mainstream European societies (whose existence was well known in Europe but only discovered by Americans with the case of John Walker Lindh) fit the same pattern. A few are from the middle class, usually the leaders (like Christophe Caze in France, a medical doctor who was killed "in action" against the police in Roubaix in 1996). Many are working-class dropouts—José Padilla, Richard Reid and the Frenchman Lionel Dumont (who fought in Bosnia)—who joined Islam because "the Muslims are the only ones to fight the system." Twenty years ago such individuals would have joined radical leftist movements, which have now disappeared or become "bourgeois" (like the Revolutionary Communist League in France). Now only two Western movements of radical protest claim to be "internationalist": the anti-globalization movement and the radical Islamists. To convert to Islam today is a way for a European rebel to find a cause; it has little to do with theology. (More than 100,000 converts to Islam live in France, but most converted for practical reasons—to marry a Muslim woman, for example.)

It follows that the second generation of Al-Qaeda militants in Europe (recruited after 1992) is characterized precisely by the breaking of their ties with the "real" Muslim world they claim to represent. All of the September 11 terrorists and their accomplices (except the Saudi "muscle" on the planes) left their country of origin to fight or to study abroad (usually in the West). All broke with their families. They did not belong to a neighborhood or community, not even a religious one in most cases. They were cultural outcasts both in their countries of origin and in their host countries. But they were all Westernized in some way (again, except the Saudis and the Yemenis); none had attended a *madrassa*, all were trained in technical or scientific fields and spoke a Western language. If we include the logistical networks, some possessed Western citizenship (Zacarias Moussaoui was born in France). All of them (except, once again, the Saudis)

[4]The exception is the Kelkal networks that operated in France in 1995. They were undoubtedly linked to and manipulated by the Algerian GIA, but were more interested in jihad against France and the West than in Algerian "national" solidarity.

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became born-again Muslims *in Europe* after living "normal" lives in their countries of origin. The mosques of Hamburg (Al-Qods), London (Finsbury Park), Marseilles and even Montréal played a far bigger role than any Saudi *madrassa* in the process of their Islamic radicalization.

Thus, far from representing a traditional religious community or culture, these militants broke with their pasts (and some with traditional Islam altogether). They experienced an individual re-Islamization in a small cell of uprooted fellows, where they forged their own Islam—as illustrated vividly by Mohamed Atta's refusal to be buried according to Egyptian traditions, which he dubbed un-Islamic. They did not follow any Islamic school or notable cleric, and often lived according to non-Muslim standards. Almost none made an endogamous marriage, but many (Al Mottassadek, Ahmed Ressam, Fateh Kemal, Jemal Beghal, Kamel Daoudi) married "European" wives. They are all far more a product of a Westernized Islam than of traditional Middle Eastern politics. However "old time" their theology may sound to Westerners, and whatever they may think of themselves, radical EuroIslamists are clearly more a post-modern phenomenon than a pre-modern one.

And they are a wholly European phenomenon. Except for a few Pakistanis, no Al-Qaeda member left Europe or the United States to fight for Islam in his country of origin. All the "Algerians" came from Europe (or, like Ressam, became radicalized in Europe), and not one was ever found in the GIA's Algerian strongholds. The foreigners sentenced in Yemen in January 1999 for hostage-taking included six British citizens of Pakistani descent (including the son-in-law of Sheikh Hamza, the Egyptian-born imam of Finsbury Park) and two French Algerians. Sheikh Saïd Omar, convicted in Pakistan for the kidnapping of Daniel Pearl, is a British-born citizen of the United Kingdom. The two young Muslims sentenced in Morocco for firing on tourists in a Marrakesh hotel in 1994 were from French Algerian families.

The peripheral character of Al-Qaeda militants is also reflected in the geography of their chosen battlefields. There is a paradox: most Al-Qaeda fighters are ethnic Arabs, the bulk of them being Saudi, Egyptian and Jordanian-Palestinian. But Al-Qaeda has been conspicuously absent from Arab lands (except, probably, for the Khobar Towers attack, the bombing of the U.S.S. *Cole*, and perhaps recent small-scale activity in Kuwait). Nor have these militants cared much about Arab conflicts. Bin Laden gave only faint lip service to the Palestinian cause until the end of 2001. Training for the September 11 attacks was initiated before the so-called second *intifada*; most of the terrorists arrived on U.S. soil in the spring of 2000 and the decision to attack was taken that January. Instead of the Middle East, Al-Qaeda and its likes have been fighting in the West (New York, Paris, London), in Bosnia, Kosovo, Somalia, Chechnya, Afghanistan, Central Asia, Pakistan, Kashmir, the Philippines, Indonesia and East Africa—but not in Egypt, Palestine, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria or Algeria.

This is not just because Arab states take their own internal security seriously. Rather, the re-communalized Muslims of Europe, logically enough, are fighting at the frontiers of their imaginary *umma*, and they are doing so because what most agitates them are side effects from their own Westernization. All the literature and websites linked to Al-Qaeda stress the "peripheral" jihad from Bosnia to the Philippines, and that focus has been noticed and criticized by Arab militants like the Saudi Sheikh Abu Ayman al-Hilali. Most of the jihadi websites are based in the West or in Malaysia. This is not only because of censorship; it is because the people behind

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them live in the West. While Al-Qaeda's campaign against U.S. interests has constantly increased and hundreds of Islamic militants have been arrested or tracked down in Europe, Islamist violence in the Middle East has steadily *decreased* since the Luxor killings of 1997. Hence the obvious question: Could EU member states be viewed as legitimate battlefields, and be attacked as a result? The answer is "yes, most definitely."

Islam in Europe's Future

RADICALIZATION is a peripheral result of the Westernization of Muslims born and living in Europe. It is linked with a generation gap and a depressed social status, and it perpetuates a pre-existent tradition of leftist, anti-imperialist protest in those communities. Notwithstanding such circumstances, most European Muslims have found a way to conciliate faith and a non-Muslim environment in a practical, if sometimes makeshift, manner. The problem is that what amounts to their *de facto* liberalism is not expressed in theological terms, and it is not bound into a socialization mechanism that can be transmitted easily to subsequent generations. This suggests that there will be ample raw human material for radicals to proselytize in the future.

This is not to say that Islam in the West is not producing a school of modern Islamic theology; it is, like that of Mohamed Arkoun at Paris University, Khaled Abou al-Fadl at UCLA and others. But this school has too few students. This is not only because of the conservative nature of Muslims. It also has to do with the lower social and educational level of first-generation immigrants, and, more importantly, with the fact that all contemporary forms of vibrant religiosity are usually based on charismatic, pietist and anti-intellectual approaches.

This is not a "Muslim" issue alone, then, but a modern one: modern theologians are not very popular in either the charismatic Christian movements or the Curia in the Vatican. Innovative theologians everywhere are waging uphill battles, whether under the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith or in the domain of the American-style televangelists. Indeed, contemporary forms of religiosity among second-generation Muslims outside the Middle East are closer to those of their 19th- and 20th-century American Christian counterparts than to medieval Islam: in short, they are examples of revivalism. Religious revivalism, after all, is centered not in family and communal tradition, but on individuals who experience a crisis of identity amid the *dis*continuity of familial and communal ties. It accords with individualism, the reconstruction of an imagined community (the evangelical church or the *umma*), a crisis of authority, defiance toward theological formality and religious authorities (bishops as well as *ulama*). It privileges self-instruction and an insistence on emotional faith rather than theology and traditional rituals.

In our time, religious revivalism is almost always socially conservative, from the American Bible Belt to the Lubavitch movement to John Paul II's defense against liberation theology. Conservative religious leaders rail against corruption and lost values, and in this sense transnational European Islam is becoming a part of the European debate on values. Many imams preach about "regaining happiness", "recovering from destitution", affirming a categorical difference between right and wrong, making a good life and so on—no different, in essence, from what conservative Christian and Jewish clergy say to their congregations.

Preaching such a message is a challenge for all conservative clergy, given the conditions they face in Europe. But

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it is only one of many challenges for Muslim clergy, for they are confronted head-on with the issue of tolerance. A complex dialectic has been set in motion: many Muslims in Europe define the bounds of their own toleration in relation to how they themselves are tolerated by non-Muslim Europeans—and here a world of mutual misperception spreads before us. Pim Fortuyn's decision to enter Dutch politics was triggered, he said, by the speech of a Moroccan-born imam who called homosexuals "sick people." This was, for the imam, a way to excuse homosexuals and thus to avoid the harsh treatment set down for them in the *sharia*, but Fortuyn could not have been expected to appreciate this. As some Europeans react against "alien" Muslim elements among them, it makes some Muslims more defensive and intolerant.

But not all Europeans do so, and not all Muslims are turning inward. Thus, Haci Karacaer, the aforementioned head of the Dutch Milli Görüs, has engaged in a dialogue with the Gay and Lesbian Associations, something inconceivable in the Middle East (where, on the contrary, there is a growing hostility toward homosexuality, as illustrated by the Cairo trials of 2002). In other words, matters are in flux, and how they are managed by both sides will go far to determine how much tinder for anger and violence may lie ahead.

In this sense, it is not theological debate but concrete interactions between European Muslims and non-Muslim society that is driving the evolution of EuroIslam. Clearly, the fundamentalist organizations of the different salafi schools try to prevent such an interaction by advocating the maintenance of a "closed" community for devout Muslims. Modernism is spread mainly by community leaders and local preachers who, when confronted by their salafi colleagues, dare to part company with them. September 11 has magnified the "obligation to speak" among moderate mainstream Muslims who are caught between a desire to express solidarity with more conservative fellow-believers and the pressure of European public opinion to denounce the veil and *sharia*.

Moderate Islam must be elaborated by Muslims themselves over the course of time, and not under political pressure or in a forced theological debate. Such a debate among Muslims in Europe will certainly come to pass, and it may even have an impact in traditional Middle Eastern societies—so much, anyway, we may hope, for reform is not yet making much headway in the authoritarian political cultures of the Muslim Middle East. But whatever the different trends at work—radicalism, liberalism, humanism—it is clear that they are the product of the endogenous evolution of EuroIslam. From a national security perspective, a great deal is riding on the outcome. □

> Ultimately, antagonistic religions must mean antagonistic cultures; and ultimately, religions cannot be reconciled.
>
> —T.S. Eliot

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THE CASE FOR WAR



ISBN: 1-893554-69-4, $25.95, 153 pages

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Out of Bali

Cybercaliphate Rising

David Martin Jones

ON SUB-TROPICAL Sunday mornings in August, in the square outside the Fatahillah Museum in north Jakarta, cultural tableaux testifying to Indonesia's diversity take place. In one of them, a troupe of Balinese school girls performs the elegant Legong dance that interprets, in its distinctive way, aspects of the island's ancient Hindu traditions. In its 2002 Jakarta version, however, instead of the sinuous traditional dress, the girls cover their heads with white headscarves. White gloves and white socks obscure their elegant hand and foot movements, while what appears to be a green satin sack hides the rest of their prepubescent anatomy.

Such puritanical disdain for traditional practice reflects the growing Islamization of Indonesian cultural life. It marks a significant breach with the recent and historical past, when both pre- and post-colonial Javanese rulers took pride in a syncretism that amalgamated religious and cultural differences into an original Indonesian blend. Across Jakarta today, however, middle-class women anxiously debate—while sipping latte in air-conditioned cafes in the downtown shopping malls—whether it is Islamically correct to wear the stylish "millennium" headscarf, elegantly tied at the nape of the neck, as a fitting accompaniment to lipstick and Ray-Bans. This fashionable equivocation receives little sympathy from sisters in Islam like Anne Rufaidah, the owner of an Islamic women's clothing chain. She insists that only the austere Middle Eastern headscarf, which descends shapelessly to the waist, meets the Quranic injunction to modesty and propriety. The Balinese dancers in Fatahillah Square wisely opt for the righteous look.

A more disturbing illustration of this increasingly intolerant mindset may be found to the south of the museum in the ethnically Chinese suburb of Glodok. Its pockmarked and windowless shopping centers bear silent witness to the chaos that marked the demise of Suharto's New Order in 1998, when over 1,000 ethnic Chinese perished during riots orchestrated by shadowy "dark forces." Even in 2002 members of this despised non-Islamic minority dare not display Chinese characters over their shophouses. Despite the recent return of public celebrations of the Chinese New Year, pragmatism here requires the deliberate obfuscation of identity. Just to the south of Glodok, as it happens, is the site of the Monumen Nasional, once the quintessential symbol of Indonesia's now rapidly decaying secular ambitions. Mounted on a concrete pedestal, a phallus-shaped flame invokes the traditional authority of Javanese

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rulers; but today the litter-strewn square of arid brown earth, sporting the occasional tuft of grass, testifies eloquently both to the Ozymandian pretensions and the subsequent decay of the New Order.

It is not only in popular culture that we see evidence of the closing of the collective Indonesian mind. In August 2002, the annual session of the Indonesian People's Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusya Waratan Rakyat, or MPR) met to discuss proposed amendments to the 1945 constitution, a document with a somewhat checkered history since the troubled republic gained independence from the Dutch in 1949. One amendment sought not to democratize or liberalize Indonesian life after the Suharto dictatorship, but instead to restore the vision of the country's more Islamically-inclined founding fathers. The Jakarta Charter of 1945 declared the centrality of *sharia* to the future of the inchoate republic, but the modernizing nationalist regimes of Sukarno (1950–66) and Suharto (1966–98) had no use for such views. In 2002, however, Islamization was back on the political agenda. Although eventually rejected by the MPR, the *sharia* amendment received support from Vice President Hamzah Haz, Assembly Speaker Amien Rais and two small Islamic parties in the Assembly.

It was also endorsed on the streets by increasingly assertive Islamist groups like the Front Pembela Islamaya (FPI—Islamic Defenders Front), Hizb ut-Tahrir (Islamic Liberation Party) and the Majlis Mujaheddin Indonesia (MMI—Assembly of Indonesian Mujaheddin), and it is clear that these groups have popular support that goes well beyond their formal memberships. A December 2001 survey conducted by the State Institute of Islamic Studies (IAIN) found that 61 percent of the population responded positively to the statement that "Islamic government, that is government based on the Quran and the Sunna and led by experts in Islam . . . is the best for this country." A higher percentage of the population also preferred military rule to the uncertainties of parliamentary rule (45 to 42 percent).[1]

Easily the largest state in size and population among the diverse nations of Southeast Asia, Indonesia is important in its own right. Destabilized and Islamized, it would threaten both the ASEAN grouping and its immediate neighbor to the south, Australia.[2] But the Indonesian case seems only an advanced version of a growing general propensity in Southeast Asia toward ethno-religious fundamentalism. Thus in Malaysia the long established dominion of the modernizing Barisan Nasional government faces the prospect of both internal factionalism and external challenge. For more than twenty years, an autocratic prime minister, Mahathir Mohamad, has driven the apathetic Malays toward ambitious developmental goals. But as he contemplates stepping down from his various offices, a countervailing Malay Islamism in the shape of the Partai Agama se-Malaysia (PAS) is both expanding its political appeal and exacerbating long dormant Chinese-Malay tensions in the multi-ethnic state. Meanwhile, in the Philippines, the unresolved struggle for Moro (Muslim) independence in southern Mindanao, which dates from the 1970s, has been globalized in the course of the 1990s as the radical Abu Sayyaf group established links with Al-Qaeda.

Indeed, the identification in December 2001 of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), a Southeast Asian Al-Qaeda franchise that was preparing to attack U.S. and Israeli embassies and British and Australian High Commissions in Singapore, demonstrated a hitherto

[1]Parts of the survey appeared in *Tempo* (Jakarta), December 31, 2001, pp. 38–52.

[2]See Rajan Menon, "Another Year of Living Dangerously?" *The National Interest* (Fall 2001).

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unsuspected degree of cooperation among radical Islamists in Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Indonesia. Also unappreciated until then were their extensive links to and identification with both the ideology and tactics of Al-Qaeda. Operating through networks of patronage and intermarriage, groups like JI, Laskar Jihad, the FPI and Kumpulan Mujaheddin Malaysia (KMM) seek to unite the Muslim world as a superpower governed by a caliphate like those of the 7th century. Several Islamist groups in Indonesia, linked together through Sheikh Abu Bakar Bashir's MMI, share this commitment to building an Islamic realm. They all maintain that the United States is the real global terrorist because of its links with Zionism, its support for un-Islamic regimes in Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaysia, and its promotion of the anti-Islamic politics of democratic secularism. These groups may not be able to take over Indonesia or other Southeast Asian states, but they may soon be in a position to disorganize, intimidate, terrorize and paralyze them.

Southeast Asia and Western Social Science

WHAT DOES all this mean? On the conventional policy level, it means that a region which until recently served as a global parable of successful development has transformed itself, in less than a decade, into an arc of instability with global ramifications. But, after the October 2002 Bali bombing, this is to state the obvious. What does it mean in more general terms about the adequacy of our understanding of contemporary Islam, on the one hand, and what we think we know about modernization, democratization and development on the other? While such concerns lend themselves to theoretical considerations, they are also the bases upon which rest several equally unconventional and ambitious policies designed to "drain the swamp" of support for terrorism. The sophistication of our understanding, or lack thereof, hence has practical import, too.

As Indonesia's post-New Order democratization proceeds to direct presidential elections in 2004, and as Malaysia looks uncertainly toward a post-Mahathir future, the growing influence of an ascetic, militant Islam is both ironic and troubling. It is ironic because Southeast Asian Islam has been widely touted over many years, both at home and abroad, as friendly to capitalism, benignly syncretic and immune to Middle Eastern-style religious fundamentalism. Yet what is happening in Indonesia and elsewhere in Southeast Asia seems to cast doubt on these assumptions. That the greatest catastrophe in the region, so far, occurred in Bali, the most tolerant and least Islamized province of Indonesia, only accentuates the point.

Militant Islam's rise in Southeast Asia is troubling because Indonesia's experience casts doubt on the mainstream analysis of Western modernization, democratization and "development" theory. Prior to the 1997–98 financial meltdown, Indonesia was approaching levels of rapid development evident elsewhere in Asia, and one could imagine Indonesia's economic success leading to political liberalization in the post-Suharto period. Taiwan and South Korea, countries where a forward-looking military had acted as a Praetorian guard for economic modernization and eventual democratization, afforded a plausible model for such expectations. Indonesia, in other words, seemed bound to surf the Third Wave, its ride delayed only by the special circumstances of Suharto's long tenure. Here the relevant analogy was the Philippines: with Suharto gone, it was supposed, Indonesia would find its way to a more or less stable

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democracy, just as the Philippines did after Ferdinand Marcos' long rule ended.

But instead, rapid development and Indonesia's post-Suharto democratic opening dissolved into a deep economic recession adumbrated by a vertiginous descent into religious fundamentalism. The Indonesian case, therefore, shook the heretofore unshakeable shibboleth of modernization theory and liberal orthodoxy: that democratization in the non-Western world would engender social and intellectual pluralism (even with its corresponding discontents), not a socially centrifugal identity politics. But rather than give up that article of Western liberal faith, some observers turned to a narrowly economic explanation to account for Indonesia's special circumstances. There is, after all, a clear correlation between the proliferation and popularity of radical Islamic groups and the simultaneous faltering of the economy, which was exacerbated by the failure of Indonesia's new democratic politics to address decisively the corruption and cronyism that undermined the New Order. We are likely witnessing, then, an example of James C. Davis' famous "J-curve", where popular disillusion and a propensity for rebellion correlate not with absolute standards of living, but with the incendiary gap between rising expectations and a sudden decline of performance.

But correlation is not cause, and a predominantly economic explanation for Indonesia's current woes appears worryingly incomplete. It can account for riot and discontent, but not for Indonesia's distinctly Islamist idiom of expression and social profile. Rather, Indonesia's tumultuous economic and political experience of recent years seems the fuse rather than the ammonium nitrate itself. Indonesia's turn toward political Islam has more to do with the consequences of the slow-motion collision between modernity and its Islamic social character. The fact that standard-issue Western modernization theory has been wrong about other Islamic societies, as well, suggests that this is a far more plausible line of analysis.

Serious observers of Islamic societies rightly stress the many cultural differences among them. Yet too great an insistence upon distinctions risks missing commonalties of equal importance. The IAIN survey shows that it is mostly among middle-class males under forty that previously proscribed Islamist groups find recruits to their uncompromising ideology of *sharia* discipline. In mid-2002, the Surabaya and Jogjakarta regional heads of Laskar Jihad, an Islamist group dedicated to advancing the Quran by the Kalashnikov if necessary, are a Western-trained engineer and a medical doctor, respectively. In other words, although radical Islam remains a minority avocation in Indonesia, its appeal to an educated middle class shares an elective affinity with the composition of the Al-Qaeda network—whether in its Saudi, Egyptian, German or British manifestations.

The popular recourse to Islamic fundamentalism in Southeast Asia also repeats a pattern found elsewhere in Asia and the Middle East. Whenever centralizing, secular authoritarian regimes in the Muslim world have experienced rapid growth and attendant social change, they are invariably confronted by a fundamentalist challenge. That challenge is everywhere accompanied by a significant middle-class retreat into a closed world of sectarian identity. Progressive secularism fails to thrive in the modernization processes of late-developing Muslim-majority states. In some cases, as in Iran, fundamentalism achieves power. In others, it achieves a capacity to blunt the power and programs of the secular state, and to retard the liberalization of civil society. Even apparent long-term successes are not immune from such challenges, as the recent political sociology of Turkey suggests.

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A New Sociology of Islam

IF STANDARD Western theories of modernization are powerless to explain such broad phenomena, where else might we look for help? It is tempting to join the queue of those who would cast Francis Fukuyama's "End of History" thesis against Samuel Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations" argument, but it is a temptation well worth resisting.[3] Fukuyama, much vulgarized by his epigoni, pointedly identified the Muslim world as the likeliest source of long-term resistance to his vision. As for Huntington's "clash", it focuses on Islam's relations with the non-Islamic world, not on the sociology of Islam itself. It is a little hard to see why so many turn for guidance to two approaches, neither of which centers on the puzzle at hand. Besides, grand theorizing is vulnerable, almost inevitably, to a form of reductionism that suffers—as Peter Geyl observed in the first proponents of civilizational history, Otto Spengler and Arnold Toynbee—from "fallacious arguments and spurious demonstrations."[4] It is therefore somewhat crude and misleading to ask if the Southeast Asian case merely indicates a temporary subsidence on the path to polyarchy at the End of History, or rather foreshadows an inexorable clash of civilizations in a global order permanently dichotomized (to get more vulgar still) between Benjamin Barber's McWorld and Jihad, or Thomas Friedman's Lexus and Olive Tree.

If one nevertheless wishes to engage in a thought experiment in which the sociology of Islam in Southeast Asia and elsewhere is constructed in terms of strengths between Whiggish optimism and Spenglarian pessimism, one does not need Fukuyama or Huntington to proceed. Such thinking has an old (and curiously neglected) pedigree. Take the former, for example. Analyzing the decline and fall of the Roman Empire from the security of a politically liberal and rapidly developing—if hardly very democratic—London in 1776, Edward Gibbon concluded that modern Europe possessed a prophylactic that Rome had lacked. Rome, as every schoolgirl once knew, fell to a combination of barbarians without and a loss of belief within. Thus, the glory that was Rome "insensibly declined with their laws and manners." By contrast, Gibbon considered that the threat posed by barbarism to modernizing 18th-century Europe had "contracted to a narrow span." This was for two reasons.

First, in the spirit of liberal 20th-century modernization theory *avant la lettre*, Gibbon contended that Europe was "secure from any future irruption of barbarians; since before they can conquer, they must cease to be barbarous." Gibbon, and the British Enlightenment generally, believed that they had identified a serendipitous developmental paradox: Civilization's schooling of the passions generated a scientific and technological advantage that could only be learned by adopting the soft civilized ways of the modern city. The Highland clan and the Bedouin tribe alike had to abandon simple traditional values, brush their hair, trim their beards and go to school lest they be permanently entrapped in a cake of backward custom. Modernization, in other words, required civilization; gaining power meant undergoing a process that would eviscerate the motive to use that power in ways inimical to mainstream institutions and values. In earlier form, this is essential-

[3]One might more interestingly throw Huntington against Huntington: the Huntington of the "clash" against the Huntington of the "third wave" or, better, the Huntington who wrote *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).

[4]Geyl, "From Ranke to Toynbee: five lectures on historians and historiographical problems", *Smith College Studies in History* 39 (1952).

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ly the same notion of process that stands at the center of Fukuyama's thesis (though Fukuyama never mentions Gibbon). Gibbon argued, second, that both Europe and the new world of America enjoyed an unassailable technological edge unknown to Rome: "mathematics, chemistry, mechanics, architecture have been applied to the service of war." Modern cannon and fortification, Gibbon contended, "now form an impregnable barrier against the Tartar horse."

That barrier stood firm for a long time, but Gibbon's analysis has broken down in our own time. We have no impermeable barrier against the contemporary Islamist equivalent of the Tartar horse. By a little analyzed or understood process, the Islamist warriors of our day have managed to circumvent the "civilizing" process to which Gibbon (and, subsequently, Fukuyama) pointed: they use Western technology against us, being adept with our tools, but without having imbibed the values of the society that produced them.

How could such a thing happen? Ernest Gellner, a pioneer of what one can fairly call a clash theory of Western versus Islamic civilizations, proposed an answer years before Huntington began asking the question.[5]

As anthropologist and sociologist, Gellner was acutely aware of the main economistic tenets and tendencies of Western thinking about modernization. But he was also acutely sensitive to the fact that these tenets could not explain the modern Muslim world. In his view, coming at the subject from cultural anthropology, Western civil society differed from traditional societies in that it required what he called modularity: a distinctive capacity to combine in effective associations with others, but without any one of these associations subsuming or defining the rest. Traditional society was stable, but also immobile, because external strictures fixed people's definitions of their own identity, and then, for lack of any alternative point of reference, those definitions were internalized. Western man, however, could adopt a variety of roles in society (religious, ethnic, political, occupational), and these could define his identity instead of ascriptive characteristics assigned at birth.

While observing that a vast chasm separated modern flexibility from traditional immobility—rather along the lines of Karl Popper's "open" and "closed" societies—Gellner recognized, contra Gibbon and most American political scientists, that modernization—what he called "the deadly angel who spells death to economic inefficiency"—was "not always at the service of liberty." Gellner observed that Islam's encounter with modernity had led it to grow both stronger and purer in the last century.[6] Islamic societies seemed to be secularization-resistant; they side-stepped the development of modularity even as they assimilated many modern modes of behavior. This defied the essence of Western modernization theory, and Gellner's struggle to understand why led him to develop a sociology of Islamic neo-orthodoxy, which describes precisely what we see developing today in Southeast Asia.

Gellner observed the macro-social realities of the 20th-century Muslim world, and saw a massive movement from the illiterate folk Islam of the countryside to the "high" literate Islam of the city. Urbanization and increased literacy led from a mimetic form of learning to an analogic process available only to those who could reason through symbols—i.e., those who could read. Gellner saw that

[5]Huntington's book mentions Gellner only once, citing only a short *New Republic* article—none of his scholarly works.

[6]See particularly Gellner's *Muslim Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

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neo-orthodox Muslims associated greater piety with upward mobility. This involved a process in which the authority defining Islamic piety passed from the clan elder to the literate cleric at the school or the urban mosque, and in which standards of conduct were learned from the printed page rather than through oral instruction. In their own cultural framework, this was advancement—indeed, it was modernization—and it applied with special power to the role and status of women.[7] If, in the post-modern, post-colonial world, identification with scripturalist high culture becomes the hallmark of Islamic urban sophistication, then it follows that the bourgeois Muslim woman in Jakarta—or in London, Karachi or Sydney, for that matter—wears the veil or the headscarf not because her mother did so, but precisely because she did not. The way "up" for women is within a newly mobile traditionalism, not outside it.

There was nothing explicitly political about the processes of neo-orthodoxy, but Gellner anticipated its political implications. As long as clan groups and tribal affinities remained more or less stable, the processes of neo-orthodoxy would be buffered by tradition and the constraints on behavior that it imposed. But if the literal community was disrupted sufficiently, or if the energies of modernization ejected individuals and families from it, new possibilities emerged—and here we come to the sociological underpinning of Islamic "fundamentalism", or Islamism.

Islamism is identified most closely with the strain of Islamic thinking called salafism.[8] While neo-orthodoxy evinced a tendency toward scripturalism and puritanical theology, fundamentalist formalism represented a modern political impulse that re-constructed Islam not in a traditional but in a faux *traditionalist* way—turning it into a *nizam*, a total ideological system.[9] Gellner saw that the Islamist social vision, while founded on a pre-industrial scripturalism, thrives best under social conditions formed by modernity: the specialization and compartmentalization of work associated with industrialization and the transformation of communications. Each jihadi group in Southeast Asia has its own website and is comfortable with mobile phones (provided they do not have a musical dial tone). What these groups envisage, then, is not the establishment of just any global caliphate, but a cybercaliphate.

The contemporary Islamist seeks to purify Islam from the accretions of "backward" tradition and turn it into a rule-based social order that stands beyond temporal power and existing political authority. He seeks, in a sense, a globalization of Islam's pre-modern scriptural injunctions that can leap over the bureaucratically-centralizing post-colonial arrangements into the transnational network of the cybercaliphate. Again, this is hard to achieve in a coherent community, where tradition and family associations stultify the impulses of change. It is much easier when that coherence breaks down, when individuals live outside such real communities and where abstract communities take their place. One would therefore expect more extreme examples of neo-orthodoxy among those deracinated from community and tradition, and more

[7]See Gellner, *Postmodernism, Reason and Religion* (New York: Routledge, 1992).

[8]*Salafiya*, or salafism, refers to the honor due to the supposedly untainted Islamic beliefs and practices of the first four caliphs, the Rushidun. (See note 3, p. 68, above.) It thus becomes clear that fundamentalism in Islam equates more or less to radical Christian forms of Protestantism, a desire to "return" to a pure, unmediated and uncorrupted personal relationship with God.

[9]See William E. Shepard, *Sayyid Qutb and Islamic Activism* (Leyden: E.J. Brill, 1996), pp. xxxix–xl.

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plentiful recruits to fundamentalism among those living literally outside of community and tradition. And this is exactly what one, in fact, finds.

Thus, across Southeast Asia and the Middle East, it is typically urban male university graduates who find in the strict formalism of fundamentalist teaching the simplicity and certitude to cushion their education in science and technology, which is necessarily an education in contingency and doubt. Outlining the belief that science can only be civilized through faith, Sayyid Qutb, the 20th-century prophet of Islamism, maintained that only the genuine practice of a pure Islam could heal the unnatural breach between religion and scientific materialism. This "ideological ideal" of Islam alone could "rescue humanity from . . . the barbarism of technocratic culture", from the vice of an authoritarian nationalism imposed by a Nasser, a Suharto or an Atatürk, "and from the stifling trap of communism."[10]

Such a system, thought Qutb, required a unified *umma*, or community of the faithful, in the novel sense of a transterritorial ideocracy. Politically, this means that the boundaries of the *umma* reflect the extent of the doctrine's acceptance. Where it is a majority, it rules; where it is not, it struggles. As Gellner pointed out, this Islamist self-reformation addresses directly the predicament of Third World backwardness. It offers scripturalism, asceticism, rule orientation and aversion to backward local particularisms, all of which, he wrote, "may have elective affinities with the virtues required to surmount the arduousness and strains of the long march to disciplined, modern industrial society."[11] Islamism promotes a rule-governed, illiberal arrangement in which society is organized

> by networks, quasi tribes, alliances forged on the basis of kin, services exchanged . . . common institutional experience, but still, in general, based on trust, well founded or not, rather than on formal relations in a defined bureaucratic manner.[12]

In its most extreme form, as in Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups, the new "community" is forged on mafia activities and terror franchises rather than on traditional pastoral-based clan affinity. This is how Al-Qaeda currently operates in Bali, Hamburg and London.

Islamism thus bulges with paradox. It exemplifies a network-based social order without a real society. It is atomized without individualism. It can operate effectively in a bewildering diversity of settings without intellectual and political pluralism. Against the civilizational prophylactics identified by Gibbon, Islamism has no need of the doubtful joys of modularity, and has developed an asymmetric capacity to turn the West's technological and cybernetic edge against it. It has devastated a modern cosmopolitan city like New York and a backpacker's holiday playground like Kuta Beach in Bali with conspicuous ease. And we cannot even assuredly find it, because "it" is not anything we have ever tried or needed to find before.

The Cybercaliphate Within

IF THIS sociology of political Islam is correct, then we immediately recognize that the war against terrorism cannot be conceived according to the heretofore standard geographical assumptions of international conflict. Traditional, even very pious,

[10]Qutb, *The Religion of the Future* (Kuwait: International Islamic Federation of Student Organizations, 1971), p. 121.

[11]Gellner, *Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and its Rivals* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1994), p. 31.

[12]*Ibid.*, p. 27.

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Middle Eastern Islam as such is not the problem. Terror-prone Islamism does arise in a remote sense from the least traditional, most fundamentalist Muslim state, Saudi Arabia; but Islamism's active nodes and cells are *not* located in Arab countries. As we have seen, many are evolving in Southeast Asia, but the most dangerous networks are located in the West. As we have suggested, *dar al-Islam* is no longer simply a geographic concept; the "virtual" world of the potential cybercaliphate knows no conventional boundaries. Thus to understand what is happening in Southeast Asia, we also have to look at what goes on, for example, in London.

The Islamist presence in the West presents profound difficulties for all adherents of liberal pluralism. The West addresses the Islamist threat with at least a semblance of realism when it emanates from "states of concern" like Syria and Afghanistan, or failing states like the Philippines and Indonesia. Yet it seems curiously trapped by its own rhetoric of tolerance and multiculturalism when it comes to addressing the fundamentalist challenge within. Hamburg Technological University served as a perfect location for Mohamed Atta to plan his towering day in history. Al-Qaeda cells remain active in Germany, Spain, Italy and France (and, thankfully, also actively well-hounded of late). But it is in Britain that perhaps the most acute cognitive dissonance may be observed.

While Prime Minister Tony Blair remains steadfast in his commitment to the war on terror abroad, the British Home Office permits self-styled sheikhs Abu Hamza and Omar Bhakri Mohamed to recruit for Al-Qaeda from their state-subsidized mosque in Finsbury Park, North London, within half a dozen tube stops of Westminster.[13] These leading figures in the Saudi-funded Islamic Council of Britain promulgate the achievement—by jihad, if necessary—of a unified Islamic world that would include among its future member states the Islamic Republic of the United Kingdom. Omar Bhakri dismisses the more moderate voices of British Islam who dissent from this salafist utopia as "chocolate Muslims."

On August 25, 2002, Abu Hamza's Al-Muhajiroun ("the migrants") and its affiliates, like the London branch of Hizb ut-Tahrir, rallied in Trafalgar Square. Clad in a variety of colorful kaftans and turbans, they resembled something left over from an aging American west coast band of the late Sixties counterculture. Instead of love and peace, however, they chanted "Osama, Osama, Osama." As in Jakarta, uncompromising certitude accompanied the flowing kaftans. Peddling their ideological wares from four green tents marked "Islam", "Capitalism", "Democracy" and "Globalization"—located just behind the backs of the statues of two heroes of empire, Sir Henry Havelock and Sir Charles Napier, whilst Admiral Nelson turned a blind eye firm atop his pedestal—the militant disciples of the sheikh, stylishly accoutred in black turbans and matching Ray-Bans, projected an image of radical Islamist chic. Indeed, the scene could have been set in Jakarta, except for one thing: the protestors did not openly avow the use of force. Instead, handouts like "A Call to Boycott America and Israel" excoriated the "hyenas and vultures which operate under the guise of the coalition against terrorism." The point was not obscure.

This heady mixture of posturing and utopianism appeals strongly to a younger generation of Asian-British youth, recruited to the ranks of Al-Qaeda and

[13]With the discovery of a ricin plot in Britain, and clear links between the plotters and Abu Hamza's Finsbury Park mosque, the mosque was belatedly raided by Scotland Yard on January 21. But in deference to Muslim sensibilities, police wore Islamically-appropriate footwear. Withal, despite a request for extradition from the United States, Abu Hamza remains at liberty to promote his views.

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its affiliates in growing numbers. Why, and why London? First, because many Muslims in London are lured away from community and Islamic tradition by the attractions and opportunities of Western life. And second, because states like Egypt, Jordan, Singapore and Malaysia may exercise a far greater degree of control over radical Islamist activity than occurs in the West generally, and Europe in particular. They can control the press, limit Internet access and overcome their concerns, if they have any, about civil liberties violations with consummate ease. Not so in the United Kingdom, where liberal guilt about Britain's colonial sins increasingly trumps common sense these days.[14] Indeed, after Al-Qaeda moved from Sudan to Afghanistan in 1998, a number of disgruntled operatives, alarmed at the medieval conditions in Kabul, proposed relocating to London. This led Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri to rule that "a brother may travel to London to collect funds, but may not stay there or seek asylum."[15] It seems that Al-Qaeda's leading strategist assumed that the Home Office would unhesitatingly grant asylum if requested, and he was probably right.

This disturbing disjuncture between the external and internal aspects of the liberal democratic reaction to Islamism might be termed the Paradox of Liberal Olympianism. It holds that, in domestic politics, minority difference must always be tolerated. Such tolerance, it is maintained, will erode white prejudice and enhance our increasingly diverse yet communitarian democracies. The liberal pluralist sees all values as ultimately compatible, and believes that universal truth and justice will emerge through tolerance. Moreover, since all values are at least potentially equal from this ultimately relativist viewpoint, minority understandings must be afforded equivalent status and receive affirmative action in the shape of state subsidies. Yet at the same time, in practice at least, Olympian pluralism maintains that cultural minorities possess the communal right to their own separate and, if necessary, illiberal development, even at the expense of the polymorphous cosmopolitanism that sustains them. To do, or even to think, otherwise would be at best intolerant, at worst racist.

Enlightenment *philosophes*, it might be recalled, preached tolerance not out of a corrosive relativism, but out of the belief that reason would ultimately prevail over outmoded custom and religious fanaticism. That is not the view, however, that informs the contemporary promotion of difference, which actively facilitates intolerant enthusiasm of an Islamist hue. Meanwhile, what Liberal Olympianism perceives as the enlightened promotion of difference, Islamists see as "hideous schizophrenia", to use Qutb's phrase for it. To Islamists, Western tolerance is weakness, and secularism a form of spiritual death requiring Islamic salvation. Simply put, while Western liberal sensibilities posit a multi-sum game, Islamist sensibilities are zero-sum. The difference is that traditional Muslims would not have even understood the multi-sum proposition, while today's Islamists understand it very well indeed, and are determined to take full advantage of it. The Londonistan crowd thus finds liberal multiculturalism deracinating, but considers it wonderfully helpful all the same.

TRUTH BE told, it *is* "hideously schizophrenic" to maintain political and ideological tolerance for the intolerant at home while practicing pre-emption

[14]British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw has maintained that many of the world's crises "are a consequence of our colonial past." *The New Statesman*, November 15, 2002.

[15]*Asian Wall Street Journal*, August 2–4, 2002.

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against their foot soldiers abroad. The homefront, after all, is, *pace* Gibbon, not immune from danger, and a new decline of laws and manners stands to do us no less harm than it did to the glory of Rome. Liberalism, civil society and Gellner's "modular man" are the exceptions rather than the rule in history; they are relatively new and still fragile in the human experience and, we must suppose, ultimately vulnerable to baser displacement. At least since September 11, 2001—if not before—we should therefore be allowed to wonder whether Western values have any natural or universal constituency. History, it would seem, is not quite yet at its End, and the historical dialectic is meanwhile bound to remain in a somewhat capricious state that does not always lean to the side of freedom. That, surely, is the burden of the evidence out of Bali, and from Southeast Asia more generally.

More radically, we must at least entertain the possibility that History might not have an End at all, a possibility that confronts us with a serious philosophical problem. We may be fated to learn to live with our own particularity, yet still have the need to exalt in it if we are to preserve it. But how can secular liberal societies like those of the contemporary West learn such a task when the Enlightenment values that define and sustain them insist not on the particular but the universal? If we must suspend hope, whether for a long time or forever, for the universal reconciliation of human history that is the essence of Enlightenment eschatology, where will our justifications come from? In a more traditionally religious era in the West, Pascal famously said that if God did not exist, we would have to invent Him. Maybe the same is true, these days, of our faith in the End of History. □

If the Shoe Fits

An Osama bin Laden picture adorns the wall calendar at the infirmary of the Al-Mukmin Pesantren, the (Indonesian) Islamic boarding school that has acquired a reputation for being a militant breeding ground. It is a place where students and teachers alike profess their admiration for the man they call the Muslim "hero". . . .

Among students, the latest fad is to carve the words "Israel" and "USA" on their slippers to symbolize their revulsion of the two countries they think most hostile to Muslims. "The Quran says that Christians and the Jews will not let us Muslims live peacefully until we follow their religions", said 19-year-old Abdul Mufi. And he thinks that as part of the grand design to undermine Muslims, his teacher and Al-Mukmin co-founder Abu Bakar Bashir was wrongly accused of masterminding several bombings in the past two years.

—Devi Asmarani
The Straits Times (Singapore)
October 28, 2002

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

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Australian for Alliance

Paul Kelly

WHAT DOES IT mean for a middle-sized regional power to be a friend and ally of the United States in the 21st century? This question is being debated today among U.S. allies with an intensity not seen since the Vietnam War. The wounded hegemon roused to action after September 11 has provoked sympathy, alarm and astonishment, but above all a desire to know whether America's pledge to defeat its new enemies once again represents the last best hope for mankind, or whether it will instead unleash a self-defeating cycle of violence and rippling chaos.

Among America's European and Asian allies a good deal of angst has been communicated to Washington in recent months, much of it organized around U.S. policies toward Ba'athi Iraq and communist North Korea. Accusations of arrogance and unilateralism have been tossed at the Bush Administration; intimations of fecklessness have been tossed back. Amid all this noise it has been easy for Americans to overlook what has been happening in Australia.

When they think about Australia at all, Americans see it as the least of their problems. The two countries have counted their dead in the war on terrorism, first in New York, Washington and Pennsylvania, and then in Bali. Australia has volunteered to fight alongside the United States in Iraq without conditions or complaints in contrast to certain other old American friends. But difficulties are now arising within this fifty year-old alliance, and it is best that they be acknowledged and addressed.

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Friends Indeed

AMERICA HAS had few closer allies than Australia. Over the past century the two countries fought together in five wars and began the new century as allies in the war on terrorism, with Australian special forces fighting in Afghanistan. In June 2002 Australian Prime Minister John Howard told the U.S. Congress that "America has no better friend anywhere in the world than Australia." On the fiftieth anniversary of the security alliance (ANZUS) between the nations, Secretary of State Colin Powell described Australia as "our oldest and closest ally in the Pacific region." The relationship is enjoying one of its periodic high tides with a Republican president in the White House and a conservative prime minister in Canberra. The new *National Security Strategy* pays positive attention to

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Australia as a model ally, and the two nations are now negotiating a free-trade agreement—a difficult but potentially far-reaching expansion of their ties.

All this notwithstanding, Australians have gotten a mixed message from Washington over the past year. From "down under", it looks as if Colin Powell's effort to construct a broad military coalition to deal with Iraq was contradicted by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's depiction of a unilateralist America that would not allow any coalition to define or undermine its mission. Of course, the United States has not discarded deterrence for pre-emption in all cases, but the intense public debate in Australia and many other countries focused on pre-emption. As a result, Australia's perception is that under the Bush Administration the United States is a more demanding alliance partner.

For the first time in many years, too, the alliance with America has acquired a sharp domestic focus, largely owing to the Howard Government's early declaration of intention to participate in Iraq. Opinion is now polarizing around competing views of the United States. One view, shaped by tradition, is for expressions of alliance unity and resolution to meet common threats, along with a conviction that Australian influence on the United States is maximized by close partnership. The alternative is for keeping some distance between the allies in this instance, for fear that misjudgments in Washington will harm Australia. This sentiment doubts whether America remains a reliable ally and prudent hegemon.

In any such debate, of course, what America's friends are saying counts most, but even many such friends are more worried than usual. In late 2002, three former Australian prime ministers—Gough Whitlam, Malcomb Fraser and Bob Hawke—as well as several former military chiefs joined to sign a letter opposing their country's participation in any Iraq campaign that is not validated by a specific UN Security Council resolution. This effort was orchestrated by former Labour Prime Minister Hawke, notable for his pro-U.S. views and close relations in office with President George H.W. Bush, and such sentiments are shared widely in Australia's foreign policy community outside of the Howard Government. Even inside this pro-U.S. government, private concerns have been vented about President Bush's inability during 2002 to persuade the Australian public to his cause.

Among America's best Australian friends, too, there is a dawning recognition that a more demanding America poses a challenge. Over the past year the word "unilateral" has meant to discerning observers not that the United States would prefer to act alone, but that it expected its closest friends to embrace its own threat perceptions. Like most other nations, Australia was psychologically unprepared for the 9/11 calamity. Its empathy for America over the attacks on New York and Washington was real enough, but when President Bush said that America was "at war", there was little real sense that Australia was also at war. When the President declared that Iraq was a threat to the United States, there was no real sense that Iraq was also a threat to Australia.

An omen of this disorientation in Australia was the fact that the ANZUS Treaty was invoked for the first time by an attack on America, not on Australia. Australian architects of the alliance, and most of their Australian successors, assumed that ANZUS had mainly to do with American help for Australia's national security, not the other way around. Naturally enough, when the equation was reversed, new questions arose. What dangers and costs might Australia create for itself by joining U.S.-led military coali-

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tions? Will America play the constructive leadership role in the international system that its junior allies need and expect of such a hegemon? Or will alliance actions undermine Australian security in its particular regional framework?

These questions are vital for Australia. While John Howard was correct to stress shared values between America and Australia, shared values are ultimately not as important in an alliance as shared interests and strategic purpose. Any discussion of the U.S.-Australian alliance must penetrate the haze of mutual congratulations that surrounds it and address this question of shared strategic purpose. When we assess the alliance in that way, the first thing we see is that things have changed from Cold War days—and rather too few observers have marked the ways.

A Matter of Interests

SINCE 1951, the shared purpose that knit America and Australia together (initially with New Zealand) arose from the common enemy of Asian communism. This was why the ANZUS Treaty was negotiated and sustained. In a deeper sense the treaty has worked Australia's way, since an alliance with the world's superpower is a national asset for a middle power operating outside any regional political bloc. But with the end of the Cold War, and of any broad threat from Asian communism, what are the purposes of the alliance today? Since the ability of the ANZUS partners to reinterpret the alliance to fit new strategic circumstances is the guarantor of its endurance, we should want to know what this re-interpretation sounds like.

From Australia's perspective, such reinterpretation has three basic themes, the first of which arises from the old geopolitics, the second from the new, and the third from a combination of the two.

The first theme concerns China. Is America prepared to accommodate the rise of China and work to integrate it into a constructive Sino-American framework? Since Australia's national destiny is tied forever to East Asia, this is obviously a matter of paramount importance for it.

The second question originates within the new geopolitics: how the United States chooses to pursue its security interest in the long struggle with Islamist terrorism. Does the United States prefer a unilateral, military-dominated approach or one that gives weight to multilateral and political mechanisms as well? How this question is parsed in practice is of enormous importance for all U.S. allies, for it will define the intersecting parameters of utility and trust within America's closest bilateral relationships.

The third question is a subset of the second: How will the alliance be relevant to Australia's challenge from Islamist terrorism within Southeast Asia and, more generally, to the prospect of living with this destabilizing threat? The October 12, 2002 Bali bombing, which killed 88 Australians, was a psychological and strategic turning point for the country. Australia must now realistically see itself as a terrorist target and its region a frontline in the war. This is a new enemy never imagined by the architects of the ANZUS alliance. The decision for Australia is whether to approach this challenge by giving priority to its partnership with the United States or to collaboration with its neighbors—or to engage in the difficult test of finding a sustainable balance between the two.

MANAGING A RISING CHINA

WHILE AMERICA is Australia's most vital state-to-state relationship, its most important region is East Asia—the focus of its trade (56 percent of exports), neighborhood cooperation and security concerns. For several decades the

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central task of Australian policy has been to integrate its Asian ties with its U.S. alliance, a challenge assisted by the fact that these objectives have been mutually reinforcing most of the time. For example, the joint status of Australia and Japan as U.S. security partners deepens the scope for Australia-Japan collaboration. If the U.S. alliance came to be seen as undermining Australia's role in Asia, on the other hand, then it would count as a serious liability to be weighed against the undoubted benefits of the alliance. Australia, therefore, has a profound interest in the way America manages its relations with China.

Australia values a U.S. forward role that contributes to the regional balance but tolerates the rise of China by seeking to incorporate it into mainstream international economic and security systems. This view is founded in realism, buffered by a bit of justifiable optimism. It recognizes the lack of strategic stability in East Asia, China's role as an anti-status quo power, and the risk inherent in Asia's three unresolved flashpoints: the India-Pakistan dispute, the division of Korea and the Taiwan issue. A strong U.S. role is indispensable to a peaceful regional balance. It is hard to see any downgrading of ANZUS, however, that would not be part of a U.S. regional retreat—a retreat that would also concern Japan and South Korea in the north and, at a minimum, Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines and Australia in the south.

Australia's main worry, however, is not the likelihood of a U.S. retreat but of an ideological overreaction to China's rising power. Australia opposes any American effort to define its Asian purpose as the "containment" of China. This applies either to the emergence of a hardline U.S. unilateralism or any effort to conscript America's Asian alliances into a plan of regional containment. If America's allies in the Asia-Pacific are typecast as part of a China containment strategy, the entire region could become hostage to a deteriorating U.S.-China rivalry—and, from the looks of China's *de facto* post-communist realities, a needless rivalry at that.

The nightmare scenario for Australia is one in which it would be forced in a crisis to choose between the United States and China. Since Australia would have to side with America, at least nominally, the costs arising from a breach with China would be substantial—particularly if responsibility for any crisis was seen to rest mainly with Washington rather than Beijing. In this situation some Australians would argue that the price of the alliance was no longer worth paying—a fact that underlines the need for each alliance partner to be realistic about what it expects from the other. This is particularly important in relation to China because Australian and American attitudes are considerably more divergent than is generally realized in the United States.

In Australia, unlike in the United States, China policy is more a source of unity than conflict. This is the result of thirty years' worth of bipartisanship on the growth of economic, political and security ties. The future power disparity is such that Australia does not regard China as a rival; rather, Australian governments have sought a relationship with China that transcends the limits imposed by the Beijing-Washington rivalry.

As things stand today, the majority view within Australia is that such transcendence will work for the time being because China, being far weaker than the United States, will defer any crisis. Any near-term testing of this view is likely to center on Taiwan. This is where management of alliance expectations is crucial. There is no disposition in Australia for military commitments in Northeast Asia. Australia's armed forces are not structured for such a role and, except possibly in the unlikely event of crude aggression on the part of China, public opinion would not expect or

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support it. The political reality that underpins the U.S.-Australian alliance needs to be explicit; America needs to know that Australia will do less than it may expect in Northeast Asia, and Australia needs to accept that it must do more in Southeast Asia. In this sense East Timor and Taiwan offer useful keys to the partners' interpretation of their alliance to each other.

The successful 1999 collaboration over East Timor began with a sharp misunderstanding. Prime Minister Howard was surprised by President Clinton's refusal to contribute U.S. ground troops to the UN force and, for a few days, there was a breakdown between Howard and Clinton. It rapidly evolved into a model of alliance cooperation: Australia as the regional power led the UN force, backed by indispensable U.S. logistical and political support. The overall message is that Australia must assume greater responsibility commensurate with its role as the metropolitan power in the South Pacific and the main economic power in Southeast Asia.

By the same token, the United States should be aware that in any conflict over Taiwan, the Australian contribution would at best be extremely modest and quite probably merely declaratory. Australia has no legal obligations to Taiwan. The "one China" policy is rarely contested in Australia. There would be little support for a democratic Taiwan moving toward independence. Australia's view is that Taiwan enjoys autonomy and *de facto* independence as it is and that there is no reason why any Australian should die to convert that into *de jure* independence. It is difficult to imagine the circumstances, outside of overt Chinese aggression, where any conflict over Taiwan would generate even modest support for Australian involvement. The potential damage to Australia's interests in terms of its China relationship could represent the most serious cost for Australia in the alliance's history. In terms of the current debate, Australia has no vital national interest at stake with Iraq—except as it may ultimately affect WMD proliferation trends. But Australia certainly does have vital interests at stake with China, right here and right now.

Australia's view is that China should meet the region's expectation of a nonmilitary solution, and that the United States and Taiwan should avoid provocation in the short term to win a managed solution in the long term. In the event of a more militant and unqualified pro-Taiwan line emerging in the United States, the chance of a breach between Australia and the United States could not be ruled out.

That the war on terrorism may improve long-term U.S.-China relations, or at least reduce the likelihood that a rivalry will intensify anytime soon, is good news. But the enduring message for the alliance is the need to manage expectations over China to avoid sudden shocks and political disappointments between Washington and Canberra. Now—when the emotional focus in both countries is being directed elsewhere—is an excellent time to talk this out.

THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR

IT IS FAR FROM obvious that the war against terrorism unites American and Australian interests to the same extent as have previous wars. The fear among America's allies, that the United States will deliberately privilege pre-emptive military and unilateral means, varies from ally to ally and is often exaggerated. Nonetheless, it is true that American perceptions of the threat it faces are different from those of its allies. To the extent that America tends toward military pre-emption and unilateralism over multilateralism, it creates new problems for old allies.

These differences between unilateral

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and multilateral approaches, while nothing like the caricatures created in some quarters (and stimulated by some overdramatic rhetoric by the U.S. Secretary of Defense), do matter. While not disparaging multilateral undertakings in all but the most vital of U.S. interests, Charles Krauthammer favors, as he put it in the Winter 2002/03 issue of *The National Interest*, "the aggressive and confident application of unipolar power rather than falling back, as we did in the 1990s, on paralyzing multilateralism." Fareed Zakaria understands as well as anyone the fragility of the United Nations and the need for U.S. security policy leadership, but he warned in the October 21 issue of *The New Yorker* that U.S. hegemony needs the legitimacy derived from operating within an international consensus. "Without this cloak of respectability America will face a growing hostility around the world", he wrote, adding that without such respectability anti-Americanism will become "the global language of political protest—the default ideology of all opposition—unifying the world's discontents and malcontents."

On balance, most Australians incline to Zakaria's sensibilities rather than to Krauthammer's. Australia's support for the Bush Administration's military actions should not be misread to underestimate Australia's serious interest in the legitimization of such actions. There has been a strong bipartisan view in Australia that any Iraq campaign should be sanctioned by the UN Security Council. Australia's preference in the post-September 11 climate for military action sanctioned by a broad coalition of nations mirrors its concern that the new U.S. emphasis on preemption could risk greater global disorder, and that deterrence should not be lightly abandoned.

Australia has strong national interest reasons for such concerns. As a middle power, Australia is interested in seeing that U.S. hegemony is deployed not just on behalf of America itself but for a better global order. This is how any sensible middle power thinks. Australia wants the United States to operate as a constructive global leader that supports Australia's post-World War II diplomatic synthesis between realism and multilateralism. In its realist phase, Australia has prized the U.S. alliance with its military and security dimensions to bolster its own security and political leverage. In its multilateral commitment Australia's interests have consisted in the development of law, treaties, economic agreements and peacekeeping to advance the development of a rules-based international system. This logic derives from Australia's situation as a stable country in an unstable region.

Australia therefore does not want an America so imprisoned by the search for consensus that it is paralyzed from taking military action. But neither does it want an America that is walking away from global institutions rather than laboring to work within them. Indeed, nothing would cause more dismay in Australia than seeing the European Union prevail within such institutions at the cost of those institutions' ultimate viability. If America should ever decide that the global institutions and rules of the post-World War II period have little value for its needs as a hegemon, it would be disastrous for middle powers such as Australia.

In short, Australia prefers an America that values partnerships and coalitions, that utilizes soft as well as hard power, that emphasizes political methods as well as military ones. Such an approach is critical to maintaining a sense of common purpose in relation to ends, means and language. One reason for this is that a certain rise in anti-Americanism is inevitable; great powers,

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no matter how benign, invariably generate resentment. But Washington must understand that such a development affects not just America but increases the potential price paid by America's allies in siding with the hegemon. This is not an argument against all military action. It is an argument for more attention to the tone of U.S. policy, and for legitimizing military action by law and through coalitions whenever possible.

Such care is particularly important because the American alliance system is overwhelmingly composed of democratic countries with real publics. Australia's pro-U.S. political leaders spent much of 2002 trying to uphold the American position, only to be engulfed by a tide of unilateral and provocative rhetoric from the U.S. administration that had the reverse impact. The U.S. alliance is not immutable in Australia. It needs democratic nourishment and it can be sustained in the long run only by public support that sees military commitments under its banner as being in the national interest and possessing international legitimacy. It is idle to believe that any lurch to an American unilateralism would not erode the domestic political support within Australia for the alliance.

THE SOUTHEAST ASIAN THEATER

SINCE THE October 2002 attack in Bali, a new factor is affecting Australia's alliance ties—that Australia itself is a prime terrorist target of the collaboration between Al-Qaeda and Southeast Asian groups such as Jemaah Islamiyah. This is a decisive change; it means that Australia now has a security crisis at its very doorstep.

Even the most apolitical Australian knows that Osama bin Laden has singled out Australia by name, and even the moderately thoughtful realize that Australia's status as a target is permanent—a function of geography, the values of its democratic multicultural capitalist society, its identification with the United States and its prime role in the liberation of East Timor. The evidence of Al-Qaeda's penetration of Southeast Asia over the past decade, furthermore, is irrefutable, as is the fact that Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines have become the new frontiers of a war in which Australia is invariably implicated. Australians also know that the governments of these countries cannot solve their terrorism problems alone, the result being a strong Australian interest in maximizing its influence and efforts to help them.

The formative template for this new understanding was the Australia-Indonesia decision only days after the Bali bombing to establish a joint investigation and inquest into the atrocity. Clearly, Indonesia is the key as far as Australia is concerned. It is Australia's nearest main neighbor, the world's fourth-most populous state and an overwhelmingly Muslim nation. Amid Indonesia's current systemic crisis—complete with nose-diving economy; several secessionist movements; and rising Islamic radicalism, anti-Americanism and xenophobia—are somewhere between a few hundred and a few thousand Indonesians who were trained in Al-Qaeda's Afghanistan camps.

Since Indonesia's future hangs in the balance, Australia needs a cool head to support its uncertain democracy, its moderate mainstream Islam, and those supportive of a tougher line on terrorism. Australia's regional policy aims to negotiate agreements on counter-terrorism with Southeast Asian nations and deepen links between intelligence agencies and police forces. The wider strategic challenge for Australia, however, is to strike a new balance between its regional security needs and its global commitments to the United States as a senior ally. So the question becomes: What role

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does the U.S. alliance play in helping Australia to meet this new threat to its security?

It is vital for Australia and desirable for the United States that the alliance between the two countries is seen to have a positive impact on Australia's new Southeast Asian problem. Any sense that the alliance hurts Australian efforts to combat new threats would be highly damaging to it. But it will not be easy for Australia to intensify its counter-terrorism agenda in the region while maintaining open and full military support for the global U.S.-led war on terror. Australia cannot afford the impression to develop in Southeast Asia that it is merely the regional agent for the United States. The Howard Government's worst mistake has been to give currency to this notion. It is not only a liability for Australia in Asia but unacceptable on the homefront. However, such a perception already exists in Southeast Asia, where Australia's influence has been diminished.

Clearly, Australia must operate more as an independent player within the alliance. A new and complex phase of Australia's effort to integrate its U.S. alliance into its regional needs is thus beginning. The immediate risk for Australia is that its role in Iraq will aggravate anti-Australian sentiment among Muslim communities in Southeast Asia and fan hatred among Muslim radicals. This is not a conclusive argument against Australia's participation in Iraq or other U.S.-led coalitions if such participation is justified on its merits, but it does mean that Asian reactions need to be monitored carefully to ensure that regional governments do not retaliate by withdrawing from arrangements with Australia. That would constitute a zero-sum game between Australia's regional needs and its U.S. alliance, and a zero-sum game is exactly what Australia needs to avoid. This will involve, no doubt, a test of American tolerance and Australian innovation.

AUSTRALIA'S approach, overall, to these new strategic tests for the alliance should be obvious. A poorly grasped element of the alliance, for many years now, has been Australia's role as an initiator of policy direction and change. In asymmetrical relations the initiative often lies with the junior partner who has far more at stake, invests greater political capital in the arrangement and enjoys a larger commensurate gain. This tradition is a firm platform on which Australia should now operate as innovator. It means an Australian engagement with the United States that is more, not less, intensive over how to respond to these new challenges.

In the meantime, Americans might profit from reflecting upon what Australia brings to the partnership. It offers a range of benefits: shared military arrangements and an ally that, when the chips are down, is prepared to fight; a country on the rim of East Asia that can assist the U.S. position in the region; an independent partner with common values whose public support can help the United States in political terms and whose private counsel can provide a test of policy. Australia is also an ally prepared to take a leadership position as the metropolitan power within its region—an event rarely replicated in Europe during the last decade. These are assets that a prudent America should value, and if they are valued, they will be sustained by U.S. political capital and a genuine effort to define new points of concord. The alternative is easy to state: it is to watch as a true partnership of peoples is undermined by a lack of understanding and imagination required in changed times. □

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The Beginning of Economic Wisdom

Michael Novak

SINCE THEY affect to work scientifically, economists usually insist that the vast majority of the propositions in their writings report what virtually all other economists would report; principles and facts rule, and virtually all concur on "the basics." Experience shows, however, that reading John Kenneth Galbraith and Milton Friedman are two qualitatively different experiences, both in regard to the principles involved and to the facts observed. Robert Heilbroner and Israel Kirzner, again, seem to live and move in utterly different economic universes.

Still, it must be granted that this particular affectation adds a certain civility to conversations among economists. They do not treat each other as badly, say, as analytic philosophers still treat continental phenomenologists or metaphysicians who lived before 1920. Furthermore, economists who strongly disagree seldom engage in direct confrontation; they rather tend to act as if proximity might end in mutual exasperation. Sometimes we non-economists positively burn to know just how Y would answer the arguments of X—especially those dramatic arguments that have the sound of aces slapping on the table.

This avoidance of direct confrontation forces the rest of us to line up the arguments as best we can and work out a philosophy of economics for ourselves. To my mind, sound economics is best characterized as one of the three interdependent institutions that constitute a free society. Furthermore, I incline to divide economic questions, like Caesar's Gaul, into three realms.

As for the first trinity, the three systems that constitute a free society are a free polity, a culture of liberty and a free economy. The aim of the first is to free humans from tyranny and torture; of the second, to enable humans to seek truth, beauty, justice and community by liberating them from their own ignorance and self-destructive appetites; and of the third, to enable humans to contend with scarcity and, by initiative and invention, slowly to free themselves from poverty. The dependence of the economy on the rule of law and good institutions of government is clear enough. So, perhaps, is its dependence on certain cultural and moral habits, especially those of work, initiative, social trust and honesty.

As to the second trinity, the three realms into which questions about economics tend to fall are these: (1) Perennial questions of all human economic life such as scarcity and constraints of other kinds,

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supply and demand, prices and risk; (2) questions involving comparisons between or among economic systems; and (3) questions regarding particular institutions within economic systems. The latter includes corporations, inventions and individual initiatives (within capitalism), national planning boards (within socialism), and laws and customs affecting land ownership and relations within and among families (within feudalism).

The very notion of economics as a discipline abstracted from politics is relatively new. Until, say, the 13th century, kingdoms were on the whole small and fragile polities. Cities were walled, and the wealthy (and titled) lived in fortified castles out of fear of marauding strangers. Law and order were in short supply, and troops to enforce both in the countryside were seldom in evidence. Such international order as there was in Europe sprang from the papacy and the international ecclesiastical courts, sometimes in concert, sometimes in conflict, with shifting imperial powers (first Roman, then Byzantine, then Gallic, then Germanic). To establish political and civil order over an illiterate, multicultural, passion-bound and fractious maelstrom of displaced and insecure tribes occupied every available political energy. From the time of Plato's *Republic* and Aristotle's *Politics*, through Aquinas on *The Rule of Princes*, Dante's *De Monarchia* and *Three Political Letters* and Machiavelli's *The Prince*, intellectual energies were riveted on the uncertainties and vagaries of politics. Thought about economics was pushed to the margins.

For centuries, too, economies had been almost wholly agricultural, at the mercy of the weather and roaming armies. Biblical words seemed to sum up economic reality: "There shall be seven fat years, and seven lean", and there wasn't much humans could do about it. By 1776, however, new inventions were changing industry and new settlements across the Atlantic had opened up virgin possibilities. In these circumstances it fell to Adam Smith to ask, more systematically than had anyone before, *What is the cause of the wealth of nations?*

The century following Smith brought economic reasoning to the forefront of human consciousness. This reasoning, however resolutely adversarial toward traditional religious ways of seeing things it was, in one respect remained rooted in a Judeo-Christian metaphysics. As John Stuart Mill pointed out, Asiatic consciousness was through-and-through communal. Swarms of coolies organized from on high had built the Great Wall of China. Outside the regions shaped by centuries of Jewish and Christian teaching about the self and its individual destiny, most peoples did not think of themselves as individuals, but rather as members of tribes, clans and local communities. Against that pattern, modern Western economics chose a decidedly individualistic analysis of economic action, with terms like action, self and individual playing a decisive role in it. This emphasis it owed to its religious heritage more than to any other source.

Indeed, even highly secular persons in the West experienced discomfort with this new "economic" point of view. By the mid-19th century, socialists and communists, having accused liberal economists of false consciousness, were busy erecting a system of economic thought based upon collectives, classes, the national state and ultimately the "Socialist International." The international community was to be constituted by a new, utopian state of consciousness and a new form of social organization from which the egotistical self would be banished. Beginning with the wife of John Stuart Mill and then the great Mill himself, a surprising number of economically-trained minds were captivated by this vision and its supposed moral superiority to bourgeois individual-

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ism. No longer orthodox Jews or Christians, such persons had no intellectual ground on which to base the metaphysical priority that biblical faith had heretofore assigned the individual. By 1850, the secularization of Western consciousness, at least in Europe, had deprived even highly trained minds of their confidence that the individual human being was paramount in the drama of history.

The stage was thus set for the great tragic ideologies of the 20th century. Two myths about the moral superiority of the collective to the individual swept the world: first, the myth of a collectivist economics propounded by Marx, Engels and then Lenin, Stalin and their successors; and, second, the fascist myth of collectivist politics propounded by Mussolini and then Hitler. Both took as their enemy liberal individualism, and also the orthodox Judaism and Christianity that nourished its roots, which they worked to supplant with new mythic and pagan liturgies of their own devising.

The underlying myth of socialism (even the Nazis called themselves National *Socialists*) intoxicated many Western intellectuals. In 1937, John Dewey's *Liberalism and Social Action* placed liberals in an entirely new historical narrative. In its origins, liberalism opposed the concentration of power in the State, but drawing from interpretations of Hegel and the currents of the Progressive era, Dewey urged liberals to see the State as an agent of great good. Many liberals henceforth depicted the captains of industry as "economic royalists" and the State as the agent of progressive social change. Thus was the way cleared for what came to be called "social democracy", a version of the socialist narrative of history digestible for Western bourgeois sensibilities. The essence of the matter is that for a multitude of intellectuals the accepted narrative line became: State=good and bourgeois (business, individual)=on the wrong side of history. Knowing in advance the direction of history, one had only to discover which elements strengthened the State or weakened bourgeois centers of resistance in any new circumstance in order to know which side to support.

BOTH THOMAS Sowell and Charles E. Lindblom were indoctrinated early in the democratic socialist narrative of history. But while the former rebelled against that narrative early and decisively, the latter stayed with it longer and, on the evidence of his latest book, while he has made much progress, his emancipation from it is still a work in progress. Both men have recently written primers in economics.[1] This gives us an unusual window on the various turnings of minds and temperaments in the wake of the Cold War and the collapse—if we may slightly mangle a title of Isaac Deutscher—of socialism armed. As anyone who has ever attempted to write a basic or introductory text knows, it is an endeavor that forces the writer persistently back toward first principles—toward philosophy. What are the basics of economics? What is the market? What does the term "enterprise" add?

Sowell has elsewhere described the experience of awakening from the democratic socialist dream as the end to a period of intellectual wishfulness. He discovered a reality principle and came to loathe the illusions in which he had been encouraged to live. In *A Personal Odyssey* (2000), Sowell described those illusions as a childish evasion of hard realities, limits

[1]Sowell, *Basic Economics: A Citizen's Guide to the Economy* (New York: Basic Books, 2000); and Lindblom, *The Market System: What It Is, How It Works, What To Make Of It* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001).

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and constraints. In *The Vision of the Anointed* (1995), Sowell could not wholly repress his anger at those who, while nourishing illusions that destroy, legislate how their lessers should live.

Perhaps the most bracing feature of *Basic Economics* is that Sowell starts out, on page one, with that most central of adulthood's themes: constraints, limits, tough choices, losses as well as gains. He defines economics in the classic words of Lionel Robbins: "Economics is the study of the use of scarce resources which have alternative uses." We are limited in our powers, our knowledge and in the time we have to learn, consider, act and follow through. On all sides we experience constraints. But the most significant limit to our desires is scarcity: "People want more than there is." Because there are alternative uses of resources, we must make choices; we cannot have all alternatives, we must deprive ourselves of some good things in order to gain others. Journalists in the *New York Times*, Sowell wryly observes, are continually shocked that middle-class Americans—some even with swimming pools of their own—are "Just Getting By", are "Constrained by Credit Card Debts", and still face "Dreams Deferred and Plans Unmet." It is too bad that middle-class Americans don't just get manna from heaven. It is sad that so many of them find the constraints of adulthood a bitter disappointment.

From chapter to chapter (25 in all), Sowell returns often to his fundamental theme: There is scarcity and there are alternative uses for resources—so deal with it. He depicts both intelligent and foolish ways to deal with choices among alternatives, specializing in showing that the courses of action most often proposed by influential media outlets are among the least intelligent ones. (It would be a useful exercise for some enterprising graduate student to abstract from this book the hundred or so key fallacies that Sowell unmasks, developing a kind of anti-catechism of utopian economics.)

The seven parts of Sowell's book each conclude with an overview chapter, so in a sense Sowell himself makes clarity easy. To convey the sweep of his thought, let me list his seven headings: Prices; Industry and Commerce; Work and Pay; Time and Risk; the National Economy; the International Economy; and Popular Economic Fallacies. That last chapter takes up "non-economic" values, "purchasing power" and "business and labor."

Because of recent brouhahas concerning globalization, Sowell's chapters on the international economy bear special virtue. The fallacy with which Sowell opens these chapters comes from, yes, the economic reporting of the *New York Times*, concerning NAFTA in 1993: "Abundant evidence is emerging that jobs are shifting across borders too rapidly to declare the United States a job winner or a job loser from the trade agreement." Here the *Times* embraces two fallacies. First, there is no fixed sum of jobs, some of them "shifting" one way or the other. Second, trade is not a zero-sum game in which one country wins and the other loses. A country engages in trade because it wants to gain; another country agrees to trade with the first because it, too, expects to gain. When *both* countries become more prosperous because of trade, both gain jobs. In the six years following 1993, for example, the U.S. auto industry, which Congressman David Bonior of Michigan had predicted would "vanish" under this agreement, actually gained 100,000 jobs. Mexico probably gained even more.

Sowell also presents eloquent discussions of the differences among "comparative advantage" and "absolute advantage", and of "economies of scale." Since time and resources are finite for everyone, concentration of sound effort is a gain. It is an absolute advantage when, because of climate, geography or the mixture of skills

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in its population, one country may be able to produce cheaply something that another cannot produce nearly so cheaply, or even at all. Bananas can be grown in North America, but only in greenhouses and at prohibitive expense; they can be bought at a fraction of that cost from the Caribbean.

Yet even when one country can produce practically everything more cheaply than another, it may still find it advantageous to concentrate on those products in which its advantages are significantly greater. For example, even if the United States can produce both shoes and shirts more cheaply than Canada, it may find it more efficient to concentrate on producing the one in which it has a huge advantage, and buying from its partner the one in which it has a lesser advantage. In that way, both countries concentrate efforts to the maximum advantage of each.[2]

Economies of scale lead nations to trade, too, inasmuch as some countries are so small that their internal market cannot support production that requires large expenditures of capital or labor, unless they find partners whose needs complement their own. Thus, South Korea and Taiwan could not manufacture many things they do without access to far larger markets outside their borders. The Dutch retailer Royal Ahold has more than two-thirds of its sales outside the Netherlands, and the Swedish retailer Hennes and Mauritz has more than four-fifths of its sales outside Sweden. The U.S. retailer Wal-Mart exports much more than either Royal Ahold or Hennes and Mauritz, but still four-fifths of its sales are in the huge U.S. market, which affords it ample economies of scale. U.S. auto companies can manufacture and export automobiles to Australia far cheaper than Australian companies facing a far smaller market could manufacture at that price. Since all resources, including labor, are scarce, no country can make everything. Concentration of effort upon selected alternative uses of resources brings higher rewards than diffusion of effort. International economics is the science of predicting the costs and benefits of such alternative uses, given the constraints of scarcity and finitude.

The fallacy of "exporting high-paying jobs overseas" also remains a hardy perennial. How can that be? Largely because excitable commentators forget the realities of scarcity, finitude and the need for concentration—and the advantages to be gleaned from focusing on competitive advantages. For more than two centuries now, higher-wage countries (Great Britain in the 19th century, the United States in the 20th) have been exporting to lower-wage countries while continuing to gain in national wealth, and also in numbers of jobs and higher prosperity. The comparative American talent in the field of computers, which Americans pioneered, is invention and innovation, especially in software. Concentrating where Americans are strongest and rewards are greatest, Americans could easily afford to allow other peoples overseas to manufacture much of the hardware for the industry. This is not to say that adaptation within and between industries is always smooth, easy and without cost. Economics, in whose very definition scarcity is a domi-

[2]Sowell shows how a comparison of the man-hours it takes to make 500 shirts in the United States and the hours it takes in Canada, against the man-hours it takes to make 500 pairs of shoes, prompts American producers to concentrate on shirts and Canadians to concentrate on shoes. The result is that the two countries together, expending the same number of man-hours, produce 6,000 more shirts and 1,000 more shoes than they would otherwise have done. In such ways, both countries exercise comparative advantages, seeking partners with mutually beneficial matches.

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nating landmark, is not an especially rosy discipline.

Sowell is unusually good, if perhaps too succinct, on "International Transfers of Wealth", especially in showing us how to interpret scary terms such as "debtor nation." In any given year, Japanese Toyotas or Hondas may be the best-selling car in the United States, while no U.S. car has ever been the best-seller (or even remotely close) in Japan. So, true enough, the Japanese usually have a huge trade surplus with the United States. As an accounting mechanism, registering only the physical things that move across boundaries, the United States is a "debtor nation." But the U.S. economy produces more services than goods, including most of the software that runs the computers in Japan and elsewhere. These exports often do not show up in the accounting. Meanwhile, the Japanese and others build factories in the United States with their surpluses. (They do this, among other reasons, so as not to have to pay for shipping their cars across the ocean.) In addition, the comparative advantage of our political and civil institutions, and the inventiveness of our economy, make investment in the United States more secure and rewarding than in most other places.

True, foreign investment in the United States (the largest share comes from the British, by the way, not the Japanese) is accounted for as a "debt." But distinguish, Sowell keeps insisting, between words and things. As an accounting convention, Japan profits from selling to us, and Japanese investment of these profits over here may be referred to as "debts." But real salaries are then being paid here to Americans who are producing more things with these funds than we otherwise could. The United States is not getting poorer. On the contrary: between 1980 and 1990, the U.S. Gross National Product (GNP) rose from $2.7 trillion to $5.6 trillion. By 2001, it had nearly doubled again, to $10.1 trillion. In the world of real effects, then, such phenomena resemble what happens when we deposit money in our account (and the bank goes deeper into "debt" to us), not what happens when we charge things on a credit card.

Moreover, in this spurious sense, the United States has been a "debtor" nation for most of its history, and it didn't hurt. During the 19th century, foreigners put up much of the money for the Baltimore & Ohio, New York Central, Illinois Central and other railroads, and otherwise helped to turn this predominantly agricultural nation into a manufacturing colossus.

Sowell closes with some highly illuminating pages on remittances to foreign countries from immigrants working here, on foreign aid and on the myth of economic imperialism. His hardheadedness in facing up to scarcity, constraints and less-than perfect choices has a refreshing adult quality. Sowell not only covers much ground, he keeps his feet on it.

TO ENTER the world of Charles Lindblom's *The Market System* is to breathe quite different air. Whereas Sowell operates pretty much within the first realm of economic questions, dealing with some of the perennial realities facing any economy, Lindblom operates rather more in the second realm, the comparative realm, trying to understand "the market system" as one device among others for achieving economic coordination. Although Lindblom has by now given up on his earlier pining for something like a democratic socialist system, in the third and final part of this work he is still inclined to seek "alternative market systems." He even retains a forlorn hope that "an alternative to the market system" can still be found. Unlike Sowell, who emphasizes scarcity and constraints, Lindblom stresses imagination, freeing one's thinking from constraints,

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and a remarkably rosy ideal of "democracy" within which choices, trade-offs and limits—while they must be faced—are mourned as defects.

Lindblom distinguishes "the market system" from markets, which every form of economy, even socialist ones, must employ. He defines the former as a system of society-wide coordination of human activities, not by central command but by mutual interactions in the form of transactions. He contrasts such a system with the household economy, which may organize the domestic life of an entire extended family but does not extend to the whole of society. He also contrasts it with the isolated black markets a visitor some years ago might have encountered on the streets of China. It is not enough that buying and selling occur; market transactions must coordinate an entire society.

In choosing the "market system" as the heart of capitalism, Lindblom makes a fundamental mistake. It is not the market, nor even a market "system", that most distinguishes the contemporary form of economy we call capitalism. The market is surely an indispensable mechanism of coordination for capitalism but, as Lindblom notes, markets are found in all economic systems. To see why the market system is not the central dynamic, consider Poland after the fall of communism. Suppose that the *Sejm* (as it did) decreed the abolition of the National Planning Board and determined that, henceforth, prices would be set by the market. Suppose further that it guaranteed private property rights, chartered banks, permitted private accounts, and recognized the legitimacy (even necessity and public benefit) of private profits. Still, if the Polish people had continued to be as economically passive as socialism from 1948–88 had taught them to be, and had waited for the state to tell them what to do next, all these measures together would not have sufficed to engender capitalism. No, capitalism began when, in the first six months of 1990, more than 500,000 Poles started new private business enterprises, and in the next six months a commensurate number did the same. Capitalism begins with the creative act and the habit of enterprise. Lindblom's whole account would have differed dramatically if he had begun with this point. As it is, his account proceeds with a certain impersonality, lack of human feeling and absence of human drama.

Yet it is not fair to tell an author which book he should have written, and there is a great deal in Lindblom's book for which to be grateful, particularly so for readers of Lindblom's earlier, more anti-capitalist books. For instance, in *Politics and Markets* (1980), a much-discussed book published during the Carter Administration, Lindblom wrote that "the large private corporation fits oddly into democratic theory and vision. Indeed, it does not fit." Coming at a time when the U.S. government had no political difficulty in confiscating hundreds of billions of dollars (styled "windfall profits") from the oil industry, and in bringing the nuclear power industry to a standstill, his book provided a spur, *in the name of democracy*, for bringing private economic activities under increasing governmental control.

In those days, Lindblom was even willing to lean over so far backwards in his sympathies that he could write:

> A communist intellectual asks: 'What are people free from in the Soviet Union? They are free from exploitation, from all moral oppression, and consequently their thinking and deeds are free from age-old shackles created by the economic, political, and moral rule of the exploiters.' It is not a ridiculous argument.

(My reaction when I first read this was to wish that Lindblom might explain this argument to Anatoly Scharansky.)

Now, however, Lindblom begins by noting the thorough discrediting of communism after 1989 and the subsequent

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abandonment of socialist economics by democratic socialists in Europe. He confesses that for many years he did not really understand the market system, nor did many of his teachers, and he takes as his present theme many "puzzles" about the market system that still trouble him. In a way, this book can be read as the effort of an intelligent man of the Left to reconcile himself to his ancient antagonist, and to make of that what he can. The reader easily detects the old socialist impulses, however—the tugs, the siren song of the old standard objections. But on the whole his attempt at self-reconciliation is a success.

Socialist ideologues, Lindblom concedes, "have realized that aspiring for a better society is not enough. They have to face the complexities of constructing one." Nonetheless, Lindblom keeps the socialist option open. He even imagines that some nations of the old Soviet Union "may return to old ways rather than continue to suffer the hardships of transition. . . . The end of the story has yet to be written." Since Lindblom approaches political economy as a task for "constructing" a better society, he worries that the success of the market system is too great: "Mainstream economics still stumbles because the market's dazzling benefits are half blind to its defects." He rejects extremists who "perceive in the benefits of the market system only the smoke of their burning disapprobation", for he has lately learned that market successes prove "the obsolescence of tired old attacks" on it. But every time Lindblom is forced to concede merit to the market system, his mind instinctively drives for a debit: "We cannot simply ignore the many highly informed dissenters who believe that experience with the market system has already shown, to anyone who cares to look dispassionately at the evidence, that it has put us all on the road to disaster."

Lindblom also concedes that such democracy as the world has yet achieved exists only in market systems: "Is the market system ally or enemy of democracy? What we call democracy does not exist except in market societies; yet the influence of money in politics arouses suspicion that none of these societies are very democratic." The market system "can coordinate human behavior or activity with a range and a precision beyond that of any other system, institution, or social process. But it is a harsh and often cruel coordinator." And again in praising the market system: "Historically, it has supported democracy—there are no democratic nation-states except in market societies—but it has sabotaged important democratic features of ostensibly democratic states." And in his conclusion: "My thesis is that there are great unsettled issues about a place for the market system in the future of any society."

In one sense, this is obviously true. Sowell would feel no need to write *Basic Economics* and expose scores of public "fallacies" if there were not in the public mind unsettled issues about market systems. But Sowell assigns many of these issues either to the nature of reality itself, which demands ever shifting patterns of choice about scarce resources and alternative lines of action, or to mistakes and illusions in the minds of opinion leaders (probably the same ones Lindblom refers to as "highly informed dissenters"). By contrast, Lindblom still doubts the value of market systems for human flourishing.

Lindblom's short book is divided into three parts: how the market system works, what to make of it, and, as we have noted above, alternatives to it. In less than a hundred pages of part one, he describes how markets "coordinate" society, although he often slips into referring to mere incentives as forms of "control"—trying to stuff market economies into the same mold as command economies. He also struggles to understand how the market system fits into the other social sys-

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tems of the free society, for he notes that not all matters (science, welfare, religion and the arts) are ruled by markets or market principles. The "domain" of the market system is wisely limited.

Lindblom also devotes a chapter in part one to the role of the corporation and the enterprise. He sees entrepreneurs and corporate executives as the privileged decision-makers regarding "what cooperation is to be attempted and by what means." They choose to use *these* resources to produce *these* goods in *this particular fashion.* Lindblom is anxious to be fair:

> I think we can do better than such popular formulations as that corporations today rule the world (they do and they don't), that enterprises are governed by irresponsible rapacious executives (often the case but of less significance than might first appear), that, for good or bad, corporations have displaced the market system (a wild exaggeration), or that they can be trusted to govern themselves (power corrupts).

In part two, consisting of ten short chapters, Lindblom tries to make some sense of what market systems mean—for efficiency (about which he has doubts), freedom, human personality, culture, "the masses" and democracy. He is much influenced by the social philosophers of the Frankfurt School and others (he specifically mentions Jürgen Habermas) who have for many decades severely criticized market societies, for which they in fact show considerable contempt. Lindblom is now more kindly disposed toward markets than they, but they remain his reference group and his brake.

Much of the systematic ambiguity in *The Market System* derives from Lindblom's unspoken, nearly invisible, yet omnipresent idealism about human beings, human institutions, and their possibilities. When he speaks of "freedom", "democracy", "rationality" and "efficiency", he seems to have in mind so pure a standard for each that, if it were made more explicit, acceptable members would turn out to a null set. For example, he is disheartened by the deficiency of freedom in the lives of workers, because when they show up daily for their factory jobs they are "controlled" by the incentives offered them. But to confound their many incentives with "controls" is to imagine so pure a state of freedom, altogether apart from costs and benefits, that one wonders if even angels may enjoy it. In real life, when the incentives are not just right, one brother says "no, thanks" and seeks employment elsewhere, even though the other brother, for other reasons, goes ahead and enters the factory. Is that not a considerable freedom, imperfect as it is?

In politics, Aristotle wrote, one must be satisfied with a tincture of virtue. In ethical reflection, it is a great mistake to expect the same perfection as one finds in logic, mathematics and the deeper reaches of metaphysics. The range within which finite, imperfect and largely ignorant human beings can enjoy freedom is not unbounded. Yet it is a domain altogether real and precious, worth dying to protect.

THE SIDE-BY-SIDE publication of these two self-described primers on economics nicely illustrates a crucial divide in the intellectual imagination of our time. One would have thought that the collapse of socialism, both behind the Iron Curtain and in the practical economic thinking of social democrats and democratic socialists, would have thrust virtually all intellectuals and social commentators into a grudging but realistic embrace of democracy and capitalism—these two imperfect yet precious systems—in order to make of them the best that our finite capacities permit us. That is what Charles Lindblom has done. But many of the same voices that once hated America and

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capitalism still hate America and capitalism, some now more desperately than ever. Their own lack of a workable and available alternative, and the disappointment of their earlier socialist illusions, seems, if anything, to have given them an even sharper edge.

Today's anti-capitalists are mostly not self-described communists or socialists; they declare themselves to be environmentalists, or vibrate against globalization without particular labels for themselves. The trouble with the greens is that, by the end of the summer, they turn out to be reds. Just as in the bad old days, they want the state to command private businesses. And the trouble with anti-globalizers is that those living in the most forlorn parts of the world not yet included in the global system remain today the most desperately poor, ill and likely to die young. As before, envy and the undifferentiated impulse to leveling are at work.

The deeper problem seems to be that neither democracy nor capitalism provides much in the way of pure, idealized outcomes, romance, poetry or myth. Both are systems for adults who have crossed what Joseph Conrad called "the shadow line" that separates illusion and fantasy from a sense of limits and reality. While Professor Lindblom seeks a reasonable idealism, struggling admirably to quell his own romantic tendencies, it is Professor Sowell who better exemplifies the sense of constraints that the ancients used to call *phronesis* ("practical wisdom" or, in some translations, "prudence").

Sowell's prudence is the habit of mind better suited to democracy and capitalism. Considerably less enamored of pretty ideals, more attentive to the multiple ways in which things can go wrong in human affairs, men and women of practical wisdom rejoice in the limited good effects that, despite everything, may actually be achieved. They count as blessings those imperfect beauties that utopians reject as flawed. What can we do when faced with such a tension except once again to recall Wallace Stevens, who observed in verse: "Our paradise is the imperfect." □

Money & Class

As we move into capitalism, less and less wealth is inherited; more and more is the result of good luck or good management in the sense of holding one's resources in a form that is rising much more rapidly in value. It's capitalism that has the best chance of producing a classless society in its most developed form. Centrally planned economies invariably create societies with the self-perpetuating elite of apparatchiki.

—Kenneth E. Boulding (1985)

In a society dedicated to economic development and 'personal growth' at the expense of all larger loyalties, conservative values are too important to be left to pseudo-conservative apologists for capitalism. In our time, the most profound radicalism is often the most profound conservatism.

—T. Jackson Lears (1981)

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Frog in the Pot

Germany's Path to the Japan Syndrome

Adam S. Posen

JAPAN'S DECADE of decline is the worst fate suffered by an advanced economy since the Great Depression. Contraction in Japan, however, is not only Japan's problem—it is also a drag on the global economy. Japan's withdrawal of capital from Asia and a weakening yen contributed heavily to the Asian financial crisis of 1997–98. Since then, Japan's continuing slump has limited export earnings for emerging market countries, thus strengthening the backlash in Asia and Latin America against globalization and the "Washington Consensus." It is also exacerbating rather than offsetting the current global slowdown.

Japan seems unable to halt its decline, even though its problems are obvious, and effective, albeit painful, remedies are available. But Japan's very wealth and stability seem to be the sources of its inaction. In other words, when enough wealth remains to allow most Japanese citizens to travel the world and purchase luxury goods, to buy off with government programs those who are directly harmed by the recession, and the costs of this and other borrowing can be put off into the future, little political pressure for change can coalesce. Small wonder, then, that financial observers have wondered whether such a fate might befall other advanced economies. When stock market bubbles have burst and deflation appears in prospect, the question "Who will be the next Japan?" has taken on urgency for policymakers and markets.

But it takes more than a bubble to become Japan. Bubble economies can build up overhangs of investment and industrial capacity in formerly overvalued sectors (like telecoms and IT), and then work these off in periods of slower growth—as current U.S. economic difficulties demonstrate. Mature economies can also reach the limits of technological catch-up, or find themselves confronting difficult choices about generous social welfare commitments made during times of faster growth and greater export opportunities—as the UK did in the 1980s, and the Netherlands and Sweden did in the 1990s. And practically every economy has suffered disruptions to financial markets and growth from corrupt or undercapitalized banking systems that misallocate credit—from the U.S. savings and loan debacle to France's Credit Lyonnais affair to the Nordic countries' widespread banking crises. In other words, it is possible to have a bad time of it, but still not fall into

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Japanese-style stagnation.

As it happens, there are four determinants of Japan's negative economic model: incomplete financial liberalization; macroeconomic policy division and deflationary bias; financially and politically passive households; and a lack of openness to trade or capital flows or foreign ideas. Of all the OECD countries, Germany increasingly shares Japan's political-economic profile. It already evidences the first three parts of the Japanese model, and the recent approach to EU enlargement taken by Germany and other EU members—elevating the power and interests of the incumbent nation-states *vis-à-vis* Brussels and the accession countries—threatens to provide the fourth.

All of this is happening gradually, however, so much so that, as in Japan, there is little significant pressure for painful and politically difficult changes. Germany, like Japan, is coming to resemble the proverbial frog slowly heating in the pot, and is in danger of a fatal consequence if it doesn't soon recognize its predicament. In a world economy in which sole reliance on the U.S. economy as the engine of growth since 1995 has created major imbalances—and where transatlantic relations are already under stress—the world can ill-afford a Germany following Japan down the path to economic perdition.[1]

A deepening of Germany's current economic weakness would not just compound the drag from a declining Japan; it would also deprive the United States of a critical partner in the promotion of economic liberalization and in the integration of developing democracies into the global economic system—a role Japan never played. It would also render even more improbable a significant increase in defense spending by the second-largest member of NATO.

The Japanese Model

WHAT A difference a decade makes. Over the last ten years, Japanese public debt and unemployment levels have doubled, and average economic growth has fallen by nearly three-quarters—to about 0.9 percent per year, the lowest of any industrialized economy. Bad debts in the Japanese banking system total an unprecedented $1 trillion and are still rising. On current trends, Japan will be unable to roll over its public or private debts and will fail to meet its internal pension and social security obligations within just five years at most. Japan has gone from being a soft power punching above its weight in international relations to being an aging society of declining significance even within Asia.

Worse, Japan seems unable to free itself from the tightening vise of fiscal erosion and debt-deflation in which its economy is caught. With each passing year of stagnation, tax revenues fall while public demands rise, limiting further the Japanese government's scope for constructive fiscal policy. Debt-deflation, meanwhile, is a vicious self-reinforcing cycle, last seen during the 1930s, where companies and individuals hit by falling prices and incomes are unable to service

[1]Germany's economic importance to the West is disproportionately great because of its geopolitical position. German output comprises 23 percent of the EU's GDP, and 32 percent of the eurozone's. The Benelux countries sell over $90 billion in goods and services to Germany every year, making it the engine of west European growth. From the strategic emerging east, Germany takes in 8 percent of Russian exports, 19 percent of Turkish exports, and 31 percent of the EU accession countries'—primarily Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic—total exports, which is over 11 percent of those NATO members' annual GDP.

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their outstanding debt obligations and so default or sell their marketable assets. These defaults and fire sales drive prices down further and dry up bank credit, leading to another round of failures. In Japan—with a bank-dominated financial system that offers little corporate access to stock and bond markets—the resulting credit crunch has starved the entire economy of new investment. It has also given aging savers little or no return on their assets, thereby sapping consumption as well.

Japan's troubles have been neither accidental nor inevitable. They are the result of politically driven and economically self-defeating policy decisions that turned a normal recession following an asset-price bubble in 1992–94 into a severe and accelerating decline. We summarize the four interwoven aspects of the Japan syndrome briefly before turning to the German case.

Incomplete financial liberalization. The seeds of the current crisis were sown in 1984 when Japan undertook to deregulate its financial markets. By 1989, most leading companies could exit their bank relationships and go directly to the markets for capital (issuing bonds, commercial paper and stock), thus depriving Japanese banks of their steady business of lending to near-zero-risk clients at high margins. Yet even as banks lost profitable opportunities, the Ministry of Finance equated financial system stability to "no closure of banks", and a network of former financial officials placed into lucrative bank jobs after retirement (the famous *amakudari*—descent from heaven) provided financial incentives that reinforced this belief.

The consequence was that too many unprofitable Japanese banks have stayed in business, retaining large amounts of Japan's funds to lend. From the mid-1980s to the early-1990s, too, the banks shifted from funding credit-worthy corporations to lending to small- and medium-enterprises solely on the basis of real estate collateral—a much riskier and more cyclical business. When the stock and real estate bubbles that their lending helped to inflate burst in 1990–92, the banks and their borrowers took heavy losses, and returns to Japanese savers began their long decline. The banks have since ceased lending to new businesses, while savings account and certificate-of-deposit holders at those banks have received little or no return on their deposits. As a result, because public-sector financial institutions put such pressure on the private banks' profitability, and because such an overwhelming share of both household savings and corporate finance is still kept in banks, the banks' bad judgments have discouraged investment and distorted markets throughout the economy, devastating growth.[2]

Uncoordinated deflationary macroeconomic policy. During normal recessions, a central bank cuts interest rates to make credit more easily available, tax revenues decline from those with declining incomes, and public spending on unemployment and other welfare benefits increases. In unusual circumstances, such as those following a stock market bubble when there is overcapacity and financial fragility, a more activist macroeconomic policy is undertaken: discretionary tax cuts are made, public works spending is often increased, and the central bank may purchase government bonds on a large scale.

Since 1990, however, macroeconomic policy in Japan has been on balance contractionary, and has worked to deepen rather than to offset the post-bubble

[2]See Takeo Hoshi and Anil F. Kashyap, *Corporate Financing and Governance in Japan: The Road to the Future* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001).

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recession.[3] The popular but incorrect perception of Japanese fiscal policy is that the government has been on a public-works spending binge. Properly measured, however, the Japanese government has provided little *added* stimulus as the economy has contracted. Over 80 percent of the increase in Japanese public debt is due to tax revenue shrinking with the economy. In fact, in April 1997, taxes were *raised* by 2 percent of GDP, cutting short a nascent recovery. Then, starting in July 1999, public investment has been cut month after month for more than three years running. Net public investment is lower now than it was in 1998.

Monetary policy has been at least as contractionary, and is perhaps even more misunderstood. The Bank of Japan was slow to cut interest rates after the bubble burst and investment declined in the early 1990s. By the time the Bank cut its overnight interest rate effectively to zero in 1999, it was too late—inflation had dropped below zero and the banking system was broken, making real interest rates high and credit conditions tight. Since then, the Bank has refused to undertake active quantitative expansion—i.e., printing yen and purchasing large amounts of either government bonds, foreign currency or other real assets—to increase liquidity outside the banking system. The result of the Bank's inaction has been the first extended period of deflation seen in any advanced economy since the Depression. Deflation not only reinforces the accumulation of bad loans and the contraction of credit in a vicious feedback loop, it also deters consumer spending since individuals wait for prices to fall.

Financially and politically passive citizens. Obvious economic underperformance, fed by regulatory neglect and deflationary policies (not to mention overt corruption), would seem to be cause for public outcry. Yet Japanese democracy has not produced a demand for change. While prime ministers come and go, the Liberal Democratic Party retains leadership in the Diet, and neither its members nor the bureaucrats running economic policy are held accountable. The selection by party caucus, not by popular election, of Junichiro Koizumi as prime minister in April 2001 was thought by many to be a signal of potential reform, but nothing much has changed. In October 2002, Koizumi and his party simultaneously gutted the first true bank clean-up proposal since the bubble, and *picked up* five seats in by-elections nevertheless.

The Japanese population appears to fear high-level stagnation less than it does major changes in established relationships. Indeed, for all the talk of social solidarity, Japan is a society in which the relatively wealthy old exploit younger workers, politically over-represented rural residents exploit urban populations, and incumbent businesses and workers exploit their current relationships to exclude new entrants. These pernicious stabilities are enabled and reinforced by a process in which LDP politicians funnel public largesse and tax breaks to these older and rural voters in return for political (and personal) contributions and safe re-election. Bureaucrats, meanwhile, maintain their power by assuring that current businesses and regulatory structures reinforce each other.

Of course, all advanced societies have special interests, and farmers and pensioners often take advantage of the less-concentrated general public in government budgets. Only in Japan, however, have such narrowly-based interest groups so successfully snatched such a large share of national income, and managed to keep

[3]Japanese macroeconomic policy is assessed in Kenneth N. Kuttner and Adam S. Posen, "The Great Recession: Lessons for Macroeconomic Policy from Japan", *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity*, 2001:2.

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it coming in the face of obvious economic decline.

The same passivity pervades the Japanese financial system. Over 90 percent of Japanese household financial assets are kept in bank accounts, bank certificates of deposit, life insurance or cash. The result is that banks and life insurers in Japan have effectively captive deposits on which they can keep dropping the returns (now nearly zero on most accounts), while their management and shareholders keep their jobs and extract what dividends they can. No one pulls out their money in search of better investments, so there is no more accountability for the banks than for the politicians. This translates into no pressure to write off bad loans or lend to new businesses.

Lack of openness. As a result of all this, Japan's government and established interests have eluded most pressures for change. Passivity is reinforced by the closed nature of much of Japan's economy and society, as reflected by its discouragement of immigration and the virtual absence of regional security or trade integration—there is no East Asian equivalent of NATO, NAFTA or the EU.

Japan's lack of openness is particularly felt in the absence of economic competition for the bulk of its domestic businesses and of its savings to invest. I refer here not to the standard U.S. trade negotiator's demands for market access for American plate glass or apples. What is really at issue is the fact that 80–85 percent of the Japanese economy—particularly service sectors such as retail, transportation and construction—is horribly inefficient, with thousands of politically protected small companies squandering Japan's stock of economic assets. Even many larger manufacturing companies are insulated from competition by tight business-government connections, particularly of bureaucrats to middle management and corporate boards of insiders from companies with cross-shareholdings. These companies secretly allocate the losses from bad investments, delinquent loans and outright waste, and they transfer the cost of those losses to the Japanese consumer and to the 15 percent of Japanese business that is internationally competitive.

Naturally enough, these inefficient companies have a strong interest in not only the substance of protection, but in maintaining the ideological pretense that Japan should have an economic model distinct from that of "the West." In the end, of course, it turns out that the maintenance of their privileges, and that alone, is what constitutes that "distinct" model. This is hardly an environment conducive to the spread of new ideas; rather, it is one that encourages the scapegoating of foreign pressures as a source of difficulty, an indulgence with implications that go far beyond economics.

The German Way

THESE FOUR determinants of an industrial democracy's proclivity toward the Japan syndrome are all measurable, and, thankfully, it appears that most OECD members have avoided them. The notable exception is Germany.

Germany appears especially susceptible to the Japanese syndrome on account of the structural similarities of the German and Japanese economies. Both were beneficiaries of U.S. reconstruction and open markets after World War II. Both are one-time exemplar economies whose growth rates slowed in the 1980s and fell on increasingly hard times in the 1990s. Both are self-described "consensus" or "stakeholder" societies that organize much of their economic decision-making around tight business-bank ties and collaborative corporate governance. Both de-emphasize stock markets. Both

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are aging societies with high domestic rates of savings, high labor productivity and low return on capital. And both have been and remain critically dependent on exports for growth.

Of course, these similarities can be misleading, for they do not foreordain similar behavior. Until the late 1990s, there were significant differences in the functioning of the two economies. Postwar West Germany was always more market-friendly than Japan, even after the liberal architect of the *Sozialmarktwirtschaft*, Ludwig Erhard, left office in 1966. While certainly more regulated than the United States, in contrast to Japan individual German business decisions were not directly influenced by government intervention. German civil servants also tended to stay in government rather than join companies—so that direct business-government ties were limited. Germany also allowed more competition, both domestic and foreign: on the trade side, the value of Germany's imports and exports composes nearly twice the share of its economy as Japan's, and foreign direct investment in Germany is nine times that of Japan. Banks did play the dominant role in German corporate finance and as the place for savings, but German banks were allowed occasionally to fail or be taken over. German bank supervisors were strict.

The electorate held German politicians accountable for economic performance, as well. The decentralized federal political system, installed by the occupying Allied powers, allotted a strong role in determining policy to the opposition in the *Bundesrat* and in the *Länder* (state) governments. This gave German citizens a sense of political responsiveness that never developed in one-party, bureaucrat-dominated postwar Japan. The generous distribution of government spoils to average workers and consumers, too, usually through universal welfare programs, reflected the fact that political power in Germany lay with the majority and not, as in Japan, with business management and select interest groups.

Most important, Germany was always more engaged internationally than Japan. This was in large part due to political geography, with West Germany in NATO and on the Cold War's front line. A partial welcome to resident foreigners, from Turkish *Gästarbeitern* to U.S. troops, added to the sense of openness. (Japan has also hosted resident U.S. troops, of course, but they have been allowed much less social influence in Japan than in Germany.) This was also a matter of enlightened leadership by a succession of German chancellors, strongly backed by a majority of Germans, who simultaneously pursued European integration and the maintenance of transatlantic ties. Membership in the EU, in turn, was then a force for economic liberalization, at least within the single market.

Nevertheless, as with Japan in 1990–92, Germany's main concern now is how to respond to a bubble and its recessionary aftermath. Germany has experienced a real stock market crash—at bottom on October 9, 2002, the DAX index was 68 percent off of its March 2000 peak (compared with a 49 percent drop in the analogous S&P 500 index over the same peak-to-trough period), and the Neuer Markt, Germany's version of NASDAQ, is to be completely shut down by year-end 2003 due to the collapse of the vast majority of its listed companies. Germany also confronts a severe slowdown; since the post-reunification boom of 1990–92, Germany has beaten out Italy for the distinction of being the slowest growing economy in the EU, at an average rate of 1.3 percent a year. In 2002, the German economy grew a mere 0.2 percent, and the government's own revised forecast for real growth in 2003 is only 1.0 percent, which is insufficient to keep public deficits and unemployment from rising

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further. This is the objective situation. How are German economic decision-makers likely to handle it?

On the first criterion of the Japanese model, incomplete financial liberalization, there is real cause to worry about Germany. In theory, because Germany always had universal banks, there was little to deregulate in terms of bank activities, and banks were already well diversified and so better able to handle shocks. Banks' hidden reserves, comprised of unrealized capital gains on shareholdings of non-financial companies and retained dividends, were supposed to provide cushions to capital adequacy. In practice, however, German financial markets have been in a state of transition in recent years akin to that which preceded the U.S. S&L crisis in the 1980s and Japan's banking problems of the 1990s. And similar to the discoveries made of late by U.S. bank-holding companies, diverse lines of business have proven no defense against cyclical losses.

Like Japan, Germany is not only a high savings country, but a country whose savers increasingly put their money into bank accounts even as returns decline. Germany's deposit-to-GDP ratio is the highest in Europe. Total deposits have grown sevenfold in the last twenty years, while the economy itself only grew by about 60 percent. During these two decades, average interest paid on deposits declined from 4 to 2 percent.[4] A growing (and now the largest) share of these ample loanable funds—four times the amount lent in 1980—have been put to work by German banks in loans to the non-financial services sector, a low productivity set of small- and medium-enterprises whose loans, as in Japan, are secured mainly by real estate collateral. Reminiscent of Japan, too, this lending growth has occurred while Germany's more stable and profitable export-oriented manufacturing sector has steadily raised a greater share of its funds by going directly to foreign markets with securities on offer. The profitability of German banks' loan portfolios has fallen, and the riskiness of its loans has risen as a result. Germany's tough labor laws restricting the firing of workers limit the ability of the banks to improve profitability internally, much as the Japanese banks feel bound to retain their "lifetime employment" workforces.

The number of German banks, however, has not declined to restore profitability—just as in Japan. There are still over 300 commercial banks of various sizes and over 530 *Sparkassen* (public savings banks). Only the number of credit unions has been shrinking. As in Japan, public banks and special credit entities—including the *Sparkassen*, their clearing banks (the state-owned *Landesbanken)*, and the *Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau* (the one-time Marshall Plan funds bank that is now a means for the federal government to pursue chosen projects off-budget)—play a significant role in the financial system. These public banks carry as advantages a state guarantee, and therefore a lower cost of funds, as well as non-profit criteria for lending. This puts them into unfair competition with Germany's private banks, further eroding the latter's profitability. The EU has recognized that this system is anti-competitive, and it has legislated that the *Landesbanken* lose their state guarantees by 2005. But that means at least another two years of eroding private bank capital.

Not surprisingly, then, visible adverse selection has begun to emerge in the German financial system. A credit crunch for new borrowers is developing as asset prices fall, collateral and balance sheets of borrowers are impaired, and banks reduce lending. A standard marker of credit conditions is the spread between government bonds and corporate bonds of equivalent

[4]All data cited in this paragraph is taken from Deutsche Bundesbank publications.

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maturity—when this spread widens, borrowers have greater trouble getting loans. In Germany, the spread between ten-year government bonds and highly-rated corporate bonds averaged 0.3 percent between January 1980 and May 1998, and rarely went above 0.7 percent for more than a month, even during recessions. Since June 1998, when German banks began to incur losses from the Asian financial crisis and then the Russian default, the risk spread has been steadily rising. As of September 2002, the spread was a hefty 1.7 percent, having averaged 1.3 percent in the preceding year.

This increase can be credibly linked to declining German bank capital. The national average bank financial strength rating, removing the effect of government guarantees, is now below C+ according to Moody's rating agency—in other words, sub-investment grade. Every other EU country's banking system except that of Greece has a higher average rating. Provisioning for the coming losses on non-performing loans in a time of declining profits will further erode German banks' capital base. Germany today, like Japan circa 1992, has too many banks with too little capital, but no significant exit of savers or public sector competitors.

In the past four years, German macroeconomic policy, the second indicator to watch, has taken on frightening parallels to that of Japan, as well. Until 1999, German monetary policy was quite flexible and stabilizing of the real economy, while German fiscal policy was well within G-7 norms for counter-cyclicality. Since European monetary unification at the start of 1999, however, German monetary policy has been set by the European Central Bank (ECB), and German fiscal policy has been constrained by the eurozone's Stability and Growth Pact. Since then, Germany has suffered from an excessively tight monetary policy. While the German inflation rate averaged 1.5 percent annually since January 1, 1999, and has fallen just *below* zero percent over the past six months, the ECB refuses to cut interest rates. Meanwhile, on the fiscal side, the Schröder government has raised taxes during the current recession in hopes of bringing the budget deficit back down to the Stability and Growth Pact target of 3 percent of GDP.

As it happens, the EU's Stability and Growth Pact has a built-in destabilizing bias: the larger a recession, the more likely an economy is to breach the 3 percent cap on deficits; and the more likely it is to exceed the deficit cap, the more tax increases or spending cuts must be pursued. Recent proposals to measure the deficit on a cyclically-adjusted basis would offset this bias somewhat. But as long as the rule remains in place mandating a rapid return to below 3 percent deficits, fiscal policy will choke off recovery by tightening credit as soon as growth and tax revenues pick up—repeating almost exactly Japan's mistake of 1997.

Some countries, like France, have defied the Pact and simply put off meeting the deficit targets. The German government, however, has explicitly abjured such measures since its politicians were the ones who insisted upon having public debt and deficit limits built into the Maastricht Treaty and the EMU in the first place. They did so in order to prevent (in their minds) fiscal indiscipline from subverting the stability of the euro. The German government has thus painted itself into a corner of austerity, for it has itself characterized any greater fiscal flexibility as an indication that markets should discount the euro's stability.

Magnifying even further the Japan-like course of increasing austerity in a time of recession is the fact that Germany has the fourth-oldest, and one of the most rapidly aging, societies in the world (Japan's is the oldest society). This will make public debt burdens less and less

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sustainable over time.

While monetary policy has been too tight in the eurozone since the euro was introduced, it has been particularly harmful to Germany. The ECB came into being as a new and newly independent successor to the revered Bundesbank, extremely concerned about establishing its credibility for toughness on inflation. As a result, it has been even more reluctant to ease credit than the Bundesbank would have been under similar economic conditions.[5] The ECB has pursued an inflation target of 2 percent or less for a weighted average of eurozone economies, a strategy with three inherent difficulties.

First, the "or less" target, rather than a symmetrical one of around 2 percent, imparts an additional deflationary bias, leading the ECB to be more aggressive in offsetting price rises than declines. Second, the target is too low for a eurowide average. The smaller and the structurally-reforming EU economies should be experiencing higher inflation as they adapt, and the large and developed economies (like Germany) would therefore have to average less than 2 percent (which in practice is actually deflation, given the positive bias of all inflation measures). Third, given the lack of synchronization between the eurozone economies' business cycles and of fiscal transfers among the economies, some countries will always suffer from significant divergences between ECB policy and their own cyclical needs. When some countries—like Ireland, Denmark, Spain, and (to a lesser degree) France—are on sustained trends of growth improvement, while other countries—like Germany and Italy—are on secular growth downtrends, monetary policy will not simply balance out over time. It will be chronically too tight for the slower economies, and will reinforce their slowdown. Moreover, now that Germany is in a currency bloc with the majority of its trading partners, it cannot loosen its monetary policy "in effect" by adjusting its exchange rate to make up for excessively high interest rates.

Perhaps the most chilling parallel between post-EMU Germany and post-1992 Japan on macroeconomic policy is in the lack of coordination between fiscal and monetary policymakers in the eurozone. As with the Bank of Japan, the ECB refuses to loosen monetary policy sufficiently or to believe that stronger growth is sustainable without inflation until elected governments pursue structural reforms. And the ECB is on record that it will view any loosening of or non-adherence to the Stability and Growth Pact as undermining monetary stability, and will tighten policy in response. In the eurozone, however, the ECB is playing chicken with not just one but twelve sets of politicians and bureaucrats. And the German Ministry of Finance, alone among those dozen national fiscal authorities, feels the need to self-impose austerity in order to set an example—even though its fiscal discipline alone will be insufficient to convince the ECB to ease policy in return.

Two Down, Two to Go?

GERMANY TODAY already has in place the first two components of what fed Japan's decline a decade ago—incomplete financial liberalization and an uncoordinated deflationary macroeconomic policy—compounded by a stock market crash and the economic slowdown needed to set the full declinist syndrome in motion. What, then, of the third element? Are German

[5]Most estimates find that the ECB should have cut interest rates between fifty and one hundred basis points more than it did since early 2001. See Michael Mussa, "Global Economic Prospects", IIE *Policy Brief* (September 2002).

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households sufficiently passive financially and politically to allow this process to gain momentum? Yes, they are.

On the political side, reunification has diversified and fragmented the composition of the German workforce, and both the pork-barrel benefits of government programs and the protections of government regulations have become more narrowly distributed as a result. Demands for protection from the sustained growth slowdown, declining employment in some manufacturing sectors (as in Japan, these are the most efficient and export-competitive businesses in Germany, while backward sectors retain unneeded employees), and the rising number of long-term unemployed have reinforced a change in Germany from dispensing mostly universal benefits to more targeted interest-group rents. (Mancur Olson was perhaps right to argue in *The Rise and Decline of Nations* [1978] that economies become sclerotic over time because rent-seeking groups accumulate.)

Notably, there are fewer traditionally unionized workers, but the relative benefits of being such a worker versus working elsewhere or being unemployed have increased. This development allies long-term German employees and uncompetitive companies in efforts to maintain the status quo and to protect specific businesses—and the protection of those businesses includes maintenance of their credit lines from either state-supported or uncompetitive banks, just as in Japan. Meanwhile, the long-term unemployed, particularly in the former East Germany, with little hope of good union jobs, have no interest in challenging the system of protections so long as the unemployment benefits and regional public-works keep coming.

Thus, as in Japan, Germany now has special-interest blocs that exploit the average German and that are capable of vetoing change. Meanwhile, ECB decisions on monetary policy, and those of the European ministers on the Stability and Growth Pact's fiscal rules, are so far removed from democratic control, let alone anything German voters can directly effect, that the decision-making process itself feeds political passivity about macroeconomic policy. And in contrast to all the German national elections since the mid-1960s, the September 2002 election offered little choice to voters on economic and social policy between the two major parties' platforms. Unsurprisingly, turnout was down, the electoral shares of the SPD and the CDU/CSU differed by only tenths of a percentage point, and political cynicism rose sharply. As in Japan, the average German voter is less willing and less able to hold policymakers accountable for economic performance.

On the financial side, too, recent events have taken a toll on German savers' willingness to move their capital out of German banks, or out of Germany altogether. The privatization of Deutsche Telekom in 1999 was meant to be the founding act in creating an *Aktienkultur* (stock-holding culture) in Germany, and the creation of the Neuer Markt and a unified Deutsche Börse was meant to take advantage of this increased demand for equities, deepening the market. At peak, however, only 10 percent of German households held stocks or stock funds, even after these initiatives. Unfortunately, the telecoms collapse has imposed huge losses on Deutsche Telekom shareholders in a very short time, and for many Germans this was their first and their major, if not their only, stock holding. Those few who took speculative risks on "new economy" stocks in the Neuer Markt were similarly burnt, and are now held up as cautionary examples. Many wealthier Germans had moved savings abroad to secret accounts in Luxembourg, Switzerland and other centers of bank privacy, but on December 16, 2002, Chancellor Schröder announced a new

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combined flat tax on savings interest and a temporary tax amnesty to bring those funds home. Average Germans, particularly the elderly, share with their Japanese counterparts an aversion to risking their money abroad—or even anyplace beyond the neighborhood savings bank.

Corporate governance scandals in the United States have further reinforced popular German suspicions about financial speculation. And this most inopportune increase in risk aversion and bank dependence in Germany happens to coincide with EU efforts to integrate Europe's banking markets, open Germany's corporations to hostile takeovers and remove the privileges of the *Landesbanken*. Germany's uncompetitive public banks and small businesses dependent upon those banks for credit are taking advantage of this fortuitously timed (for them) bad press for "Anglo-Saxon finance capitalism" to pressure their government to resist such liberalization. So Germany appears to be following Japan on the third step to the path of perdition, financial and political passivity in response to the first two steps.

Will Germany's greater openness, then, save it from the proverbial pot? That depends upon the actions of the EU, and right now those are mostly heading in the wrong direction. The European Union's constitutional convention, led by former French Premier Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, has sought to enhance the power of the nation-states—particularly of the largest states in the EU, France and Germany—*vis-à-vis* the European Commission and Parliament in the face of Europe's expansion to include ten countries from the east. This statist approach increases the likelihood of German economic decline in four ways.

First, weakening the European Commission will impede Brussels' independent efforts to push liberalization (including of banking) on unwilling European governments.

Second, by making decision-making in the EU more akin to that in the U.S. Senate, horse-trading and logrolling will promote national champions and bailouts rather than healthy compromises.

Third, stunting the development of the European Parliament to promote rule by national ministers will magnify the EU's democratic deficit, making citizens in Germany and elsewhere still more passive about economic policy.

Fourth, the premium placed on state leadership, with France at the forefront, will make establishing a separate EU identity—including a foreign policy divergent from that of the United States—the priority rather than internal development and international integration.

Combine these effects with the likely combative and retrogressive response of the ECB to any political measures that the Council of Ministers might undertake, and Germany ends up fulfilling all four steps to Japan-style stagnation.

U.S. Policy Options

THERE IS room for the U.S. government to forestall such a development in Germany and in Europe, and good reason to do so. Expanding growth in the major economies should be a U.S. foreign policy priority. We have already seen the damage done to American interests in East Asia by Japanese stagnation: withdrawal of Japanese export demand, credit, technology transfers and investment from the region; economic contraction in 1997–99 throughout those markets, reducing living standards and shifting cheap exports to the U.S. market; post-crisis political instability in Indonesia and varying degrees of increased anti-Americanism from Malaysia to South Korea as a result of scapegoating "failed" U.S./IMF policies; resistance to further multilateral trade liberalization and eco-

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nomic integration; Japan's withdrawal from international leadership even as a donor or soft power; and the enhanced opportunities for China in the region as a result.

We can ill afford a similar destabilizing sequence taking place among the NATO members of eastern Europe, along Russia's border, and in Turkey and North Africa. That is, however, what will happen if the German economy does become the next Japan. And it is likely to cause problems worse than those of East Asia for three reasons. First, global economic distress cumulates both directly and politically—if we add German decline and east European or Mediterranean economic instability to that already incurred in East Asia (and occurring in Latin America), the effects on global growth will be multiplied, and the political reaction against market economics will increase. Second, Germany is more geopolitically influential than Japan because its economy is more integrated with those of its neighbors, it plays a significant role as a NATO member, and it has generally played a large role in supporting U.S. multilateral initiatives (the obvious exception being treatment of Saddam's Iraq).

Third, the timing is very dangerous. The U.S. economy is no longer growing as fast as it was during the Asian financial crisis, and cannot afford to take in its current level of imports indefinitely, let alone increase it from emerging markets even as it readies a war budget. Yet formerly liberalizing but now economically frustrated governments throughout East Asia, Latin America and, if Germany goes, eastern Europe are looking for additional evidence to use in blaming their economic travails on Western indifference or *laissez-faire* processes.

Thus, while security goals may indeed be ultimately more important than economic ones for American national interests, as the Bush Administration proclaimed upon entering office, the economic policies of the United States and its allies are critical to achieving those security goals. Preventing Germany from going farther down Japan's path should be *the* primary U.S. foreign economic policy priority, and one of the main U.S. *security* priorities overall. There are four steps that the United States can take to pursue this priority.

Practice reverse linkage. Making Germany's and other allies' economic policies a security goal means linking progress on this front to U.S. cooperation in other issue areas, rather than artificially separating "high" and "low" politics. This reverses the nature of the economic linkage in the days of U.S.-Soviet détente, where political concessions by the Soviets were rewarded by trade deals. Japan has demonstrated how a country that runs a trade surplus and keeps vast national savings at home will not be constrained from pursuing deflationary policies that are harmful well beyond its own borders, and there is little direct economic leverage the United States can bring to bear upon such a country. U.S. policy under both Presidents Clinton and Bush has been able to move Japanese economic policymakers when broader diplomatic and security concerns linked Japanese economic decisions to other things desired by Japan. So why not Germany as well?

Promote a federalist Europe. Giscard and the French statists have not yet won with their vision of a Europe led by national prime ministers, weighted by state size. In fact, most of America's supportive European allies on Iraq and other security issues (with the notable exception of the United Kingdom) favor a federalist Europe with a strengthened executive and European Parliament, and oppose big state domination of EU decision-making. By holding out the carrot of greater recognition of the EU in international organizations (the IMF, the UN Security Council and so forth) as well as

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the prospect of more extensive bilateral coordination—conditional on Europe moving in a more federalist direction—the United States can support its friends in this debate.

Play to Germany's traditional postwar values. American foreign policy can benefit from a call to Germany's recent past. Since the 1950s, Germany has been committed to a federalist rather than a statist Europe. Until its most recent economic troubles gave it assistance fatigue, Germany had championed the cause of European supranational decision-making in response first to Mediterranean and then eastern enlargement. Germany also was repeatedly in consort with the United Kingdom in supporting liberalizing reforms on the Continent. If the United States appeals to Germany's sense of historic responsibility to eastern Europe, to economic efficiency in the EU, and to wanting to transcend the nation-state, it can influence German policy toward internal EU arrangements.

Encourage liberalization without sanctimony. U.S. economic performance in the 1990s and its military predominance have converged with a moralistic tone in U.S. foreign policy to make American-supported economic liberalization extremely unpopular in many places. The United States would be wiser to pick specific areas in which economic reform will serve a strategic purpose—particularly in saving Germany from stagnation—instead of being generally and promiscuously triumphalist about its superior "model." That would have the additional advantage of being more persuasive to Germans and Europeans in general since it would draw attention to the fact that there are countries doing much better than Germany (Ireland and Sweden, for example) as a result of constructive reform without converging completely on some American ideal.

In the German case, this agenda would include encouraging free international competition for pension fund and investment management, reducing agricultural subsidies and barriers, creating what amount to non-aggression pacts between rich countries of "no corporate bailouts"—rather than encouraging their escalation, as the United States did with its 2002 steel tariffs—and advancing some form of renewed international banking standards. All of these initiatives would directly or indirectly lead to greater openness, financial stability, citizen risk-taking and macroeconomic stimulus in Germany and in a more unified, less statist, European Union. That would be in everyone's interest. □

> Maybe everyone is too rich. I have noticed that there is no dissatisfaction like that of the rich. Feed a man, clothe him, put him in a good house, and he will die of despair.
>
> —John Steinbeck
> *East of Eden*

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Taba Mythchief

David Makovsky

AFTER THE U.S.-led coalition routed Iraq in Operation Desert Storm in 1991, President George H.W. Bush told Congress that he would vigorously pursue the Arab-Israeli peace process. Indeed, a landmark Middle East peace conference in Madrid followed in short order, which for the first time brought Israel to the same table with all its immediate neighbors. A second U.S.-led war against Iraq will also likely be followed by a focus on the Arab-Israeli arena, for the same twin logic applies to both cases. The first part of this logic reasons that such a focus will improve America's standing with the Arabs, who believe, rightly or wrongly, that the United States has a double standard in which it seeks to redress Arab, but not Israeli, wrongdoing. But it is also driven by a judgment that an American victory will alter the regional equation, emboldening moderates and weakening extremists, and thus improve the prospects for peace.

This American impulse is likely to be strongly reinforced by other actors. In the summer of 2002 the European Union, Russia, the UN and the United States formed a "Quartet" dedicated to moving the Israeli-Palestinian process forward, and they developed a "road map" for that purpose. They have been active, too, in promoting Palestinian political reform, identified by the Bush Administration as a key to peace. They will strongly encourage at least the first rationale that argues for a more active American role to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict.

If such a push should come, it would be tragic were it plagued by a misleading mythology—that Israelis and Palestinians were at the verge of peace in January 2001 as they met at Taba, a tiny Egyptian resort adjoining the Israeli port city of Eilat. According to this myth, both sides had essentially agreed on the critical and difficult issues of land, refugees and the status of Jerusalem, and it was only Ariel Sharon's rise to power that prevented these discussions from coming to fruition.

This myth has wide currency in both the Arab world and in Europe. The diplomatic advisor to Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Abdallah, Adel Al-Jubeir, claims that at Taba "the Israelis and the Palestinians came very close to an agreement."[1] Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak says that the talks

> could have led to a settlement, had an additional chance of a few more months been made available for negotiations. These proposals only needed some clarifications and

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[1] "Meet the Press", NBC, April 21, 2002.

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some mutual concessions in order to crystallize a final settlement had the Israeli government had the intention to start serious negotiations with the Palestinian Authority.[2]

France's former Foreign Minister, Hubert Védrine, notes that a viable Palestinian state needs to be created "not on the basis of the Camp David accords, which were not specific enough, but by using the terms of the subsequent negotiations at Sharm al-Sheikh and Taba."[3] Even some Americans are taken by the myth of Taba: thus Michael Lind writes that, in contrast to earlier negotiations, the Israelis and the Palestinians at Taba "came close to agreeing on a different plan acceptable in its broad outlines to moderates on both sides."[4]

This is just not so.

First of all, the Israeli delegation at Taba did not have the moral authority to negotiate two weeks before an election in which Prime Minister Ehud Barak was widely expected to lose in a landslide; and Israel's delegation was led by a government that had the support of only 42 of Israel's 120-member parliament. Noting the oddity of a minority government holding the most sensitive negotiations in the country's 52-year history, Israel's Attorney General Elyakim Rubinstein wrote Barak a letter questioning the legitimacy of such a step. Even had a deal been reached, therefore, it is very unlikely that the Knesset would have ratified it.

But no deal was ever in prospect. Palestinian negotiators made only conditional and tactical concessions at Taba, and even these were never agreed to by the Palestinian leader, Yasir Arafat. While some key Palestinian negotiators wanted a deal, no evidence suggests that Arafat himself was willing to make any concessions of real significance. Even the diplomat who has put forth the rosiest assessment of the Taba negotiations—EU Middle East peace envoy Miguel Moratinos—wrote in a document summarizing those talks (published in the February 14, 2001 *Ha'aretz*) that "serious gaps remain."

It is important not only to avoid misreading what happened at Taba, but to examine carefully what did and did not occur in the period just before and after it. Doing so will constitute good preparation for the next round of serious Israeli-Palestinian negotiations.

After Camp David

THE ISRAELI political landscape in the aftermath of the Camp David summit in the summer of 2000 featured a mix of stunned acquiescence and dizzy disbelief. Every Israeli leader since June 1967 had declared that no part of a reunited Jerusalem would be ceded to the Palestinians (or any other form of Arab sovereignty), and no one believed that any mainstream Israeli leader would offer to yield 90 percent of the West Bank to the Palestinians. Barak proposed both—and more, for Barak's Jerusalem concession included Israeli willingness to yield part of the Old City. Nonetheless, polls at the time demonstrated that about half of the Israeli public supported such concessions if they would end the decades-old conflict. Barak could consider offering such concessions because he had conditioned the public in the months leading up to Camp David that "painful compromises" would be required for peace. As a result, much of the Israeli public was simply astonished by the Palestinian refusal to accept them, or even to negotiate about them.

Two months later, with the outbreak of the so-called Al-Aqsa *intifada*, Israeli

[2]Speech by Mubarak in Spain, November 2, 2001.

[3]*Washington Post*, June 17, 2002.

[4]Lind, *Made in Texas: George W. Bush and the Southern Takeover of American Politics* (New York: Basic Books, 2003), p. 137.

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public opinion began to change dramatically: either the Palestinians were using violence as a tool in negotiations, or Arafat did not want peace at all. Either possibility represented a depressing revision of the hopes nurtured by the Oslo accords, but the former at least held out some hope that a deal was still possible. But which was it? It was not clear, nor was Arafat's role in the onset of the violence.

The Barak government boldly assumed the former, more optimistic assessment of Palestinian strategy and maintained its intention to negotiate despite the violence. But the latter view was strengthened when the Palestinian Authority released dozens of convicted terrorists from jail after the outbreak of violence, and when Arafat refused to publicly call a halt to that violence.

Then came the "Clinton parameters", put forward on December 23, 2000, which the Barak cabinet accepted. In other words, Israel now agreed to give up 97 percent of the West Bank, yield all but the Jewish neighborhoods of East Jerusalem and concede that virtually all the Temple Mount would be exclusively Palestinian. Barak's acceptance of such terms amid continuing violence was the final blow to his political standing in Israel. But Arafat still demurred. At a meeting with Clinton on January 2, 2001, Arafat emptied the Clinton parameters of any meaning. U.S. peace envoy Dennis Ross characterized Arafat's reply as follows: "He said yes, and then he added reservations that basically meant he rejected every single one of the things that he was supposed to give." As Arafat himself said in the first sentence of his letter to Clinton, published in the Palestinian daily *Al-Ayyam* on the day of his meeting, the President's proposals "do not meet the required conditions for a lasting peace."

Hopes for peace seemed to have gone up in smoke. Arafat turned down the President who had opened the Oval Office to him on twelve occasions, making him his most frequent foreign guest. Now this President was leaving office. Like most observers, Barak believed that, in the wake of Arafat's rejection of the Clinton parameters, any further talks were pointless. Barak was also being trounced in polls by 15–20 percent margins by a man heretofore deemed unelectable, Ariel Sharon. Even had he believed a deal possible, Barak was running out of time.

The Road to Taba

YET THE doves in the Barak cabinet, led by Shimon Peres, did not relent. Because of the Palestinian violence and the Israeli public's reaction to it, Barak was entirely dependent on the doves and on the frail hope that following their counsel would provide a last-minute breakthrough to rescue his tenure. The doves, too, threatened to desert him before election day if he did not enable a peace delegation to hold eleventh-hour talks at Taba. As Barak's own foreign minister, Shlomo Ben-Ami, later portrayed it in an October 17, 2002 *Ha'aretz* interview, alluding to Peres,

> there was a pistol on the table. The elections were a month away, and there was a minister who told Ehud that if he did not go to Taba they would denounce him in public for evading his duty to make peace. He had no choice but to go to a meeting for something he himself no longer believed in.

It is unclear if the doves really believed they could reach a deal at Taba, or if they were more concerned about establishing a concessionary baseline for the widely anticipated next Israeli prime minister, Ariel Sharon. In any event, the fact that the Palestinians did not accept the deal saved the Knesset the acute embarrassment of voting it down.

For the Palestinians, Israel's Taba

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negotiators were a sort of dream team. Hawks like Rubinstein and the centrist Dan Meridor were absent; in their places were Israel's three arch-doves: Peres, Yossi Beilin and Yossi Sarid, who headed the Meretz Party to Barak's Left. Even had Peres, Beilin and Sarid not told them as much—and they did—the Palestinians knew that Israel had never before and might never again put forward such a tractable negotiating team. Yet the Palestinians *still* refused key reciprocal concessions at Taba.

The Palestinians had wanted Taba to begin after Clinton left office so they could flout his parameters without insulting the president of the United States at the same time. Some Palestinians also imagined that George H.W. Bush's son, George W., might reflect some of the lack of empathy toward Israel that his father sometimes appeared to project while in office. The Palestinians thought they were about to reap a political windfall. American Jews were known to be political supporters of the Democrats, and thus losers in a Bush Administration, especially given the Texan's oil industry connections. At the opening plenary session of the Taba talks on January 20, 2001, according to participants, Ahmed Qurei (Abu Ala'a) said what he subsequently told *Al-Ayyam* on January 29, after Taba broke up: "We refused to accept the Clinton initiative as a basis for the negotiations. The Israelis said that the Clinton proposals should be the basis, but we rejected it." Nabil Sha'ath was even more blunt at the start of the negotiations: "Clinton is a dead horse." As such, there was no agreed upon starting point for the talks.[5]

Retrogression on the Red Sea

THE NEGOTIATIONS at Taba were split up into working groups in a bid to resolve the remaining differences. These primarily concerned land and borders, security, refugees and the status of Jerusalem.

The committee on security hardly convened. Shlomo Yanai, a general who headed Israel's negotiating team at Camp David and Taba, told me that "on security issues, we not only made no progress, but there was retrogression. The Palestinians . . . retreated from understandings with us and President Clinton at the summit."

On the territorial issue, Ben-Ami insisted on remaining within the Clinton parameters, but quickly moved toward the upper end of the 95–97 percent zone at Palestinian insistence. He said that Israel should withdraw from 94.5 percent of the West Bank, but once one factored in swapped border areas that Israel would cede within sovereign Israel, he was approaching Clinton's upper limit. Ben-Ami's plan involved the displacement of about 45,000 Jewish settlers living in the West Bank. When Barak heard about the Ben-Ami map, he insisted that Ben-Ami rescind it, for this was a figure that exceeded what Barak and Clinton had thought the Israeli public could bear without major upheaval. The Palestinian team also drew up a map—a real accomplishment—since this was only the second such map they presented since negotiations with Israel began in earnest the previous spring. According to this map, Israel was to evacuate 130 out of 146 settlements, which would displace 100,000 to 120,000 of the 180,000 West Bank settlers—three to four times the number contemplated by Clinton and Barak.

This proposal came as a shock to the Israelis. At Camp David, the Palestinians

[5]Abu Ala'a confirmed this to me at his home in Abu Dis on June 11, 2001. See also the memoir of Barak's top negotiator, Gilead Sher, *B'Merchak Negia* (*Within Touch*) (Tel Aviv: *Yediot Ahronot* Publishers, 2001), p. 398.

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Israeli Foreign Minister Shlomo Ben-Ami and Palestinian negotiator Ahmed Qurei shake hands on January 21, 2001 at Taba.

had agreed that Israel could retain two settlement blocs that would contain the highest concentration of settlements, as well as Jewish neighborhoods in East Jerusalem. One would be Gush Etzion, an area adjacent to Bethlehem that had been inhabited by Israelis until the eve of the 1948 war, when they were wiped out by the Arab Legion and Arab irregulars. The second was Ariel, located not far from the Tel Aviv suburbs. Regarding a third settlement area adjacent to Jerusalem called Maaleh Adumim, the largest settlement in the West Bank, Palestinian negotiators had been divided. Some were prepared to view Maaleh Adumim as included in those Jewish neighborhoods in East Jerusalem that would become Israeli, while others disagreed.[6]

At Taba, the Palestinians had a change of heart about all this, but one that *widened* the gaps. They agreed that Israel could annex the settlements in these blocs but not the blocs themselves, since they did not want to include a single interspersed Palestinian village inside of Israel. In other words, Israel would have to uproot at least 100,000 people, but the Palestinians would not allow even a single Palestinian to become an Israeli citizen, let alone be forced to move. As Ben-Ami later told *Ha'aretz*,

> they presented a counter-map that totally eroded the three already shrunken [settlement] blocs and effectively voided the whole bloc concept of content. According to their map, only a few isolated settlements would remain, which would be dependent on thin strings of narrow access roads.

The Palestinians also retrogressed in a second manner. They argued that Efrat, Gush Etzion's main population area with several thousand inhabitants, should be eliminated. So instead of moving toward the Israelis at Taba, the Palestinians pulled back from their stated position at Camp David, as two settlement blocs became a cluster and a half.

Furthermore, the Palestinians insisted on getting Latrun—a small "no-man's land" along the armistice lines from the 1948 war. Latrun was the site of a critical battle when Jerusalem was under siege, isolated and without access to food and other essential supplies. The battle at Latrun re-opened the supply lines to the city. Today the area virtually sits on the Jerusalem-Tel Aviv highway, and near the rail line linking the two cities.

Finally, the divergence between the sides reflected itself in overall territorial ratios. As noted, the Palestinians refused to be bound by the Clinton parameters. The map they presented has been described as one in which Israel would keep 2.34 percent or 3.1 percent of the territories. Yet even this miniscule amount was not a compromise, since the Palestinians insisted that the number to be retained by Israel add to zero, with swaps of territory inside sovereign Israel

[6]Interview with Dennis Ross, January 3, 2003.

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making up the difference. The Palestinians justified the insistence on their getting 100 percent by citing Israel's full withdrawal from Sinai in a peace treaty with Egypt. The Barak government had agreed to the idea of providing land "swaps" inside pre-1967 Israel to boost the Palestinian percentage, but it also wanted Palestinian consideration of long-term leasing arrangements of very limited land, since it would otherwise be impossible to consolidate a Jewish settlement bloc without including Palestinian villages within it. The Palestinian response was, "yield the land first, and then we will consider."

DISAGREEMENTS over land were joined by disagreements over Jerusalem. Arafat had rejected the idea at Camp David that Israel and the Palestinians would share the Temple Mount—known as *Haram al-Sharif* ("The Noble Sanctuary") to Muslims—and insisted on full Palestinian sovereignty. Despite this, everyone knew that dealing with the question of holy sites in Jerusalem required a creative formula. Ideas abounded during and after Camp David, including reserving sovereignty only for God. Finally, in contravention of the policy of every Israeli government since 1967 and, at the time, even in contravention of Barak, Foreign Minister Ben-Ami said he would be content if the Palestinians would merely acknowledge the Temple Mount as a site holy to Jews. He even asked Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erekat during talks at Bolling Air Force Base in December 2000 if he would agree to language that there would be no unilateral Palestinian archeological excavations since this place is holy to Jews. Erekat refused. Ben-Ami recalled, "Erekat said we won't excavate, but we won't write anything about the area being holy to the Jews."[7]

Taba did not produce any documents, so exactly what happened there regarding Jerusalem is not entirely clear. The transcript drawn up by Europe's Middle East peace envoy, Miguel Moratinos, is based on subsequent talks with a few Israeli and Palestinian participants. The best Moratinos could get was that "the Israeli side understood" they had a Palestinian concession, such as sovereignty over the Jewish Quarter of the Old City of Jerusalem. It is not stated by the Palestinian side, however. Even with the widest stretch of the Moratinos document, key explosive issues like Palestinian sovereignty in Jerusalem holy sites remained unresolved. As noted above, even the optimist Moratinos wrote that, overall, "serious gaps remain."[8]

[7]Conversation with Shlomo Ben-Ami, June 12, 2001.

[8]The Moratinos document matters because a previous document, drafted by Beilin and Abu Mazen on November 1, 1995 without authorization (at least on the Israeli side), was heralded as a blueprint for peace that "proved" that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was solvable. But Abu Mazen and Arafat immediately disavowed it, and when senior Clinton Administration officials urged in advance of Camp David that the summit be based on it, they were rebuffed by the Palestinian side. Yet the Beilin-Abu Mazan document did have utility for the Palestinians. As Hassan Abdel Rahman, PLO representative in Washington, explained to me: "We used 'Beilin-Abu Mazen' as our guide in understanding what the Israelis would put forward at Camp David. When the Israelis raised the idea of the Temple Mount as being important to them at Camp David, one of the reasons we rejected it was because it did not appear in Beilin-Abu Mazen. If this idea that there was once a Jewish Temple was so important, why didn't it appear? We figured it could not be so important to Israelis." In other words, Israeli concessions in past negotiations formed a baseline for future negotiations, but the Palestinians themselves were not bound by

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The Palestinians also rejected the idea that Israel would have sovereignty over the 480-meter Western Wall, but hinted that Israel could have sovereignty over the exposed part—about a sixth of it—which is the smaller area that the Palestinians have misdefined as the Wailing Wall. Yet this figure never made it into Moratinos' summary of the talks: "The Palestinian side acknowledged that Israel has requested to establish an affiliation to the holy parts of the Western Wall." It continues to distinguish between this and the Wailing Wall.

Finally, on the issue of Jerusalem, the basis at Camp David for negotiations regarding the Old City and the surrounding areas such as the Mount of Olives was that all this area would be a "Holy Basin" where a special regime would be enforced, and where no side would have full sovereignty. The Palestinians rejected this idea outright at Taba. Emboldened by earlier Israeli concessions, they now insisted that the entire area be under exclusive Palestinian sovereignty except for the Jewish Quarter and parts of the Wall. In a speech in Gaza three months later, Arafat declared that the Palestinians were justified in not accepting Taba since, among other factors, the Palestinians would not hold a "century of struggle" and still not obtain exclusive sovereignty over the Temple Mount area.[9]

A THIRD REASON Taba failed was the highly-charged issue of refugees. Yossi Beilin, who headed the Israeli side of the refugee talks at Taba, likes to say that Taba represented progress because the refugee issue was the one issue on which actual drafting was done. But that drafting did not resolve the future of the refugees; it dealt only with the past. This is an important and sensitive issue, for the Palestinians see the question of historic responsibility for the birth of the refugee issue in 1948 as vital to their national narrative. The focus of the drafting was the loaded question of who was responsible for triggering the Palestinian refugee problem over fifty years ago. Beilin subsequently wrote that "we were very close to an agreement concerning the story of the creation of the refugee problem, which described the Israeli approach and the Palestinian approach to the issue, and their common denominator."[10]

Beilin has not divulged this "common denominator" formula, but his Palestinian counterpart, Nabil Sha'ath, said progress at Taba involved Israel accepting partial responsibility for the birth of the refugee problem, an assessment that Beilin has denied. But the Moratinos document notes that the Israeli side did put forward "a suggested joint narrative for the tragedy of the Palestinian refugees." This suggestion was apparently deemed insufficient by Palestinian standards, since the Moratinos document says that "no agreement was reached in an attempt to develop a historical narrative in the general text."[11]

Harder than dealing with the past was

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their own concessions. The Palestinians were thus very careful about what they told Moratinos regarding Taba.

[9]Arafat's remarks in Gaza, WAFA/Palestine News Agency, May 20, 2001.

[10]Beilin in Bitterlemons.org, December 31, 2001.

[11]Interestingly, Israeli "new historian" Benny Morris believes Israel should be unyielding on this issue. Morris was pilloried by members of the Israeli academic establishment when he questioned the classic Zionist narrative that all the Palestinians fled, noting that many were indeed expelled during the heat of battle. Yet, it is the same Morris who said about this issue in an interview with *Yediot Ahronot* on November 23, 2001, "I revealed to the Israelis the truth of what happened in 1948, the historic facts. But the Arabs are the ones who started the fighting. They started the shooting. So why should I take responsibility? The Arabs started the war, they are responsible."

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the future. Unrestricted immigration of Palestinian refugees to the new state of Palestine was agreed at Camp David; the main issue at Taba was whether refugees were entitled to live in *two* states: Israel as well as Palestine. Palestinian moderate Sari Nusseibeh told an academic audience in Jerusalem in the fall of 2002 that it would be "crazy" for Israel to allow the Palestinians to immigrate to *two* countries. But the Palestinians usually argue that they seek only a symbolic return of Palestinian refugees to sovereign Israel. The majority would be settled in the new state of Palestine, in third countries or in the country of current residence through a variety of procedures that would minimize in practice the number of refugees. Yet this is not what the Palestinians proposed at Taba. Even Beilin admitted that no deal was reached:

> Specific sums of [compensation] money were not agreed upon, nor was the actual number of refugees which would be permitted to come to Israel. However, the distance under dispute between the parties was narrowed substantially, and the Palestinian side agreed that the number of refugees must be such that it would not damage Israel's character as a Jewish country.[12]

It is telling that Beilin's optimist sense that a deal over the refugee issue was near has not been echoed by Arafat, Sha'ath or Moratinos. The Israeli position entering the talks was that Israel could admit 25,000 refugees as a symbolic gesture. This was not acceptable to the Palestinians.[13] Beilin has written that he offered to admit 25,000 refugees during the first three years of a 15-year period, thereby hinting the figure could increase fivefold in the subsequent dozen years. Beilin subsequently admitted that the 15 year idea was not suggested by Barak or reached in consultation with him. Sha'ath hinted to Beilin that he wanted to bring "six figures" to Arafat, but there is no evidence to suggest that even this would have been acceptable to the "old man." A Western diplomat added: "Sha'ath told me that Abu Mazen would accept 100,000 refugees, but he said there is no indication that Arafat would accept it at all. There was no deal." Palestinian negotiating documents from Taba say that there was no modification of the Palestinian position.[14]

As always, the key remained with Arafat, who declared: "Return is a sacred right. People are fooling themselves if they think that can be renounced in exchange for a handful of dollars", alluding to a $30 billion package. This is not just rhetoric. Arafat's struggle for Palestine predates Israel's winning the West Bank and Gaza in 1967, and his comrades-in-arms and main constituency have always been the 1948 refugees. Even a year later when interviewed on this topic, Arafat said publicly what he has said

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[12]Beilin in Bitterlemons; author's interview with Beilin in Tel Aviv, June 2001.

[13]A *Le Monde Diplomatique* text makes clear that the Palestinians wanted no limits on the right of return to sovereign Israel. The Palestinian position paper states, "All refugees who currently reside in Lebanon and choose to exercise the right of return shall be enabled to return to Israel within two years of the signing of this agreement. Without prejudice to the right of every refugee to return to Israel, a minimum of XX [*sic*] refugees will be allowed to return to Israel annually. The exercise of the right of return subsequent to such declaration shall not be limited in time."

[14]Sha'ath told *Al-Quds* on January 26, just after Taba broke up: "The Palestinian side did not discuss the Israeli proposal to hand out questionnaires to the refugees in which they would be given the opportunity to choose between return and compensation. The Israelis can say whatever they want, but the starting point of all of our discussions is the refugees' absolute and sacred Right of Return."

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many times since Taba, that he wanted to "begin with my brothers and beloved refugees of Lebanon", making it clear that it would not end there.[15]

Chasm

THE IDEA that the parties were on the verge of a deal at Taba is fantasy. After the talks concluded, Abu Ala'a told *Al-Ayyam* that "there has never before been a clearer gap in the positions of the two sides." Saeb Erekat concurred, telling the Palestinian daily *Al-Quds* that Taba "emphasized the size of the gap between the positions of the two sides and the depth of the disagreements, primarily on the subjects of Jerusalem and the refugees." (During Taba, Arafat's top security aide for Gaza, Mohammed Dahlan, told the media the talks were "*harta barta*", a very derisive Arabic slang expression; he subsequently apologized for his language.)

In the two years since Taba, countless diplomatic entourages, including those from members of the Quartet, have pleaded with Arafat to compromise on several key thorny issues. He has not done so. Indeed, Arafat's own words refute the revisionism surrounding Taba, and his actions ever since confirm those words. In remarks made in Gaza three months after Taba, he rhetorically asked, "Did we miss the chance given to us in Camp David and Taba?" After ticking off possible compromise ideas floated around at the time, Arafat declared, "we didn't and will not accept such things."[16] If Arafat had wanted to conclude a deal comparable to terms discussed at Taba in the subsequent two years, he could have stolen world attention (and won a second Nobel Peace Prize?), set in motion the collapse of the Sharon government, driven a wedge between the United States and Israel, and ended his own *persona non grata* status in the Oval Office. His silence speaks volumes.

As suggested above, there are two ways to view Arafat's behavior since Camp David. One is that his refusal to compromise is a bid to gain the best possible deal from Israel, and it follows that he ultimately would agree to end the conflict if the terms were right. In the meantime, his refusal to compromise on core issues is a survival mechanism at a time when intramural Palestinian politics, as usual, are fractious and potentially bloody. Many observers are sure that this view is correct, and this includes most European and many professional American diplomats. Because they are sure that this is so, these observers can, rightfully in their own minds, blame the present Israeli government for not being sufficiently accommodating in order to achieve peace.

The other way to interpret Arafat's behavior is through the prism of ideology, or, put a bit differently, by taking Arafat's professed worldview seriously. In this view, it is not accidental that Arafat never prepared his public for compromise in key areas throughout the Oslo period; it was because he never intended any real compromise. He genuinely believes in the Palestinian right of exclusive control over Jerusalem's holy sites and the right of as many refugees as wish to do so to live in Israel. He is in no hurry to end the conflict short of achieving these goals. He does not define success by what he can obtain territorially and economically, but by what he has not yielded ideologically.

In this view, therefore, the peace process has failed not because of problems of communication or misjudgment, but due to irreconcilable visions. That process has never been about classic conflict resolution, dominated by a mix of pragmatism and bargaining. From Arafat's point of

[15]Arafat interview with Beirut-based LBC Satellite Television Network, December 31, 2001.

[16]Arafat's remarks in Gaza, WAFA/Palestine News Agency, May 20, 2001.

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view, these negotiations have functioned as a tool of a revolutionary who views the idea of splitting the difference on issues of core principle as a sin unpardonable by his ultimate judge—history. Indeed, as this point of view insists, Arafat believes that to compromise in areas such as Jerusalem and refugees would mean accepting Israel's moral legitimacy. This he will never do, and this is why Camp David and Taba had to fail.

If this second view of Arafat is correct, then peace is clearly not possible as long as he remains the leader of the Palestinians. This is the view shared by the present Israeli prime minister and the White House, and the evidence suggests that this second view is the correct one. Arafat evidently cannot bring himself to accept the Jewish right to national self-determination. He has *never* spoken of legitimate Jewish national rights, and he has never admitted that there ever was a Temple in Jerusalem, since doing so would admit that there are deep historic Jewish roots in the land, and that Israel is not merely a Western-concocted post-Holocaust phenomenon. It is telling that in a speech to the UN Racism conference in Durban, South Africa in September 2001, Arafat blasted Israel for practicing "apartheid" and then broadly hinted that Israel's existence was not legitimate, but the "result of the rivalry and conspiracies of the colonialist forces in the region at that time." This is why Arafat seems to think that history is his ally. In a post-Camp David whirlwind diplomatic tour, Arafat stopped in Jakarta on August 16, 2000, where Indonesia's former president, Abdurrahman Wahid, urged him to end the conflict with Israel. The reply? "Arafat confessed to me that in a hundred years, Israel will disappear. So why hurry to recognize it?"[17]

The issue of the moral legitimacy of a Jewish state is not just a theoretical issue but a central practical one, since any deal reached will require the Palestinian mainstream to engage in an ongoing confrontation with irredentist rejectionists among them in order for peace and stability to be maintained. If Israel lacks moral legitimacy in the eyes of the Palestinian leadership, true moderates can never win an internal Palestinian struggle.

IN LIGHT OF all this, it is curious how the Taba myth has taken hold among Arab, European and some American elites. Perhaps diplomats needed to present Taba as a success, or as merely a "process problem" that could easily be overcome, since alternative conclusions were too painful to countenance. If Arafat could not accept even a very generous peace deal, further negotiations would be futile, confrontation inevitable, and the need to find alternative Palestinian leadership as daunting as it was inescapable.

There is also a less charitable explanation. Taba represents the most concessionary of all Israeli proposals tabled so far, so to say that it nearly succeeded works as a means to establish Taba as a baseline for the next round. In other words, those not positively disposed toward Israel may well see the myth of Taba as a way to increase pressure against it, whether or not there is ever a final status agreement. Indeed, for some unreconstructed Nasserites in the Arab world, an insistence on Taba is an assurance that no peace deal will ever be signed, except one that it is utterly unworkable. If one believes, as Arafat seems to, that time works against Israeli survival, than pretending that Taba was a close call makes perfect sense. It precludes the end of the conflict and makes it look like Israel is the obstacle to peace.

In the wake of President Bush's June 24, 2002 call for Arafat's removal almost two years after Taba, and amid growing

[17]Wahid interview, *Yediot Ahronot*, May 10, 2002.

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calls from Palestinians for reform, history may nevertheless get a reprieve. Most Israelis and Palestinians know that a two-state solution is inevitable, and it will probably come close in the end to the Clinton parameters. Specifically, it must be clear that Palestinian refugees can go to Palestine, not Israel, lest Israel lose its Jewish character. Moreover, there must be agreement on a formula that avoids exclusive sovereignty over the Temple Mount in Jerusalem so that the religious sensitivities of both sides are preserved. Finally, it must be clear that this deal ends the conflict between these two peoples and that each respects the moral legitimacy of the other's national project.

Unlike Arafat, many Palestinian negotiators have privately supported an honorable compromise with Israel. For its part, the Israeli public has repeatedly demonstrated that when there is hope for peace, it will support far-reaching concessions—and it will elect a new government to make those concessions if that is what is required. Getting there will be harder now thanks to the mistrust that has accrued during the past two years of violence. Nonetheless, new leadership among the Palestinians in the wake of a successful campaign against Iraq might well bring us to a tipping point—but that tipping point will fall the wrong way if the Taba myth is not dispelled. It does not represent a tragically missed model for a stable and sustainable peace. Properly understood, it reveals the roots of failure, and the motives of those who see failure in much too positive a light. □

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Books

Imperialism: The Highest Stage of American Capitalism?

Gideon Rose

Andrew J. Bacevich, *American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 320 pp., $29.95.

WHEN THE dust from the Soviet Union's collapse was still settling, the future of the international system seemed up for grabs. Now that bipolarity has given way to unipolarity, parsing the behavior of the hegemon is clearly the order of the day—and this is the task Andrew Bacevich sets for himself in *American Empire*. His study is really two books in one. The first, a description of post-Cold War American foreign policy that stresses continuity over change, is impressive and persuasive. The second, an attempt to explain this record with reference to an expansionary logic supposedly inherent in America's domestic political economy, is not.

Bacevich begins by noting how conventional wisdom views the end of the Cold War as a dramatic turning point in the history of American foreign policy. It rendered the country's old grand strategy of containment obsolete, this story runs, forcing policymakers to come up with a replacement appropriate to a new and turbulent era—something they failed to do during the 1990s. Hogwash, he says; in recent years "the United States has in fact adhered to a well-defined grand strategy", which is "to preserve and . . . expand an American imperium." Far from being an improvisation, moreover, this strategy "derives directly from U.S. principles and practices elaborated and implemented during and even before the Cold War."

Bacevich is not the first to make this case, but he does it at length and convincingly. Partisan posturing leads political players on all sides to exaggerate the differences between one administration and the next, he argues, and journalists and historians tend to follow suit, treating each presidency as a distinct and separate phenomenon. But this obscures the broad similarities in approach that lie beneath the surface. Bush *père*, Clinton and Bush *fils* have all drawn on a common playbook, one that stresses global-

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ization and interdependence as the key features of the contemporary world, free trade and open markets as the chief goals of U.S. policy, and American military hegemony as the guarantor of international stability. The "Big Idea" tying all of this together is

> openness: the removal of barriers to the movement of goods, capital, people, and ideas, thereby fostering an integrated international order conducive to American interests, governed by American norms, [and] regulated by American power.

In support of this thesis Bacevich pulls together a broad range of public statements by officials in all three administrations, showing that there is indeed a consistent rhetorical and ideological core to U.S. foreign policy thinking. And he links this to a basic set of policies, demonstrating that what unites Executive Branch decision-makers from both parties is more significant than what divides them. Only people who do not know the game, therefore, are surprised when their favorite presidential candidate sheds his inflammatory campaign rhetoric about China or Russia or nation-building or whatever and embraces the previous guy's positions once ensconced in office.

Befitting his status as a retired U.S. Army colonel, Bacevich is particularly insightful on military issues, and is an excellent guide to the difficulties the defense establishment has had in coming to terms with the new international environment. Trained and equipped to fight large conventional wars, the American armed forces have instead found themselves pressed into service in a variety of "imperial policing" missions around the globe. As the services fight off attempts at radical military transformation and grumble openly about civilian interference, Washington relies increasingly on modern versions of the "gunboats and Gurkhas" used by imperial powers a century ago. And at the cutting edge of this new/old system are the regional commanders-in-chief, operating as "proconsuls" responsible for the routine management of the Pax Americana.

FOR HELP IN explaining all of this—most of which he finds distasteful—Bacevich turns to two dissenting historians from decades past, Charles A. Beard and William Appleman Williams. Both have been deservedly pilloried over the years, he says, for botching the great foreign policy issues of their own times, the fights against Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, respectively. But they are still worth reading, for while they may have been wrong about our enemies, they were right about *us*. They understood that the true and permanent source of American foreign policy lies within, and cautioned against its all-consuming lust. Looking over their shoulders, Bacevich claims, we can see three great truths about recent events:

> First, that U.S. foreign policy remained above all an expression of domestically generated imperatives; second, that economic expansionism abroad, best achieved by opening the world to trade and foreign investment, was a precondition of America's own well-being and therefore the centerpiece of U.S. strategy; and third, that [officials believed] the cause of peace was best served by the United States' occupying a position of unquestioned global preeminence.

The strategy of "openness" that the United States has recently pursued, therefore, is neither new nor surprising; it merely "adapt[s] the logic of empire to suit the needs of democratic capitalism."

Since contemporary American primacy does indeed raise certain echoes of empires past, a sophisticated theoretical treatment that compared the two would be welcome. Unfortunately, this book is

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not it. Ignoring the vast literatures on these topics in both diplomatic history and international relations, Bacevich simply replaces one set of naive shibboleths (that American foreign policy is an innocent reaction to outside threats) with another (that it emerges from the machinations of desperate capitalists). In academic terms, he has moved from traditionalism to revisionism without continuing on to the post-revisionist syntheses taught at the end of the semester.

His retrograde theory has two fatal flaws: it explains too little and too much. Bacevich fails to establish clear and convincing links between cause and effect, spending almost no time, for example, tracing the actual process by which domestic economic interests supposedly guide American foreign policy decision-making to outcomes consistent with their preferences. This is odd, since many of the policies he tries to explain—such as the costly interventions in the dirt-poor backwaters of Bosnia, Somalia, Haiti, Kosovo and Afghanistan—have produced no apparent economic benefits.

He also fails to consider why other rich countries today do not display the same neo-imperial drive. Germany and Japan are far more dependent on exports than the United States, so if there were indeed any connection inherent in "democratic capitalism" between internal growth, external markets and expansive foreign policies, the crews on many of the gunboats should be speaking rather different tongues.

That such a simplistic theory turns out to be problematic should come as no surprise, since these and other difficulties have bedeviled similar economic accounts of empire for a century. It is thus no accident, one might say, that the authors whose works Beard and Williams drew on—Hobson, Lenin, Hilferding and the rest, unmentioned in these pages—have long been relegated to the remainder bins. As the German historian Wolfgang Mommsen noted a quarter of a century ago,

> there is no foundation in the old thesis, originally accepted by bourgeois as well as Marxist writers, that expansionist opportunities are necessary to the preservation of capitalism. Indeed the difficulties of the modern world are partly due to the fact that this is not so. The reluctance of private capital to invest in third-world countries is no less notorious than the disinclination of industrialists to consider the economic advantages of the periphery when choosing a site for an industrial plant.

A MORE satisfying theoretical treatment of America's post-Cold War activities would therefore start by distinguishing among three distinct aspects of the policies in question—their ends, means and scale. Bacevich is right to look inside the country to understand the first—even if his particular economic explanation is wrong. But such solipsistic navel-gazing cannot account for the second and third aspects, which emerge from the interaction between the country and the international system at large.

What Bacevich and many others have a hard time grasping is that America's active role in world affairs has not been a quest for power but a reflection of it. The strong do what they can, Thucydides noted, and the relative strength of the United States has been growing steadily for more than two centuries. Today it is very strong indeed, and in such circumstances the surprise would be not something resembling an American empire, but the modesty and humble isolation that critics so often recommend instead.

Born free, from colonial times onward Americans have rarely doubted that their liberal institutions offered a generalizable template for human happiness and prosperity. Debate has centered primarily on whether to let others discover this on their own or push them to

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see the light.[1] When the nation was young and relatively weak, it favored a modest view of its mission, protecting and advancing its material interests as necessary, but going not abroad in search of monsters to destroy. As its power grew, however, so did its ambitions, and it began to wonder whether its destiny might involve more than serving as a liberal role model and cheerleader.

By the end of the First World War the United States was the system's strongest player, allowing Woodrow Wilson to use the nation's decisive intervention in the war as a springboard for an attempt to create a global liberal order. His failed efforts left the country chastened, but developments over the next two decades set the stage for a second try. Chief among these developments were the emergence of aggressive tyrannies from the turmoil of the Great Depression, which left American officials further convinced that liberal politics and economics were connected both at home and abroad; and the continued rise in relative U.S. power, which left them better able to translate such thoughts into action.

When the country found itself dragged into war once again, therefore, it embarked on two battles simultaneously. The first was a struggle *against* the Axis, designed to destroy the regimes that posed an immediate threat. The second was a struggle *for* a liberal international order, designed to provide the United States and the world with lasting peace and security. Planning for the postwar era was based on the conviction that making the world over in America's image—liberal, democratic, capitalist—would serve everyone. What American policymakers did not foresee was how the Soviet Union would refuse to cooperate, and how a weak and devastated Europe could not be left to fend for itself. If the negative struggle ended in 1945, therefore, America's second, positive struggle continued long after, as it gradually accepted the need to engage the world in order to save it.

The officials who devised the Bretton Woods institutions, the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, NATO and the remainder of the postwar international architecture never planned to embark on a course of permanent, massive intervention abroad. They wanted and expected their new order to emerge without much effort. In the event, however, the combination of America's burgeoning domestic strength and other nations' weakness inexorably pulled America's interests and commitments outward, and the rest was history.

The record of American foreign policy in recent years has followed precisely the same pattern. Containment proved to be a slow-motion reprise of the negative struggle against the Axis, a battle to rid America and the world of yet another aggressive despotism. And it was complemented during its lifespan by a positive struggle to sustain and expand the ever-more integrated liberal order. The demise of the Soviet Union ended the first struggle, but barely affected the second.

In the 1990s, American policymakers thus found themselves once again adrift in an unexpected and unfamiliar setting. Standing alone at the top of the international system, with no significant challengers to American primacy remaining, their reflexive instinct was to follow the universal logic of the postwar settlement to its natural conclusion, extending the attitudes and institutions of liberal order to the remainder of the globe. Yet no one really knew how long the "unipolar moment" would last, and there seemed little interest at home in spending large amounts of blood and treasure on foreign adventures. The result was the muddling through recounted in Bacevich's

[1]Robert Tucker drew the matter well in "Exemplar or Crusader? Reflections on America's Role", *The National Interest* (Fall 1986).

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pages, as the country's foreign policy establishment tried to keep history rolling forward in its grooves—but without causing anybody, least of all ourselves, too much trouble.

AND THEN came September 11, which changed everything—or did it? In many ways the debate over the "war on terrorism" is *déjà vu* all over again. Reprising the traditionalist interpretation of the origins of the Cold War, many observers now see the Bush Administration's moves in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere as a simple reaction to a new set of pressing external threats. Others reprise the revisionist stance, arguing that the administration has seized on the attacks as a pretext for doing what it wanted to do anyway, which was to expand its global writ at others' expense. The outcome will be perpetual war for perpetual peace, say these critics, as the new imperialism generates ever-greater resistance from a world unwilling to submit to American domination.

As was true in the earlier debate, each of these perspectives glimpses part of the picture, but neither does justice to what is actually going on. That is because neither adequately addresses the interaction between America's relative power, its ideals and its behavior. Both omit the crucial fact that in the years between the collapse of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the Twin Towers the United States pulled even further ahead of the rest of the pack, becoming in both economic and military terms not just the strongest power in the system but the strongest state in the modern history of international politics. This massive power potential was bound to express itself eventually in a comparably ambitious world role, although just when and how remained to be seen.

In retrospect, therefore, 9/11 may well take its place in the history books alongside the 1950 communist invasion of South Korea, as a catalyst that intensified and militarized a new phase of international politics—this one characterized by American unipolarity. Just as the outbreak of the Korean War gave life and money to a script for postwar order that had been largely written but not yet produced, so the attacks on New York and Washington have galvanized the nation into accepting the lead role in the post-Cold War world that it had previously eschewed. The Bush Administration's much-discussed *National Security Strategy*, from this perspective, is notable less for its intellectual innovations than for its open (and tactless) proclamation of this new state of affairs. It reflects the new ideological superstructure that follows naturally from the new material base.

So where does this leave us? Neotraditionalists have trouble accepting that America is indeed now a colossus. Neorevisionists have trouble accepting that the country's strength can be, and in the past generally has been, a force for good. The truth is that today's officials, like their predecessors half a century ago, are neither innocent heroes nor scheming villains. They are ordinary people in extraordinary circumstances, struggling under enormous pressure to expand the frontiers of a global political and economic order that has, over several decades, helped more people taste freedom and prosperity than in all previous history. Whether they can approach this challenge with appropriate prudence and wisdom, using the immense power at their disposal responsibly so as to replicate their forebears' large successes while avoiding their occasional mistakes, remains to be seen. □

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Suffering

Alan J. Kuperman

David Rieff, *A Bed for the Night: Humanitarianism in Crisis* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002), 384 pp., $26.

"BLURBING" is the publishing world's term for soliciting advance reviews from an author's colleagues for inclusion on a trade book's back cover. Since only favorably disposed colleagues are solicited, the vast majority of "blurbs", unsurprisingly, are raves. Warning flares should therefore go up whenever blurbs are decidedly lukewarm, as they are for David Rieff's *A Bed for the Night: Humanitarianism in Crisis*. Three of its five blurbs are anything but rave endorsements. "I do not agree with all of Rieff's judgments", says Brian Urquhart, former UN Undersecretary General and widely acknowledged as a creator of UN peacekeeping. Nobel laureate Nadine Gordimer says, "I disagree with some of his conclusions", and longtime human rights advocate Aryeh Neier invites the reader to "agree or disagree with Rieff."

When such critiques are the most favorable comments a publisher can solicit, there is usually a reason. And in this case there certainly is: despite saying very little—and saying it with mind-numbing repetition—Rieff manages to contradict himself so often that it leaves the reader shell-shocked in confusion and muttering in complaint. The only message that comes through clearly is that David Rieff is a frustrated fellow. He claims to be frustrated by the state of humanitarian intervention, something that in theory could be improved. But most readers will see that the roots of Rieff's frustration actually lie in the stubborn realities of human nature and international politics, which are not likely to be ameliorated anytime soon.

RIEFF'S MAIN thesis is that there is a contradiction between "humanitarianism" and politics—even liberal politics motivated by human rights concerns. Thus, for Rieff, the growth of humanitarian intervention over the last three decades, and especially the 1990s, may have been a triumph of liberal politics, but it has left humanitarianism as a vocation essentially dead. This is an outcome he deeply mourns.

Readers may be forgiven for asking what in the world Rieff is talking about. The last decade has witnessed more humanitarian intervention, more funding for such efforts, and more claims of an international right (even a responsibility) for such intervention than ever before in human history. But, for Rieff, this is not humanitarianism because it has become entangled with politics. The key to understanding this puzzle is Rieff's definition of humanitarianism—which he never sets out in one place, but which can be gleaned nevertheless from the text. Pure humanitarianism exists when individual citizens, of their own volition and using their own funds, give medical assistance or food to people who need it without consideration of the politics in either their own state or that of the recipients. As he puts it, "Aid should be fundamentally apolitical and should have no other agenda than service and solidarity."

Rieff's most useful contribution here is to provide a typology and evolutionary history of humanitarian organizations. He divides these organizations into three categories, based on the extent to which they fit or stray from his definition of pure

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humanitarianism. Closest to his humanitarian ideal is a single organization, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Although the ICRC was established by a political act—specifically by multilateral government action in the Geneva Convention of 1864—it satisfies Rieff's definition of humanitarianism in most other respects. Specifically, it maintains a strict political neutrality, providing food and medical care wherever it is needed regardless of political considerations, and it refuses even to share information with the media or national governments about the political conditions it observes during the course of its work.

By contrast, both of Rieff's other categories comprise organizations that focus not merely on treating human suffering but also on identifying and ameliorating its root political causes. The first type consists of groups, typically European, that have traditionally maintained strict independence from their own governments but have spoken out about the political causes of humanitarian suffering. Within this category, Rieff describes great variation in the willingness of European groups to engage in politics. Britain's Oxfam, he says, has always had an explicit socialist political agenda. The French group *Médecins Sans Frontières* (MSF), on the other hand, has engaged in politics reluctantly as a last resort. It was driven in this direction, Rieff explains, by cases in which pure humanitarianism was obviously ineffective or counterproductive in that it sustained the underlying political causes of human suffering by propping up oppressive governments or supporting inhumane rebel groups.

Rieff's final category is defined by groups that act in support of their national governments' humanitarian activities—which for Rieff are not really humanitarian at all by dint of their political genesis. These groups are typified by American refugee organizations during the Cold War such as the International Rescue Committee (IRC), which he disdains as little more than the "humanitarian arm of America's anti-Soviet struggle." He notes that European aid workers shared this view, deriding the organization as IR-CIA.

Starting from this typology, Rieff proceeds to blame the demise of humanitarianism on three trends that entangle the media, human rights advocacy and state interventionism together into an ugly, dysfunctional knot. He alleges that humanitarian organizations have made a devil's bargain with the media, starting with the Biafran war of the late 1960s. To garner resources for that relief effort, he says, the humanitarian organizations hit upon a formula that they have honed ever since. They package stories and images of human suffering for the Western media, who broadcast it back home. This, in turn, generates donations for the humanitarian organizations, thereby enabling them to provide relief and send representatives to the next crisis, where the cycle starts all over again.

The problem with this seemingly virtuous circle, Rieff points out, is that the tail has begun to wag the dog. Humanitarian organizations used to pick the conflicts in which to get involved based on an assessment of human suffering. But as media attention and funding for humanitarianism grew, the number of organizations proliferated rapidly, resulting in a Darwinian struggle among them for prominence and donations. The consequence of this process, says Rieff, is that aid efforts now tend to be focused on those conflicts that fascinate the Western media and public, not necessarily those where the need is most pressing. For instance, most relief work in the 1990s went to alleviate comparatively mild suffering in the Balkans—where the victims were white and threatened to flood the rest of Europe with refugees—while millions of black Africans died in conflicts from Sudan to Rwanda.

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Rieff's second villain in the decline of humanitarianism is the West's increasing emphasis on human rights in its foreign policies. This is likely to confuse those who believe that humanitarianism and human rights advocacy are essentially the same thing, or at least closely related—as they in fact are. According to Reiff, however, the promotion of human rights is antithetical to humanitarianism because it calls for imposing sanctions against recalcitrant states to compel them to treat their people better. Such sanctions block trade and development aid (although usually not emergency relief), and thereby may increase human suffering in the short run. This Rieff characterizes as directly contrary to the humanitarian ethos. In Afghanistan, for example, he charges that post-Taliban nation-building efforts "made a mockery of humanitarian principles by in effect holding aid to victims hostage to the good behavior of states." Thus, by partnering with human rights groups and even adopting their discourse in media campaigns, humanitarian organizations have made a second Faustian bargain: they may bolster their fundraising, but only at the cost of undermining the humanitarian essence of their work.

The final straw in the demise of humanitarianism, as Rieff sees it, is the increasing involvement of states themselves in humanitarian intervention. Contrary to most liberals, who applaud the advent of Western governments finally providing the financial and even military resources necessary for emergency relief, Rieff bemoans a distorted humanitarianism. Because states have now become the primary funders of major relief efforts, even formerly independent humanitarian organizations—the ICRC, Oxfam and MSF all included—have been reduced to suckling at the teat of the state, making them "effectively subcontractors of donor governments."

The problem is exacerbated, Rieff argues, by the fact that states have begun to label nearly all their interventions as "humanitarian", when invariably they are motivated by interests such as national security, reducing immigrant flows and promoting abstract and often ill-defined human rights—none of which satisfies his definition of humanitarianism. "These interventions invariably reveal mixed motives and hidden agendas", Rieff writes; as long as Western states pay the NGO piper, he implies, they will call a tune other than humanitarianism. Even when these military interventions support humanitarian objectives, Rieff insists that they still undermine the very soul of the enterprise: "A humanitarianism that supports the idea of war carried out in its name is unworthy of that name." The resort to force, he argues, is a "perversion of humanitarianism, which is neutral or it is nothing. . . . [I]magining that just wars can be joined with humanitarian imperatives is delusional and antihistorical."

There is some truth in this analysis, but there is nothing new about it. Scholars such as Richard K. Betts and the late Myron Weiner, and practitioners including Mary Anderson, John Prendergast and most eloquently Alexander de Waal, have long since laid out the dilemmas of humanitarian intervention. We have known for many years that humanitarian intervention is *never* politically neutral in the context of war, because food and medicine help not only civilians but also combatants. Thus, Rieff's holy grail—politically neutral humanitarianism—is a kind of intellectual unicorn: alluring and beautiful, but nonexistent.

PARTLY AS A result of its shaky logical foundation, *A Bed for the Night* suffers from numerous flaws of argumentation, and the reader must suffer along with them. Perhaps most impor-

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tant, despite implying throughout that something is very broken in the current state of humanitarianism, Rieff never offers a solution as to how to fix it, or even what the goal of remedial action should be. He criticizes humanitarian organizations both for engaging too much in politics and not enough. For example, after tarring American organizations as pawns of their government's anti-totalitarian efforts during the Cold War, and European organizations as distorted by their promotion of socialism and human rights, it seems that Rieff is about to argue for a return to pure humanitarianism. But instead, the organization that most rouses his ire is the ICRC, precisely because it practiced pure humanitarianism during World War II. When Red Cross workers discovered evidence of the Holocaust in progress, they deliberately hid it from the outside world on the grounds that divulging it would be a political act that could endanger their humanitarian activities. For Rieff, this is a mark of shame that the ICRC can never live down. But what it really shows is the moral failing of the pure humanitarianism that Rieff spends the rest of the book advocating.

Rieff never resolves this contradiction. The best he can offer is simply an assertion that the ultimate solution lies in addressing the root causes of internal conflict, such as inequality and lack of economic development. Accordingly, he calls for the West to increase substantially its overseas development assistance. But, as he himself acknowledges, "development aid has largely been a failure." Thus does one fundamental tension between analysis and prescription beget another.

Nor is it clear why Rieff has chosen the present moment to sound the death knell for humanitarianism. The West now spends more money to care for more people in need than ever before. The essential cosmopolitan humanitarian ideal—the belief that all people everywhere, regardless of their social or political differences from each other, are entitled to compassion and the fulfillment of their basic human needs—has moved from utopian fantasy to an embedded political norm. The *right* of humanitarian intervention, a radical break from three centuries of international relations, is now taken so much for granted that political debate now focuses on whether there is a *responsibility* to carry out such intervention. Remarkably, this is the context for Rieff's declaration that humanitarianism is dead.

It isn't dead, not least because Rieff exaggerates the extent to which humanitarian organizations have become pawns of governments. These groups do embrace government contracts where they can get them, usually in the high-profile emergencies that are also the ones pursued by Rieff and his media colleagues. But NGO coordination with governments and militaries in complex emergencies actually enhances the delivery of relief aid. These relief organizations also still perform vital work in dozens of lower profile cases, where they neither benefit significantly from nor are distorted much by Western governmental largesse and oversight. If Rieff is saying that such small efforts pale in significance to the higher-profile government-funded cases, then it is he, rather than any organization, that has strayed from the humanitarian ideal.

Nor is human rights advocacy contrary to humanitarianism. Who can deny that the primary causes of humanitarian emergencies are rapacious and incompetent governments that are unable or unwilling to protect their peoples' human rights? Since Rieff himself acknowledges that "most humanitarian emergencies have their origins in human rights abuses", it is frankly hard to understand his insistence that the two be decoupled. Admittedly, the promotion of human

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rights is no panacea, and can give rise to unintended consequences when carried out naively. But some form of such advocacy is unquestionably part of the long-term solution to alleviating human suffering. The challenge is how best to integrate humanitarian, human rights and traditional national interest objectives—not to pick between them as if they were mutually exclusive.

AT LEAST AS worrisome as the things Rieff gets wrong are the things he doesn't get at all. Among these, three stand out: the erosion of the norm of sovereignty, the logistical obstacles to effective humanitarian intervention, and the emerging challenge of moral hazard.

The norm of sovereignty persisted, after an admittedly shaky start, for over three centuries following its creation in the Treaty of Westphalia. During the past decade, however, it has been all but abandoned in the name of humanitarian intervention, with alarmingly little thought given to the unintended consequences. Supporters of this trend argue seductively that saving innocents from slaughter is more important than preserving a vestige of absolute monarchical rule. However, it is crucial to recall the historical logic in which the sovereignty norm arose. After decades of savage religious struggles, culminating in the carnage of the Thirty Years War, European statesmen realized that their pre-existing norm—waging war because one state did not like the domestic nature (usually the religion) of another—was a recipe for perpetual conflict. To avoid this fate, they agreed to reserve *casus belli*, the legitimate grounds for war, to the *external* actions of states. While this norm was sometimes breached over the centuries, it indisputably served as a brake on ideological wars.

To replace Westphalia, humanitarian interventionists have proposed the concept of "sovereignty as responsibility." States must earn the privilege of sovereignty by safeguarding their peoples' basic human rights; if they fail to do so, they surrender sovereignty to other states that may intervene militarily to restore those rights. The appeal of this notion is obvious but its practical utility is far less so, not least because states and societies do not agree on what comprises basic human rights.[1] Do they include the right of women not to wear a *burka* and not to be subject to female circumcision? In some places those are basic rights, but in others they would violate local norms. Thus, the warm and fuzzy notion of "sovereignty as responsibility" reveals itself as a radical departure that would eviscerate Westphalia and raise the prospect of a widespread return to religious or ideological wars.

To his credit, Rieff warns that "any decision to be consistent" about using military force to impose human rights norms "would commit the world to war without end." However, he then bemoans the fact that Western states lack the moral courage to join this "utopian" battle. This is astonishing. No reasonable person can be cheered by the prospect of perpetual ideological war—except perhaps Osama bin Laden. Yet Rieff apparently wishes the West would take up the gauntlet.

Rieff also omits all consideration of the practical obstacles to military intervention, factors that can inhibit effective intervention even when the political will for such efforts exists.[2] Three such

[1]This problem has been debated at length in these pages by Francis Fukuyama, Robin Fox and William Schulz. See the Winter 2000/01, Summer 2001 and Summer 2002 issues.

[2]Discussed in my *The Limits of Humanitarian Intervention: Genocide in Rwanda* (Washington, DC: Brookings, 2001).

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obstacles stand out: the startling speed at which atrocities can be carried out, the relatively slow pace with which intervention forces can be deployed to distant theaters, and the difficulty governments have acting upon advance warning while avoiding unacceptably high false-alarm rates. For example, in Rwanda, most of the 1994 genocide was perpetrated during its first three weeks. It took two of these three weeks for the West to figure out what was going on, and even if the political will for intervention had existed (which it did not), airlifting a sufficient force would have required more than a month, too late to prevent most of the killing.

Although the West had ample warning that something bad might happen at some point in both Rwanda and Kosovo, no one knew for sure if, what or when it might happen—or whether something even worse might happen first in Burundi, Macedonia or some other hot spot. In other words, as with Pearl Harbor or September 11, advance warning becomes obvious only in retrospect. It is of little use for Rieff and other critics to bemoan the absence of political will for humanitarian intervention without also addressing these devilish details about how we can actually carry out such intervention effectively.

Finally, although Rieff uses the term "moral hazard" twice in the book, it is not evident that he really understands what it means. Put simply, moral hazard is when efforts to ensure against risk inadvertently promote risk-taking behavior. For example, the U.S. government provides insurance to protect depositors against the risk of bank failure; but as a result depositors don't much care which insured bank they put their money in, so they wind up putting it in riskier banks than they otherwise might. Analogously, the "moral hazard of humanitarian intervention" signifies a situation in which international efforts to ensure people against genocide and ethnic cleansing inadvertently trigger these very atrocities.

The dynamic is simple: under ordinary circumstances, most disgruntled ethnic groups do not take up arms against the state because they fear ruthless retaliation. As a result, most states have no incentive to carry out genocide or ethnic cleansing against subordinate ethnic groups. But when the international community announces a policy of humanitarian intervention to protect ethnic groups against atrocities, it actually increases the incentive for these same groups to launch armed rebellions. Leaders of such groups now calculate that if their rebellion succeeds, they win; if it falters, some outside force will spare them the greater cost of defeat—so why not go for it? The tragic, unintended consequence of a policy of humanitarian intervention is thus to trigger more rebellion, which in turn provokes more ruthless retaliation by state authorities. Any credible analysis of humanitarian intervention today must at least discuss this dynamic. Rieff's does not.

A BED FOR THE NIGHT is not a coherent analysis but a series of fragmented musings by a very talented writer and reporter who wants to share his well-earned frustrations. Such a style can work in op-ed and short essay formats, where syncretic analysis is neither expected nor possible. But it falls flat in a book-length work, where emotional energy and a way with words cannot cover over a lack of intellectual rigor. □

Alan J. Kuperman is assistant professor of international relations at the School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Johns Hopkins University in Bologna, Italy. He is completing a book on the moral hazard of humanitarian intervention.

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"The Rudest Man I Ever Met"

Hume Horan

John Boykin, *Cursed is the Peacemaker* (Belmont, CA: Applegate Press, 2002), 512 pp., $29.95.

JOHN BOYKIN, a writer and communications consultant in San Francisco, has written a clear, detailed and well-organized tribute to one of the Foreign Service's heroes, Philip Habib. Boykin's tale of how Habib dislodged PLO fighters from war-torn Beirut conveys the excitement of a novel, but without distorting what was a most portentous reality. The extraction of the PLO from Lebanon could have turned into a massacre of the PLO by the Israeli Defense Forces and the Phalange militia, and it could have provoked a wider conflict involving Syria. Instead, thanks to Habib's drive, clear vision and the support of President Reagan, the PLO was on its way to Tunis on September 1, 1982. A grateful republic recognized Habib's work: in a White House ceremony, President Reagan awarded him the Presidential Medal of Freedom, making Habib the first career diplomat ever to receive the nation's highest civilian award.

Boykin captures well the twists and turns of the frustrating reality of the Middle East and, more clearly than any other book I have read, also the *process* of conflict management—how the right individual can, for a time, leave a mark on Middle Eastern realities. The core of the book deals with Habib's 1981–83 mission to Lebanon, Israel and Syria, describing in detail the PLO's extraction from Beirut as a first step toward further reduction of tensions in the area. The withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon and greater domestic autonomy for the Lebanese were supposed to ensue, but these steps never came to pass—for reasons beyond Habib's ability to influence or control. Lebanon's strong man, President Bashir Gemayel, was assassinated; his successor was weak and pliant before Israeli demands; and Syria's dictator, Hafez al-Asad, the final arbiter of events in Lebanon, opposed Washington's plans for the region. Throughout much of this period, moreover, the prime mover in Israeli policy toward Lebanon was Defense Minister Ariel Sharon. Sharon sought nothing less than an Israeli protectorate over Lebanon. His duplicity, nit-picking, and constant challenges to Habib would have broken a less doughty and pugnacious U.S. representative.

Although Habib gave as well as he got, his protracted mission—one of high-impact, no-pads diplomacy—took its toll. Over time, like any other tool, Habib was worn out. The Lebanese felt guilty in his presence, the Israelis resented his aggressive expertise, and the Syrians were always poised with their veto. Habib himself told the President and the Secretary of State, George Shultz, "I've run out my string."

Habib's exit came quickly. Secretary Shultz was eager to nail down a diplomatic success. He came to the area in late April 1983 and, on May 17, presided over an Israeli-Lebanese agreement. Shultz took much pride in "his agreement." U.S. diplomats, however, including Habib and the brilliant, blunt-spoken ambassador to Syria, Robert Paganelli, told Shultz that they regarded the agreement as so much waste paper—which it soon proved to be. Deputy National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane was then sent to the area to try to salvage something from Shultz's effort,

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but he had not mastered his brief. McFarlane was humiliated and savaged by Asad, while Habib (who had no advance warning of the McFarlane trip) submitted his resignation.

WHAT JUDGMENTS does Boykin help us to reach, both on Habib's work and on more expansive themes?

Habib brought a distinct personal style to U.S. Middle East diplomacy. As the son of a Syrian immigrant, he determined to make his mark in the Foreign Service by being the hardest-working, best-informed, most clear-spoken officer in the entire Service. Through a series of standard assignments, including that of political counselor in Vietnam, his judgment was prescient, and his bosses much appreciated advice and analysis that was blunt, expert, and that never ducked the all-important question, "Gentlemen, what are we going to do about it?" Americans can forever be proud that when the Korean military was about to make Korea's future president, Kim Dae-jung, literally "walk the plank", U.S. Ambassador Philip Charles Habib was there to stop them. Later, as Assistant Secretary for East Asian Affairs, Habib's clarity and directness were a refreshing astringent to the many anfractuous, dilatory and self-protective "action memorandums" making their way to the Department's Seventh Floor.



Philip Habib in 1981 CORBIS

Habib was also the U.S. government's consummate diplomatic troubleshooter, along with the late, great General Vernon Walters. Having played host to both these great men, I can honestly say that I would many times rather have had a visit by General Walters than one from Ambassador Habib. Walters was unfailingly supportive of U.S. ambassadors. He was the essence of good judgment, coupled with tact and good manners that extended even to the smallest children in the house. Through him spoke not only an administration, but decades of 20th-century American history. Habib, on the other hand, was described by one ambassador's wife as "the rudest man I ever met."

As one of the republic's best "special emissaries", Habib's successes and failures show the limitation of high-powered *ad hoc* diplomacy. Special emissaries can be effective if they receive strong support from the highest levels and if they are given clear "goals and objectives." There is another critical prerequisite, too: that their mission not be so prolonged that the novelty of their presence wears off, and they slide into the tar pit with the other local players. (One recalls Secretary of State Warren Christopher's interminable and fruitless shuttles through the Middle East that included 27 visits to Damascus—toward the end of which, one member of his party quipped, "The hotel stopped changing the sheets for us.") The Special Emissary's focus, of course, should also be inclusive—it should take in an area-wide issue, whose parts may fall within the area of responsibility of several regional embassies.

Looking back, one may fairly conclude that Habib—presented with an impossibly difficult Middle East conundrum—achieved results that, although partial, constituted a *personal* as well as a

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collective triumph. And in the Middle East, personality counts for a lot. Habib came with a reputation for expertise and personal toughness. He was also known as a straight shooter—someone who would give the same unvarnished opinion to each of the parties to the conflict. He was also an optimist who infected his colleagues with the belief that something could always be done about "it." He was pragmatic, but impatient with too much "laying groundwork." He'd say, "Forget the groundwork. Let's see if there isn't a little point of agreement we can reach", and then: "OK, let's see if we can build upon that."

Above all, Habib was tireless—and one important lesson we can draw from Boykin's account is that to be a successful Foreign Service Officer and a successful negotiator, you have to be enduring. Negotiating is as much a physical as it is an intellectual activity. Finally, one can say that Habib, without giving up anything of substance, worked well with Arabs. They found him quick and congenial. "*Dammo khafif*" ("His blood is warm"), they would say, meaning that he had the personal skills to be accepted even when he told his interlocutors frank and disagreeable things.

Habib seems to have had little life apart from his 16-hour workdays and his seven-day weeks. In thirty years he took only four vacations. The dinner table was Habib's solace and relaxation, but its excesses contributed to his recurrent heart problems and, ultimately, to his death in 1992. Habib gathered around himself a brilliant stable of younger officers, including Richard Holbrooke, Chris Ross, Frank Wisner, John Helble, Tony Lake, Peter Tarnoff, John Negroponte, Ryan Crocker and Ed Djeredjian. "Phil's boys" admired him unconditionally. Habib encouraged open give and take. His aides found the work always gripping, and knew their boss never asked more of them than he was prepared to give himself.

The story is told that one evening Habib's special assistant, John Helble, brought in a memorandum for him to sign. Helble had been working seven-day weeks for a year and a half. "Is it all right?", Helble asked. Habib replied, "I signed it, didn't I?" Helble responded, "Phil, do you realize that in 18 months, you've never said I was doing anything right?" Habib: "Do you think you'd still be here if you weren't?" Elsewhere Boykin quotes Habib as saying, "If you go home at five, and your wife is happy, you're not doing your job." One hears the voice and glimpses the style of Henry Kissinger, Habib's great friend.

Habib was also supported by a cadre of more senior and exceptionally able Foreign Service Officers: his deputy Morris Draper (my predecessor as political chief in Amman), Brandon Grove in Jerusalem, Robert Paganelli in Damascus, Bob Dillon in Beirut, Sam Lewis in Tel Aviv, and Nicholas Veliotes and Charles Hill in Washington. At home, and at each stop abroad, Habib could count on support and advice from colleagues who were as good as the U.S. government has produced for any region.

IN THE LARGER scheme of things, though, were Habib's accomplishments lasting? He may have reduced tensions between Israel and Lebanon by removing the PLO and its fighters to Tunis. But Lebanese political space was soon filled by the even more militant Hamas and Hizballah who still bedevil us—and Israel—today. Looking back, it seems clear that more lasting progress toward regional peace could only have come from a stronger and more persistent involvement by the U.S. government at its highest levels—including the President. But even then, there is something to the theory of ripeness: outsiders, no matter how strong and clever, cannot

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force local protagonists to make peace if they insist otherwise. After the April 1983 bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, and the October bombing of the Marine Corps barracks—in which 241 Marines were killed—there was a real aversion in Washington to a closer engagement with a set of issues that offered only conflict, political risk, much acrimon, and not much likelihood of success.

Phil Habib did more, tried more, and succeeded at more than perhaps any Foreign Service Officer of his generation. Those who want to understand not simply *what* he did for our country, but *how* he did it, should read Boykin's excellent book. It is more than a paean to Phil Habib; read properly it is a manual of sorts for his would-be successors. □

Hume Horan served as U.S. Ambassador to Cote d'Ivoire, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and Cameroon/ Equatorial Guinea. He retired from the Foreign Service in 1998.

Burying Nikita

Susan Eisenhower

William Taubman, *Khrushchev: The Man and His Era* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2002), 768 pp., $35.

FOR THE BABY boomers among us, Nikita Khrushchev was the personification of the "Soviet bogeyman", the nuke-wielding, shoe-banging premier who warned that he would bury us—we the grandchildren. I met him on my grandparents' Gettysburg sun porch in 1959, one afternoon in the midst of the Camp David summit. Khrushchev was affable, attentive and full of plans for the President's forthcoming trip to Moscow. I remember well his Santa Claus shape and his deep belly laugh; but I also remember being both intrigued and terrified by the things associated with him, from the screaming newspaper headlines to the duck-and-cover drills I endured at school.

Despite the menace Khrushchev seemingly posed to us in our youth, he has since that time been painted in more benign terms. In some circles he is seen as someone who tried to bring reform and enlightenment to the USSR before his time; a well-meaning man who just could not bring his hardliners along, in part—some have argued—because the United States would never slide him a break.

Those who have gone wobbly on the image of Nikita Khrushchev will find new stability in William Taubman's biography, *Khrushchev: The Man and His Era*. Taubman has done a masterful job of reminding us not only how complex a man Khrushchev was, but also how much blood he had on his hands, and what a wild ride it was in international relations while he was in power. Taubman takes us from Khrushchev's humble beginnings as the son of an illiterate peasant family through the end of his political career—covering both domestic politics and international relations. There is much fertile ground to cover, and no shortage of crises to dissect.

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In extraordinary detail, Taubman describes Khrushchev as cunning, conniving and freewheeling; a man of stubborn nature and primitive instincts. He is also well described as a self-made careerist with overwhelming ambition: at one moment, emotional and sentimental, the next, prideful, boorish and unyielding. One comes to see why Khrushchev was eventually ousted from the Kremlin. It was not just because his reformist bent failed to produce real reform, or that his secret speech to the 20th Party Congress was out of step with the hardliners in post-Stalinist Russia. Rather, he was deposed at the height of his power because even his most faithful subordinates regarded him as a loose cannon. It is hard to imagine that any government, no matter how despotic, could withstand any more irresponsible political adventures like the legendary ones over which Khrushchev presided: from his campaign in agriculture—which included his disastrous courtship and patronage of Trofym Lysenko (who ultimately destroyed biology in the USSR)—to provocative but wrongheaded approaches on how the USSR could achieve strategic advantage, which contributed significantly to the U-2 debacle and the Cuban Missile crisis.

Throughout, Taubman makes a great deal of Khrushchev's contradictory instincts and his duality—giving us psychological insights to interpret Khrushchev's most outlandish and barbaric acts, and emphasizing the guilt he carried with him in consequence. He suggests that Khrushchev was both a man bent on personal survival and one possessed by self-deception. After several hundred pages, however, Nikita Khrushchev does not seem as complicated as Taubman suggests. He comes across not only as a master politician during his meteoric rise, but as a master manipulator as well, knowing perfectly well what he was doing while he was doing it. The problem was that Khrushchev could not anticipate the repercussions of his actions over time, and no one had the courage to warn him. And as he gained ever more power—eventually absolute power—he spun out of control and became unstoppable, uncheckable and, of course, unpredictable.

KHRUSHCHEV'S rise to the top was not inevitable. Taubman shows us that as the USSR moved from the post-revolutionary period to the early Stalin years, there seemed to be no rhyme or reason for who survived and who did not. Much speculation has therefore been advanced about Khrushchev's role in the purges and his subsequent acquisition of power. In 1992, General Dimitri Volkogonov, Yeltsin's man in charge of the Russian archives, told me that I would not find anything much on Khrushchev's crimes in the archives. "Of all the Soviet leaders", Volkogonov told me, "he was the only one to destroy documents incriminating himself in the mass killings."

Despite the paucity of records on this score, Taubman manages a fairly damning indictment of Khrushchev's role in the Stalinist purges, as First Secretary of the Moscow Communist Party and then as First Party Secretary in Ukraine. For example: "On June 27, 1937, the Politburo set a quota of 35,000 'enemies' to be seized in Moscow and Moscow province, of whom 5,000 were to be shot. Khrushchev himself asked that 2,000 former kulaks who were now living in Moscow be liquidated in partial fulfillment of this total."

After returning to his native Ukraine as party boss in 1938, Khrushchev served on troikas—the infamous three-man committees—that had the ability to impose the death penalty without appeal. When asked if Khrushchev signed death warrants, Politburo mem-

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Eisenhower and Khrushchev at Camp David, 1959

ber V.M. Molotov replied: "Of course he did. . . . Otherwise he wouldn't have been moved up. Any intelligent man could see that." According to Molotov, Khrushchev sent "54,000 people to the next world as a member of the [Ukrainian] troika."

Taubman writes that the way Khrushchev survived being purged himself was "to outdo [everyone else] in carrying out Stalin's order[s]." In June 1938, for instance, at the 14th Ukrainian Party Congress, Khrushchev declared: "The struggle is still being carried out too weakly. . . . We must . . . mercilessly smash spies and traitors. And we shall smash them and finish them off." The next March in Moscow, Taubman adds, "[Khrushchev] boasted about having extirpated 'vermin' during his first year in Ukraine."

Khrushchev himself surmised that he might have survived the bloodiest years of Soviet history because Stalin liked him and relied on him for other reasons. He believed that he had pulled a "lucky lottery ticket" while at the Industrial Academy in the early 1920s. There he had come to the attention of Nadezhda Alliluyeva, Stalin's beautiful but modest wife, and "it was because of her that Stalin trusted me", he recalled in his memoirs.

Despite Stalin's goodwill, Khrushchev never intervened to save a friend or a trusted comrade from execution. Nor did he seek to avert the unjustified sentence that sent his daughter-in-law to the gulag. After serving prison time, she was relegated to a penniless life of shame and deprivation. Even as his authority grew, Khrushchev did nothing much to help her, even though he was convinced of her innocence. Taubman is probably on target, too, when he writes about Khrushchev's love of power and attention: "While the thirties were the worst of times for many of his compatriots, they were the best of times for him."

What, then, is one to make of Khrushchev's famous secret speech at the 20th Party Congress in 1956 in which he denounced Stalin's crimes? According to Taubman, Khrushchev "insisted he believed in Stalin and in the guilt of Stalin's imagined enemies. He denied he understood what was going on until after Stalin's death." At the same time, Taubman reasons that

> Khrushchev had powerful political reasons not to come clean. To go beyond his famous attack on Stalin in 1956 and admit his own guilt would have undermined the whole Soviet regime, let alone his own position. In addition, he felt a personal guilt so profound that he couldn't bear to admit it, even to himself.

While such psychological assessments are hard to resist, one could also make a powerful case that whoever came to power after Stalin's death would have had to denounce Stalinism within the decade, if only because of the sheer numbers of victims and victims' families, and evidence of his criminal behavior every-

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where. Unless the killings were to continue on the same scale, sooner or later some acknowledgement of Stalin's crimes would have been required for the continued sustainability of the system. As Taubman observes:

> Even Khrushchev's most Stalinist colleagues favored at least some de-Stalinization, if only to prevent their own power struggles from being resolved by violent means. Still, all feared their complicity could be used against them.

Less than ten months after his attempt to de-Stalinize, however, Khrushchev surprised Western and domestic audiences with pro-Stalinist sentiments. Taubman suggests that this was not just a tactical retreat but that it also "reflected Khrushchev's inner doubts." Maybe so; but it may also have been Khrushchev's brand of pragmatism, the sort of political calculation that inspired the secret speech in the first place.

Whatever the case, Khrushchev's revelations at the 20th Party Congress had a seismic effect in the USSR and clearly played a role in destabilizing Eastern Europe, contributing significantly to the Hungarian uprising. Other roller coaster rides were still to come....

KHRUSHCHEV'S capacity to set tops spinning in Soviet domestic affairs was matched in foreign policy, the U-2 incident of 1960 being a classic example. No sooner had the American spy plane been shot down than the Soviet premier worked himself up into a frenzy, turning the planned Paris summit into a bust. It is noteworthy that among the most clear-eyed about Khrushchev's motives for this have been the Russians, including some members of the Khrushchev family.

In 1990 I attended a conference in Moscow on the Eisenhower-Khrushchev years. During the meeting I suggested that Khrushchev had been manipulative when he fomented an international crisis out of the U-2 flights. Perhaps, I suggested, the Soviet premier wanted to use the incident as a way of making sure that Richard Nixon would not be elected as president six months later. My comments were derided by my Western colleagues at the conference, but our Soviet counterparts thought it utterly plausible that Khrushchev had used the affair for this purpose. Indeed, some were certain that it was Khrushchev's intention to embarrass fatally the President and his Vice President, who was at the time in the midst of a tight presidential campaign. At the same time, like many others in the West, I had assumed that the American administration had committed a provocative and unforgivable act in the eyes of the Soviets. But at the same conference one Russian researcher told me that the U-2 program had been nothing more than the unilateral expression of the 1955 Open Skies proposal, and that it had been a Soviet mistake not to seize on the American proposal at the time.

During the U-2 crisis, however, Khrushchev managed to position himself as the victim. He personally chose to make the U-2 incident a public spectacle, even though it would have been far more consistent with Soviet interests for him to keep the evidence in his pocket to use to his advantage at the summit. While he professed to be shocked and hurt when Eisenhower admitted knowledge of the flights, saying it was a betrayal of trust and friendship, he relished the opportunity to take advantage of it. Sovietologist Priscilla Johnson covered Khrushchev's public statements on the U-2: "Disappointment at a friendship gone wrong appeared to be the leitmotif of his remarks", she said. "Asked if he would still greet Eisenhower as his guest in the USSR, Khrushchev

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replied, 'What shall I say? Put yourself in my place and answer for me. . . . I am a man and I have human feelings.'"

I doubt how much trust and friendship really had to do with it. Khrushchev had known that there were U-2 flights over his country for some time, and had never lodged a formal protest. While the overflight on this occasion might have been too close to the upcoming Paris summit to be advisable, Khrushchev chose to make this a crisis for his own reasons—and not necessarily to shore up his sagging domestic support. According to Taubman, the vast majority of Khrushchev's advisors were unhappy with his handling of the matter. A candidate member of the Politburo snorted: "All I know is there have always been spies and there always will be." Other Soviet advisors thought Khrushchev decided to junk the summit because it would fail to resolve the Berlin issue and meet the political expectations he had set for it.

Apparently, Khrushchev decided to wreck the summit while in flight on his way to Paris. There, French President Charles de Gaulle, who had only recently seen the Soviet premier on an earlier trip to France, recalled that Khrushchev was "a character so changed in identity and meaning as to belong to the realm of Russian fiction." Even Khrushchev recalled, "I was all worked up, feeling combative and exhilarated. As my kind of simple folk would say, I was spoiling for a fight." After more than 45 minutes of tirade in which Khrushchev harangued Eisenhower for everything, he demanded that the conference be put off for at least six months, by which time, it was understood, Eisenhower would no longer be president.

The Americans were grim and aggravated, the British upset, and the French annoyed. In a wonderful passage, Taubman describes de Gaulle chiding Khrushchev for making too much of the overflights: "'Yesterday that satellite you launched just before you left Moscow to impress us over flew the sky of France eighteen times without my permission. How do I know that you do not have cameras aboard which are taking pictures of my country?'

"'As God sees me', replied the allegedly atheist Khrushchev, 'my hands are clean.'

"'Well then how did you take those pictures of the far side of the moon which you showed us with such justifiable pride?'

"'In that one I had cameras.'

"'Ah, in *that* one you had cameras'", de Gaulle replied.

In the end, the Soviets were the biggest losers in the U-2 affair. The U-2 flights had assured that the United States did not have to rely on Soviet bluster about their capabilities, thus making it possible to keep U.S. military expenditures in check. What did the Soviets get? "Khrushchev had broken with Eisenhower, ruined Soviet-West German relations (at least for the time being), alienated East German intellectuals, who had hoped for improved ties with the West, and encouraged Walter Ulbricht to continue scheming to create a confrontation over Berlin", Taubman tells us. Years later, Anastas Mikoyan, Khrushchev's closest associate, remarked: "Because our anti-aircraft missile finally accidentally shot down the U-2, Khrushchev engaged in inexcusable hysterics. . . . He simply spat on everyone. . . . He was guilty of delaying the onset of détente for fifteen years."

Perhaps Khrushchev realized he had overstepped the mark sooner rather than later. I was surprised to discover, on a visit to the Eisenhower Museum and Library, that as early as the fall of 1960 a high-level Soviet gift had been presented to President Eisenhower. Not long after, when John J. McCloy met Khrushchev at Putzinda in 1961, "Khrushchev talked to me about a possible visit of [Dwight D. Eisenhower] to

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the Soviet Union in spite of the effect of the Powers' incident on earlier plans for a visit", he wrote my father, John Eisenhower. "He was sure it would bring forward a strong indication of goodwill which the Soviet people and its leaders had toward your father." Of course, the trip never happened, and Khrushchev's marathon temper tantrum during the U-2 crisis was left, untempered, to erode confidence in his foreign policy abilities.

WILLIAM Taubman has written a wonderful book—fair, balanced and thoroughly researched. The facts of Khrushchev's political life notwithstanding, he has made it hard not to feel nostalgic for Nikita Khrushchev, a colorful, quotable and in some cases downright entertaining figure. We almost feel sorry for Nikita, a man who loved power, and fell, oh so far and fast, from the pinnacle of it. Sent into house arrest, Khrushchev was bereft and unsettled, a dissident of sorts, worrying about the KGB and complaining about his treatment. His health failing and his psychological state frayed from years of isolation and inactivity, he told Soviet playwright Nikolai Shatrov that his biggest regret was that, "My arms are up to the elbows in blood. That is the most terrible thing that lies in my soul."

I wonder how we would view Khrushchev today if the full Soviet archives had survived—and how much remorse he would have felt had he managed to stay in power. Nevertheless, he did express regret, and that in turn engenders our compassion. Who could not feel for a dying old man who contemplates eternity understanding that the brightest part of his own legacy was directly enabled by the darkest part of it? He rehabilitated the very victims he helped to purge. Even if he was an atheist, Khrushchev must have wondered in his last lonely days if making a bargain with the Devil was such a good idea after all. □

Susan Eisenhower is president of the Eisenhower Institute and a long-time analyst of U.S.-Russian relations. She is author of *Breaking Free* and *Mrs. Ike*.

'Til Your Well Runs Dry

Humanitarian care, alleviation of human suffering, and tolerance are important human values; but so are security, civil order, and fairness and consistency in the application of laws and rules—even if their appeal is less obvious until such a time as they are not available. Public discussion would gain immeasurably if it proceeded from a recognition of this.

—Owen Harries
The Australian (February 4, 2002)

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Letters

Power Steering:

In response to Walter McDougall's interesting review of my book, *The Ideas That Conquered the World* ("Power Steering", Winter 2002/03), I should like to make five points.

First, someone who has read the review but not the book would not be aware of the thesis of *The Ideas*. It is that the three great liberal ideas of peace, democracy and free markets dominate the world in the 21st century—not because they are practiced everywhere (obviously they are not) but rather in the sense that for the first time they have no serious rivals as formulas for organizing political and economic life. Whether the many countries that do not have genuinely democratic governments or effectively functioning free markets will acquire them is a question to which only the course of the 21st century will provide the answer. That is why, in a phrase McDougall quotes disapprovingly, I say in the Introduction (with tongue, of course, in cheek—but the humor is apparently too dry for some tastes) that the book will tell the reader "everything important about the twenty-first century except its outcome."

Second, McDougall says that I was "ambushed by Al-Qaeda [i.e. the attacks of September 11, 2001]" while my book was in press. I do not know, and McDougall does not say, where he obtained this piece of information, but it is false. *The Ideas That Conquered the World* went to press in June 2002, giving me ample time to reflect on the meaning of the events of September 11 and incorporate my conclusions into the book, conclusions that I have found no reason to revise since the book was published.

Third, McDougall writes that I "acknowledg[e] that the global triumph of liberalism will widen the gap between rich and poor." Wrong again; my view is the opposite of the one he imputes to me. The spread of liberal ideas and institutions, above all of working free markets and property- and rights-protecting governments, offers the best and perhaps the only hope for closing that gap, a point supported by a great deal of economic research.

The fourth point has to do with Europe. McDougall is right that I regard it as an attractive model that will help to promote, by its example, the three great liberal ideas. He disagrees because he finds Europe to be a terrible place, beset with "cultural demoralization, demographic decay, growing xenophobia and economic stagnation." For Europe to serve as a model for others does not, however, require that it be perfect (it isn't) or that the European Union be without flaws (readers of *The National Interest* will be familiar with these). Rather, the role I see for Europe requires that it be a more peaceful, prosperous and democratic place than it was for most of its history and than most other parts of the world are today. And anyone who doubts that either or both of these propositions are true is in need, to put it as neutrally as possible, of a deeper familiarity with European history and/or a wider acquaintance with the world beyond Europe and North America.

Finally, McDougall says *The Ideas That Conquered the World* is "muddled" and cites as evidence the similes employed in the book.

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(Several of those he lists as similes in fact appear in the book as metaphors.) Just why McDougall believes that the use of these two venerable literary devices is a sign of muddle I confess I cannot imagine. But if, for reasons he does not reveal, there is a connection between them, this puts me in extraordinarily distinguished (if muddled) literary and intellectual company.

MICHAEL MANDELBAUM
School of Advanced
International Studies,
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Washington, DC

McDougall replies:

Having suffered from genuinely mean, ignorant, and far more critical book reviews than mine of *The Ideas That Conquered the World*, I both appreciate Mandelbaum's dismay and admire the grace of his rebuttal. Indeed, I believe his five points, if read together with my review, provide a thorough adumbration of the strengths and vulnerabilities inherent in so ambitious a book. For those who have read only Mandelbaum's letter and not my review, however, I must iterate that I am a historian and the bulk of the review disputed the author's interpretation of history. None of his five points dispute my disputation. To be sure, the author zings me by suggesting that anyone doubting his propositions about Europe lacks familiarity with that continent's past. But the zing misses the mark. Aside from the fact that I have taught European history for thirty years, my review asserts in the bluntest possible language that the reason Europe became peaceful and prosperous was the furious power of nations rooted in liberal British traditions to outperform totalitarians in hot and cold war. Does anyone think Europe would be the irenic spot it is today absent American power and will? Does anyone think Europe, in its current disarmed and demoralized state, likely to persuade (much less force) the rogues and great powers of Asia to embrace the EU model? Only someone unacquainted with history might so imagine.

The Unipolar Moment Revisited:

Charles Krauthammer's lively article ("The Unipolar Moment Revisited", Winter 2002/03) uses the Gulf War as the best recent example of how the cultivation of coalitions hampers U.S. interests. I would argue, however, that another reason, having nothing to do with the coalition, was more important. Bush (and his senior advisors) all believed Saddam would be overthrown from within. Therefore, there was little reason to run the risks cited by Scowcroft (the coalition), Baker (Gorbachev might be overthrown), or Powell (casualties) by marching to Baghdad.

Saddam might very well have been toppled had the President controlled the military end-game rather than leaving it to Schwarzkopf and, for that matter, Scowcroft. The destruction of some of Saddam's best divisions and the end to his military mobility would have presented the Sunni tribes with their worst nightmare: a victorious Kurdish and Shi'a advance with revenge uppermost in their minds. Only the Americans could have prevented that and our price would (or should) have been Saddam. But this was missed because the war was ended too soon, allowing some Republican Guard divisions to escape. And, as Scowcroft has admitted, he did not instruct Schwarzkopf to destroy Iraq's helicopter fleet when Saddam violated the truce.

Bush paid little attention to all this because he had his own Vietnam syndrome, to wit: that the United States had been defeated in Vietnam partly through civilian micromanagement. He, unlike Lyndon Johnson, would leave it to the generals. He did. They left Saddam in place.

Thus, the U.S. "decision" not to remove Saddam was more a lesson in a presidential misjudgment compounded by civil-military relations than a coalition that restricted U.S. actions short of the desired goal.

HARVEY SICHERMAN
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The Scandal of U.S.-Saudi Relations:

Kudos to Daniel Pipes for "The Scandal of U.S.-Saudi Relations" (Winter 2002/03). Having taught at Saudi universities for two academic years (1984–85 at King Faisal University in Hofuf and 1998–99 at King Saud University in Riyadh), I can corroborate many of Pipes' assertions and findings. I would add only two caveats.

The assertion that "non-military [American] women working for the U.S. government in Saudi Arabia are not expected to wear an *abaya* in Saudi Arabia" is not entirely true, regardless of what CNN might have to say on the subject. How many CNN reporters know Riyadh from a hole in their head? When they sign on for a full academic year in the Kingdom, then maybe they will know whereof they speak. Whether or not American women are exempted by their American superiors is immaterial and entirely beside the point. American women do *not* walk about in public, in malls, in grocery stores, on the streets of Saudi cities without an *abaya*, unless they wish to court serious trouble from the *mutawa*, who cruise about in military Land Rovers with one Saudi soldier driving and another Saudi soldier riding shotgun to back up their liberal use of the heavy stick.

Regardless of Pipes' allegations of venality on the part of American ambassadors, industrialists, etc., who have retired from Saudi service, the *real* reason for America's kowtowing to everything Saudi is oil—our need of it and our perceived need of it.

We should never have done business with the Saudis or granted them diplomatic recognition in the first place. When SOCAL's Lloyd Hamilton and Ibn Saud's finance minister Abdallah Al-Sulaiman signed the first Saudi oil concession in Jeddah on May 29, 1933, we Americans made our bed, and we have been sleepwalking in and out of it ever since.

NEDRA DYER MCCLOUD
Lubbock, TX

Pipes replies:

I thank Professor McCloud for the kudos and her two comments. I think she and I do agree on her first point, for I was not asserting that American women go *abaya*-less but that the U.S. government does not expect them to wear this article of clothing.

The second point, however, is a true difference of outlook. Yes, oil is important but there are plenty of other oil-producing states, and toward none of them does one find anything like the obsequiousness that so regularly characterizes the U.S. approach to Saudi Arabia. I am convinced that the culture of corruption documented in my article accounts for this difference.

A Papier-Maché Fortress:

I am a great admirer of Paul Schroeder, and have learned much from his historical studies and his interventions in public debate. I was disappointed, however, by his negative review of Philip Bobbitt's brilliant and provocative book, *The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace and the Course of History* ("A Papier-Maché Fortress", Winter 2002/03).

In his review Schroeder contradicts himself. He says, in effect, that it is impossible to write a book like *The Shield of Achilles*, and that Bobbitt has done it badly. Well, if something cannot be done at all, it makes no sense to say it should have been done better, and Schroeder's review should have been only a sentence or a paragraph in length.

Here is Schroeder on the alleged near-impossibility of writing an interpretative history of world politics: "Sixty pages of notes and eleven of bibliography may seem impressive, but the reading required to undergird so sweeping a reinterpretation of history as Bobbitt offers would have to be at least ten times as great and yet also more discriminating—a nearly superhuman demand, to be sure, but one that is inseparable from the undertaking." Schroeder does not explain why "nearly superhuman" rather than human standards should be employed to evalu-

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ate an individual's achievement in this field, but not in other areas of academic endeavor, to say nothing of the arts, sports and cuisine. (One wonders whether the same superhuman standard of achievement should be applied to reviewers.)

But Schroeder is inconsistent. Having suggested that Bobbitt's project is impossible of realization, he then concedes the possibility of its success by criticizing Bobbitt's work in detail. The disproportion between Bobbitt's offenses, real and alleged, and the punishment meted out by Schroeder is striking.

The few genuine factual errors that Schroeder finds, like the statement that more Poles lived under Prussian and Austrian than under Russian rule after 1815, are not the kind which undermine either Bobbitt's argument or his credentials to write the book he is writing (as distinct, say, from a history of the Polish partitions). To brandish a minor error concerning a subsidiary topic as proof of an author's utter, lamentable, unforgivable incompetence is a tried-and-true technique of hostile reviewers, but it should be beneath the dignity of an eminent scholar.

Most of Schroeder's criticisms are of definitions or concepts, not factual mistakes. For example, he is free to object to Bobbitt's characterization of Switzerland as a "state-nation", but this is a question of terminology, not of fact or falsehood. The term "nation" is routinely used to refer, not only to an ethnic group with or without a state of its own (the usage preferred by scholars like Walker Connor and Anthony D. Smith), but also to any sovereign polity or distinct territory or "country" (the United Nations, one could argue, should really be called the United States). Swiss citizens visiting the United States who record their nationality as "Swiss" might be surprised to learn that they are guilty of revealing "the vagueness and vacuity of certain core concepts."

Many scholars in the overlapping fields of diplomatic history, international law, international relations and political economy find concepts like "the short 20th century", the Westphalian system, the wars of religion and the revolutions in military affairs helpful, while others think that one or all of these categories are misconceived. Like all such concepts, the original categories that Bobbitt proposes, including the market-state and the Long War of 1914–90, are not true or false so much as they are plausible or implausible, as Schroeder himself admits: "Anyone may choose to see this period as one long war over this central issue if one wishes." Schroeder proceeds to state his own rival interpretation (the German War of 1914–45?) as though it were a rebuttal: "In both wars, the central issue was finally solved once and for all in 1945. In the most important sense, therefore, 1914–90 was not one Long War." Schroeder may think he has graveled Bobbitt, but most readers of his review, I suspect, will find themselves disconcerted by Schroeder's *odium theologicum*.

The harsh tone of Schroeder's review essay surprised me, because *The Shield of Achilles* differs from most attempts at interpretations of world political history in ways that ought to win the approval of historians—at least those who are not defending territory claimed by their guild. Most "metanarratives" of world history are deterministic schemes devised by social scientists, like the IR theorists whose torture of history Schroeder has justly criticized elsewhere. Bobbitt, however, believes that history is the result of many contingent factors, not the working out of some quasi-natural process or providential scheme. Even his refreshing and allusive style, which Schroeder dismisses as "elliptical exposition", signals Bobbitt's adherence to the classical view that history is a human art akin to hermeneutics and literature, not a "science of society" modeled on physics or biology.

I am not sure what the perfect book on the evolution of the world order in recent centuries, written by a "nearly superhuman" author, would look like. But I am convinced

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it would resemble *The Shield of Achilles* more than most other efforts in this field.

MICHAEL LIND
New America Foundation
Washington, DC

Schroeder replies:

I have decided not to respond substantively to Michael Lind's letter. I understand his reaction and the points he makes, and expected my verdict to be a minority one. I do have answers to his points, but giving them would require far more than the space available, and I consider it better, since I had ample space to express my views, to let the other side be heard. Should he or anyone else wish to hear more on the grounds for my unfavorable judgment, my e-mail address is: pschroed@uiuc.edu, and I will reply to serious queries as promptly as possible.

A Matter of Writing Life and Death:

Michael P. McDonald's otherwise fine review of two recent efforts to chronicle the life of Primo Levi ("A Matter of Writing Life and Death", Winter 2002/03) was marred by the gratuitous reference to Ernst Jünger. Granted, Ernst Jünger's neo-romantic and anti-democratic early writings do little to illicit sympathy; nonetheless, his explication of the Great War, along with his critique of representative democracy, was quite compelling to many disillusioned Weimar Germans. Jünger's book *In Stahlgewittern* (1921) was the first successful attempt to render the experience of total war into language, bringing the detached gaze of the scientific observer to bear on the face of battle.

As the 1930s dawned and the Weimar Republic fecklessly attempted to deal with the disastrous consequences of the Depression, Jünger's thought became more radical. The zenith of Jünger's anti-bourgeois theorizing can be found in *Der Arbeiter* (1932), where he made two fundamental points: (1) technology leads to the transvaluation of all values and the transformation of societal institutions, and (2) technology is not neutral, but is rather a force that mobilizes the world by altering, at root, the way man perceives his environment. Moreover, Jünger believed that any attempt to place such observations within a normative framework inhibited the ability to explain what was actually happening in the world. Thus, his analysis is unconstrained by ethical considerations, not in the name of evil, but in the name of science.

Jünger's politics are more difficult to define than McDonald suggests. He consistently rebuffed Nazi overtures, declining in 1928 to be included on the Nazi Reichstag list, and, after the January 1933 elections, he refused both a seat in the Reichstag and election to the Nazified Prussian Academy of Poetry. Jünger, anti-democrat though he was, also published the only genuine indictment of the Nazi regime from within Germany itself. His *Auf den Marmorklippen*, completed just days before the onset of World War II, allegorically condemned the barbarism of the Nazi state. This novella marked Jünger's public break with the regime and a distinct change in the trajectory of his life and thought.

By 1941, Jünger was a reluctant officer in the Wehrmacht busily working on *Der Friede*, a treatise designed to establish a framework for postwar peace. This work, published in 1943, and approved by officers involved in the events of July 20, 1944 did not reach an English audience until 1949, when it was published as *The Peace*. Its call for a European Union has, for the most part, become a reality, and its contention that the war was, at its core, a conflict of theological visions found an echo in General Douglas MacArthur's remarks aboard the U.S.S. *Missouri*, pursuant to the signing of the formal instrument of surrender by Japanese authorities.

My purpose here is not to impugn McDonald. Ernst Jünger was a complex man of paradoxes. Some of his writings were indeed reprehensible, yet parts of his *oeuvre* make a significant contribution to our literary canon. It would be unfortunate to dismiss Jünger with the simplistic appellation "fascist."

DAVID FRANKLIN
Greeley, CO

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Fate and Freedom in History:

Compliments to John Patrick Diggins for exposing the remarkable blind spots and double standards of Eric Foner, a leading figure among the many American historians who have devoted their career to documenting the evils of American society and history ("Fate and Freedom in History", Fall 2002).

Foner also personifies the often overlooked (and sometimes vigorously denied) continuity between the Old and the New Left. Most obvious, these movements share a visceral rejection of American society and the belief that capitalism is the source of all evil in the world. They also have in common a sentimental idealization of the communist movement in the United States and refuse to acknowledge that the Communist Party of the United States routinely and unhesitatingly subordinated itself to Soviet policies and interests.

However, unlike most New Leftists, Foner harbors a barely-concealed reverence for the Soviet Union that he imbibed early in life in his family. In this regard he can only be compared to the venerable representative of the very old Left, Eric Hobsbawm, who too clings to his ancient pro-Soviet loyalties.

The adamant refusal of "revisionist" historians such as Foner to re-examine their own convictions is yet another demonstration of the emotional roots of political beliefs found across the entire political spectrum. Foner remains in the grip of less than fully rational sentiments which predispose him to embrace double standards: all benefit of doubt flows to the Soviet system (and others which claim "socialist" credentials), while all critical impulses obsessively target the United States and capitalism. As Diggins shows, Foner is genuinely incapable of drawing any conclusions from the fall of Soviet communism that may cast doubt on his world-view and call into question the verities of Marxism.

To be sure, it is always difficult and uncomfortable to reassess and revise long-held, deep-seated beliefs. There is especially little incentive to undertake such soul-searching when a self-sufficient subculture of kindred spirits surrounds and supports the individual in question, fortifying him against doubt. The many distinctions showered on Eric Foner cannot but confirm his world-view and political predisposition. Not only historians but our entire academic culture has, since the late 1960s, nourished and rewarded the kinds of beliefs Foner represents with exceptional clarity and no hint of self-doubt. □

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Letters to the Editor

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Continental Divides

Josef Joffe

A GERMAN chancellor openly defying the United States? Accusing George W. Bush of "adventurism" and hurling an ever louder "no" across the Atlantic—a "*nein*" to war against Saddam under any circumstances? During the Cold War, America's trustiest ally would not have dreamed of insurrection, not while Soviet shock troops were ensconced 25 miles outside of Hamburg, whence I write. Thereon hangs a tale that transcends yesteryear's transatlantic troubles of the "Whither NATO?" variety. It is the story of bipolarity lost—the first chapter, not the last.

The Atlantic Alliance has been dying a slow death ever since Christmas day 1991, when the Soviet Union committed suicide by dissolution. Having won the Cold War, the Alliance lost its central purpose and began to crumble like a bridge no longer in use—slowly, almost invisibly. In 1994 the departure of the last Russian troops from Central Europe signaled that the capitulation was complete. The Europeans saw their existential dependence on the United States lifted, the latter its lesser but still vital need for a European *glacis*.

Only one year later, as the wars of Yugoslav succession began in earnest, NATO as quasi-supranational army was already defunct, for those who fought with the United States were but a loose coalition of willing and able. The most obvious watershed was 9/11. It was not that the Europeans withheld fealty from the United States; indeed, as the Alliance invoked Article 5, numerous NATO members contributed to the American cause. The deeper message of 9/11 and the Afghan campaign was one of systemic transformation.

Above all, the United States demonstrated a surfeit of autonomous power that finally rendered explicit the transition to unipolarity. Moving unopposed, and several military-technological orbits above the rest, it needed merely assistants, not allies. And so Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld would famously proclaim that the mission determines the coalition and not the other way around. This spelled the unheralded demise of NATO as we knew it—as a community that would either act together or not at all. Alliance was now formally *ad hoc* and *à la carte*.

Or even less, as the run-up to the second Iraq war would demonstrate. History and theory have always predicted more than just the death of alliances as the price of victory. The larger warning is that the international system abhors imbalances, that power begets counter-power. Surreptitiously, balancing against the

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United States had already begun in the latter 1990s when Washington regularly found itself alone and on the other side of such issues as the ABM Treaty, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the International Criminal Court (ICC).

Au fond, all of these duels were not about principle, but power. If the United States wanted to scratch the ABM Treaty in favor of missile defense, Europe, China and Russia strenuously sought to uphold it on the sound assumption that a better defense makes for a better offense, hence for richer U.S. military options than under conditions of vulnerability. A less-than-complete test ban would also enhance U.S. options by allowing the development of smaller, hence more useable, nuclear weapons. Naturally, Europe *et al.* insisted on adherence while the United States balked. And so with the ICC. In the end, even the Clinton team correctly understood the underlying thrust of the ICC. Claiming the right to pass judgment on military interventions by prosecuting malfeasants *ex post facto*, the Court might deter and thus constrain America's forays abroad.

Not to put too fine a point on it, Europe and others cherished this expansion of multilateral oversight precisely for the reason that the United States opposed it. Great powers loathe international institutions they cannot dominate; lesser nations like them the way the Lilliputians liked their ropes on Gulliver. The name of the game was balancing on the sly, and both sides knew it, though it was conducted in the name of international law, not of raw power.

The contest turned from jujitsu to wrestling in the summer of 2002—once the Bush Administration began to prepare the world for a second round against Saddam Hussein. The first clarion call was Gerhard Schröder's indictment of American "adventurism." It was followed by a categorical refusal to join the American effort—not even under a UN mandate. In the regional government campaigns in Hesse and Lower Saxony in January 2003, the Chancellor went one worse by threatening to vote against a war resolution in the Security Council.[1]

To argue that Schröder tapped into the reservoir of German pacifism to save his sinking campaign is true, but it misses the deeper point. Spawned by strategic imperative, the Federal Republic was practically a child of Truman's and Eisenhower's America. No German chancellor, even of the Left, would have dared play politics with the American connection while Soviet armies were poised to lunge across the Fulda Gap. Better to lose the elections than to lose the Americans.[2] That Schröder chose to save himself and not the American tie provides the most vivid proof of bipolarity lost and dependence unhinged.

Indeed, the demise of bipolarity abroad translated immediately into its collapse "at home" in Germany. For fifty years, there had always been an "American party" in the system—the Christian Democratic and Liberal (Free Democratic) right—and a victorious one, to boot. Yet this time, its leaders did not rush to the defense of the United States; unlike the Adenauers and Kohls, they merely squirmed and waffled. It may be true that all politics is local, but it helps to have a permissive international environment on your side.

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[1] In January 2003 Germany entered the Security Council as a rotating member; in February, it became chairman.

[2] It is instructive to recall the fate of Chancellor Helmut Schmidt (1974–82), who stuck to the deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles in the face of his Social Democrats' opposition. No longer in control of his own party, he was abandoned by his Free Democratic coalition partners, who bolted to the Christian Democrats in 1982 and helped to elect Helmut Kohl as chancellor.

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The French, an Economy power that always tries to fly Business, played a subtler game. From de Gaulle onward, they have sought to capitalize on their nuisance value. Patiently and skillfully, they went up against the United States in the Security Council to execute (with Russia and China) a supple balancing strategy. The purpose was to entangle Gulliver in the ropes of great power diplomacy. And entangle they did—when the United States consented to prosecute its war against Saddam by way of the UN. The fruit of France's labor was Resolution 1441: dire threats against Iraq, but no *automaticity* of force; "serious consequences", but UN inspections first.

When Hans Blix returned from his first forays with ambiguous reports in hand, France's stand predictably hardened. The signal, repeated by Moscow and Beijing, was "more inspections"—on the plausible expectation that the approach of spring and summer would close America's window of military opportunity and postpone an attack *sine die*. Compared to Schröder's foot-stomping, this was a far more subtle performance, but the underlying thrust was the same. The objective was to constrain and contain the United States that had mutated from "last remaining superpower" to "hyperpower" and "empire."

And why not, given that America's might was no longer stalemated by the Soviet Union? The French and the Germans (as well as the Russians and the Chinese) acted as if they feared the "hyperpower" more than Saddam's imperialist reflexes and his vehicles of mass destruction. And well they might in this new era of Gulliver Unbound. Assume an American victory that is swift and sustainable, intimidates rather than inflames Arabs and Iranians, relieves dependence on dangerous clients such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, and finally loosens up the pathologies of Arab political culture that spawned Al-Qaeda. Such an outcome would install the United States as arbiter over the Middle East, over its oil and politics. This prospect can hardly enthuse the lesser players, for it would certify what is already the case *de facto*: the global primacy of the United States. So it should not come as a surprise that America's rivals and quondam allies would try to balance against Number 1 by enmeshing him in the ropes of institutional dependence. These are the ways of world politics.

HOW WILL this story of bipolarity lost unfold? As this issue goes to print amid the rumbles of war, we cannot know. But we do know that the past is not over yet. Suddenly, on January 30, those who would fashion a diplomatic axis against the United States found themselves confronted with an equally soft alliance against themselves—when Britain, Spain, Italy, Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Denmark and Portugal ever so politely told Messrs. Chirac and Schröder to back off.

In diplomatese, the message said of Iraq: "Our goal is to . . . ensure that this regime gives up its weapons of mass destruction. Our governments have a common responsibility to face this threat." Decoded, however, the missive read: "We are not amused that France and Germany are trying to gang up on the United States. Saddam must be disarmed, by force if need be." Repeated more harshly by the "Vilnius 10" on February 5 ("We are prepared to contribute to an international coalition to enforce . . . the disarmament of Iraq"), the message was that 18 European countries (from "A" like Albania to "S" like Slovenia) were not ready to take on the "hyperpower"—and even less ready to submit to the French and Germans as would-be gang leaders.

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The implication for U.S. policy is ambiguous. On the one hand, it has lost its former "Continental sword", Germany. Berlin's escape from dependence was the most vivid illustration of system transformation, for the French have opposed the United States in the past without ever completely slamming the door on bandwagoning. True to style, they dispatched their aircraft carrier *Charles de Gaulle* toward the Suez Canal while simultaneously entrapping Washington in the corridors of the UN.

On the other hand, the United States may have gained a large group of new playmates, ranging from Britain to the Black Sea. The Euro 8 and the Vilnius 10 are a motley bunch. Some of them resent the Franco-German tandem's claim to leadership, others would rather depend for their security on a remote superpower than on weaker and nearby neighbors—an urge that seems to increase in direct proportion to geographical proximity to Russia. At any rate, the first victim of the impending war against Iraq has been Europe's pretension to a common foreign and security policy. The game is now wide open for balance and maneuver, and for all comers. As the broadsides of the 18 showed, the United States can play this game, too.

Yet such a strategy—balancing *à la* Britain—has not been America's greatest forte. Nor will it take care of the underlying dynamics of the post-bipolar world. Great power generates counter-power, for, to paraphrase Freud's remark about biology, the anatomy of the international system *is* its destiny—if not sooner, then later. Is there an escape from this dour verdict of history and theory? Perhaps—if America learned to soften the edge of its overwhelming power with the soothing balm of trust. In his State of the Union Address of 2003, George W. Bush did not hold out much hope for such an escape when he asserted that, in the end, "the course of this nation does not depend on the decisions of others."

Real empires routinely crush their rivals. But America is only an "imperial republic", as Raymond Aron mused decades ago. Democracies, as his compatriot Alexis de Tocqueville reminded us, are fickle and inward-bound. Presumably, they pay "decent respect to the opinions of mankind" because they cherish that respect for themselves. They are better off leading by heeding because they cannot sustain the brutish ways of Rome for any length of time. There is also the practical matter of who will pacify postwar Iraq if not a significant part of the international community. Who will help in the war against terror and proliferation? For such wars cannot be won *tous seul*, not to speak of the never-ending campaigns against protectionism, drugs and overpopulation.

Unwilling to conquer, this "empire" still needs order beyond its borders. The objective is the right "milieu", as Arnold Wolfers put it forty years ago. To achieve it, America must sometimes use force; to sustain it, however, the sword is not enough—and it is, in the end, too costly to use too often. To build the right coalitions for peace, the United States must not forsake the "co" in "coalition"—as in "consensus" and "cooperation." As Gulliver learned, it is hard enough to live even as a friendly giant among the pygmies. It is even harder to escape their slings and arrows when the giant's strength is untempered by self-restraint. For power, as this last quarter shows, shall be balanced. □

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"IF THE LOGIC OF American empire is unappealing, it is not at all clear that the alternatives are that much more attractive."

—Stephen Peter Rosen

"THE NEW STRATEGY is somewhat provocative, but it is deliberately so. It must be provocative if it is to foster the painful worldwide debate that must occur in order to condition the international community to think hard about new dangers."

—Philip Zelikow

"THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION's rhetoric of preventive war does not reflect a sober appreciation of the American predicament, but instead echoes point by point the disastrous strategic ideas of earlier keepers of imperial order."

—Jack Snyder

"AMERICA'S ACTIVE role in world affairs has not been a quest for power but a reflection of it."

—Gideon Rose

"HOWEVER 'OLD TIME' their theology may sound to Westerners, and whatever they may think of themselves, radical EuroIslamists are clearly more a post-modern phenomenon than a pre-modern one."

—Olivier Roy

"AL-QAEDA HAS ADOPTED our opposition to conquest and pushed it to its logical conclusion: can't conquer, so kill."

—Anna Simons

"THE RANGE WITHIN which finite, imperfect and largely ignorant human beings can enjoy freedom is not unbounded. Yet it is a domain altogether real and precious, worth dying to protect."

—Michael Novak

"FRANCE IS AN ECONOMY power that always tries to fly Business."

—Josef Joffe

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